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Results of Russian, Central Asian Summit in Moscow Viewed

Efforts To Settle Conflict Arouse 'Skepticism'

MK1008112293 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Aug 93 pp 1, 3

[Igor Rotar report under general headline: "The Results of Discussion of the Tajik Problem in Moscow are Not Unequivocal. Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, and Karimov Save the Ruble Space. Dushanbe is Ready to Fight Opposition to the Last Russian Frontier Guard"]

[Text] The roles of the main protagonists since the 1992 Almaty summit have remained basically the same. Just as before, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have shown an interest in the speediest possible termination of the Tajik crisis. Turkmen leader Saparmurad Niyazov, true to his policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, avoided discussion of the Tajik problem.

Somewhat unexpected has been a shift of emphasis in Islam Karimov's tactics. Known for his dislike of Islamists and his assistance to the present Dushanbe leaders in coming to power, the Uzbek president, together with other conference participants, condemned his erstwhile proteges for their unwillingness to begin a dialogue with the opposition. Apparently, the pragmatist Karimov, who knows the situation in Tajikistan not from hearsay reports (the Uzbek army is giving direct aid to Tajik military forces), is beginning to doubt Dushanbe's ability to control the situation in the republic. In this event, in order to safeguard his motherland from the Tajik disease, Karimov simply must revise his policy in that republic.

Like last year, the peaceful initiative came from Russia: It was proposed that the conflicting sides sit down at the negotiating table. True, during this time the rivals have had time to swap places. In November 1992, representatives of the Islamic democratic opposition were in the government while the rebel detachment of "anti-Islamists" (the present rulers of Dushanbe) were storming the republic's capital. At that time, Moscow was inviting the "Islamic democrats" to moderate their appetites and agree to the creation of a state council in Tajikistan where representatives of all parties and regions in the republic would participate on an equal basis. At present, in fact, the same is being proposed to the new victors: dialogue with the opposition, while Tashkent is also suggesting general elections with the participation of all strata of the population.

The entire experience of the three-year confrontation in the republic shows that the conflicting sides are not capable of a political compromise. Talks in Tajikistan have been held more than once. And each time, after exchanging the kisses that are traditional in the East, the opponents sign the requisite documents. Literally on the following day, however, war breaks out with even greater intensity. The situation is even more complicated by the fact that both conflicting sides are very heterogeneous in their composition: There are a number of semiautonomous groups that quite often are only nominally accountable to the Tajik leadership or the opposition leaders. Neither should it be forgotten that in Tajikistan, political confrontation is indistinguishable from regional confrontation, and in a republic where the number of victims in the ongoing civil war is running into tens of thousands, the custom of vendetta is still alive. Regardless of politicians, Tajiks from different regions will continue to settle scores among themselves.

Other results of the Moscow meeting are also fairly ephemeral. The participants decided to consider the Tajik-Afghan border as part of the general CIS border, and they want to beef up its protection. One can hardly doubt the fact, however, that the main restraining force on the Tajik-Afghan border is the Russian army. The transfer of this frontier to Russia's jurisdiction early last fall, which the border guards were looking forward to, has failed to produce the desired results.

After the border was given a new status, incursions from Afghanistan did not diminish. The border troops press center's officers in Tajikistan have repeatedly stressed that it is unrealistic to fully cover the border in the present circumstances, and therefore it could have been predicted with certainty that joint protection of the border would not lead to the expected result.

Efforts to achieve success in settling the conflict on an international plane arouse certain skepticism. Appeals to the UN secretary general and attempts to win Riyadh, Teheran, Islamabad, and Kabul over to their side, although vital, have little effect. As Kabul has frequently stated, it cannot control the situation in northern Afghanistan. Even having found understanding among the leadership of influential Islamic countries, Russia and leaders of the Central Asian states cannot stop aid to the Tajik insurgents from nongovernmental Muslim organizations sympathizing with them.

And yet the results of the meeting cannot be assessed as zero. For one participant, namely Russia, the summit has proven to be fairly productive. Acting as a peacemaker in the various hot spots of the former USSR, Moscow is trying at the same time to increase its influence in these regions. What has happened in Moscow seems to have confirmed a prediction made by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's commentator Vitaliy Portnikov (6 August) that "the events in Tajikistan will prod Russia and the Asian republics toward each other." Indeed, the wish by the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to stay in the ruble zone, Nazarbayev's proposal about the creation of CIS coalition collective security forces, the fairly beneficial agreement between Moscow and Almaty on the use of Baykonur (the space center will remain off limits to Ankara, Teheran, and Islamabad), and finally, the sensational appeal to the CIS heads of state to set up an economic union confirm that the central Asian leaders, with the exception of Turkmenistan, are still inclined to orient themselves toward their northern neighbor and not toward their new influential friends from the Organization for Economic Development: Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

Adamishin Comments

MK1008114293 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Aug 93 p 1

[Vera Kuznetsova report under the "Summit" rubric under the general headline: "The Results of discussion of Tajik Problem in Moscow Are Not Unequivocal. Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, Karimov Rescue Common Ruble Space. Dushanbe Is Ready To Fight With the Opposition to the Last Russian Border Guard"]

[Text] Stances have been agreed upon in advance. This is the reason why the "Oriental Summit" at the Kremlin—the meeting of the leaders of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a delegation of Turkmenistan (as observer)—ended in the unilateral signing of four documents. Three of them deal with the situation in Tajikistan and on its border, and the fourth concerns the meeting of CIS chiefs on 7 September in Moscow to consider an economic union.

At the first stage—and the meeting in Moscow may be seen as the beginning of the military and political settlement of the conflict on the Tajik-Afghan border—the leaders managed to agree upon and, most importantly, to legally formalize three ways to resolve the problem. The Statement on Measures To Stabilize the Tajik-Afghan Border and the Declaration on the Inviolability of Borders (the summits' final documents) state that the Tajik-Afghan border is to be seen as a CIS border and protected collectively. Furthermore, all the five states undertook to take part in the buildup of the border troops' presence there, even Uzbekistan, which, having its own, hitherto calm border with Afghanistan, would not accept a direct involvement (by sending people) in the conflict. After Russia finally put the question point-blank, however: either all, or not me—the Central Asian leaders fully accepted (or to some extent were forced to accept) the plan proposed by Boris Yeltsin. The plan's second provision (after "concerted effort on an equal basis to provide security" of the CIS borders) was a call for a direct dialogue between the Tajik authorities and the opposition, including all its parts, without any selective approach. In the statement signed by the leaders, however, the word "opposition" was replaced by "various political forces," which did little to change the essence of the document. This is why Tajikistan Supreme Soviet Chairman Emomali Rakhmonov seemed gloomy. Both during and after the summit, the leaders of the other four states were not sparing in their harsh assessments of the current Tajik leadership's political mistakes, which have compounded the border conflict. Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov said bluntly: "Rakhmonov and Abdulladzhanov have to step across themselves." In this situation, Rakhmonov was forced to agree to hold a version of a "roundtable" in the republic. The presidents of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan offered their respective capitals for the forum. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin said immediately after the Moscow talks that political forces in Tajikistan expressed support for such negotiations.

The third most important decision of the summit was to draw the international community's attention to the regional conflict that threatens a complete redivision of the world. Anatoliy Adamishin said in an interview for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the subject:

[Adamishin] One of the Moscow summit's main objectives was to influence Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia so that they help us find political solutions, and nearly all these states have officially agreed with us. We have already achieved a small success: today (10 August) there will be a meeting between the foreign ministers of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Later, a meeting of the two presidents may be considered.

[Kuznetsova] Why did you abandon a quadrilateral meeting including Russia and Uzbekistan?

[Adamishin] I do not think we did. Maybe an expanded meeting will take place as well. It has been put off thus far, because bilateral talks are of major importance, and after all it is a border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. I think that a dialogue in this "format" is more productive. The Afghans have assured us that they are ready to assist in resolving the conflict. I have received reports from Tajikistan that the emphasis on a political settlement at the Moscow summit has helped ease tensions on the border.

[Kuznetsova] What response do you expect to receive to the appeal of the Group of 5 leaders to the United Nations general secretary?

[Adamishin] We are expecting assistance from the United Nations—that a special representative, who has already been assigned, be sent in, and also humanitarian aid, observers, and peacekeeping forces; and if they are unwilling to send theirs, they may give this status to the CIS forces that protect the border.

'Official Announcement' on Results

PM1008125593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Aug 93 First Edition p 7

["Official Announcement on Results of Meeting of Heads of State of Central Asia and Russia" under the general heading: "Conference of Leaders of States of Central Asia and Russia"]

[Text] A conference of the heads of state of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was held in the Kremlin 7 August. It discussed the problem of ensuring the inviolability of the CIS borders, and in particular questions of normalizing the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. The meeting resulted in the adoption of a Declaration on the Inviolability of Borders and a statement concerning measures to step up protection of the Tajik-Afghan border. This was announced by the Russian Federation president's Press Service.

The adopted documents stress that ensuring the inviolability of the borders of the states which have signed the declaration is regarded by them as a sphere of joint vitally important interests and is implemented both multilaterally and bilaterally. And the sides act on the understanding that

national accord in the states signatory to the declaration is the most important condition for security on the borders and that, in order to achieve internal stability, democratic institutions and human rights guarantees must be strengthened.

Having noted that the states participating in the conference regard the Tajik-Afghan border as part of the common CIS border, the heads of state discussed and adopted specific decisions to step up protection of the Tajik-Afghan border.

Attaching particular importance to political settlement measures, the conference participants declared their determination to adopt, in the event of continued armed attacks on the Republic of Tajikistan from outside, the requisite commensurate retaliatory measures in accordance with the Treaty on the Collective Security of the CIS Countries.

The conference participants declared that they expect the Afghan side to adopt immediate measures to prevent Afghan territory being used for hostile actions against neighboring states.

The foreign ministers of the states participating in the conference have expressed their concern at the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border in an address to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 11 Aug

LD1108052193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0430 GMT 11 Aug 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 11 ITAR-TASS—The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Newspaper calls the continuing confrontation between the executive and legislative arms of government in Russia as "self-destruction".

The newspaper's editor-in-chief Vitaliy Tretyakov writes that "only new general elections and new government can save the country from the consequences of this self-destruction", since "the agony of the political regime is self-evident".

Summing up the results of the all-Russian conference on the social protection of servicemen and their family members which ended in Moscow on Tuesday, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (an organ of the Russian Armed Forces) and ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA (an organ of the Russian parliament) newspapers regard these results unfavourable.

In the opinion of the Army newspaper, the conference did not reply to the following question: "Who and when exercises the right of servicemen to their protection?" while the Russian parliament newspaper points to the fact that "the state is in debt to the Army".

The PRAVDA newspaper which also wrote on this topic, calls attention to a statement by parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov at the conference who noted that "the Army is the main guardian of the Constitution. Therefore, the present government should not treat the Army's needs in an off-handed manner, as it does now".

The same newspaper comments on "the law on state secrets" adopted by the Russian parliament on Tuesday. Sergey Ivanov, head of the group which drafted the law, writes that the act "takes into account the present economic realities, does not put absurd barriers to the useful exchange of information and at the same time guards information carriers from a temptation to peddle secrets to the detriment of state interests".

Commenting on the continuing tripartite (with Russia's participation) talks to settle the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA points to the fact that the absence of real progress at the talks is attributed to the persisting mistrust of the Georgian and Abkhazian sides of each other.

Writing on the same topic, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA features an interview with former Abkhazian Vice-Premier Zurab Labakhua. The former vice-premier claims that "the Russian delegation should take a more definite, consistent and tough position" at the tripartite negotiations to achieve progress.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries an article by Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the Russian parliament Committee on Defence and Security, who writes that Russia should work out a sound concept for security.

He stresses that Russia should not "regard itslef a timid petitioner at the anteroom of the international community" and that nothing should make Russia forget its own interests.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Karasin Holds Briefing

Wants Peaceful Solution in Bosnia

LD1008124093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1130 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 10 August—The events of recent days in Yugoslavia, in Brussels, and at the talks in Geneva show that the situation surrounding the Yugoslav crisis has reached an extremely dangerous stage, it was stated at a briefing today by Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department.

The diplomat noted that the Russian side, which has an interest in the swiftest settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is taking active measures to exert a constructive influence both on those involved in the talks and on other parties that have been brought into play in settling the crisis. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that the main thing at present was to prevent uncontrollable actions in Bosnia itself that might give cause for strong-arm actions.

Grigoriy Karasin reported that Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev would be having direct contact by telephone and by other technical means with the Yugoslav and American leadership in the coming few hours in order to convey once again to them Moscow's firm position in favor of the swiftest political settlement to the Yugoslav crisis and against gambling on strong-arm methods of solving it.

Urges Direct Baku-Karabakh Contacts

LD1008124493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1255 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Aug (TASS)—The fact that a certain proportion of Karabakh and Azerbaijani leaders manifest mental inertia and a reluctance to finally recognize that there is no future in approaching the resolution of the Karabakh problem using force could have the gravest consequences and create an explosive situation in the region. This was stated by Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs information and press department during a briefing today.

The diplomat went on to say that Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned at the escalation of combat operations in the conflict zone, the sides' departure from the ceasefire understandings, and the increase in rocket and artillery fire and bombardments of settlements. The spokesman for the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that further territorial acquisitions, should they happen, will be perceived by the international community as an infringement of the norms of international law and will be met with the toughest condemnation. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls upon the conflicting parties to declare an immediate ceasefire, to continue talks within the framework of the Minsk CSCE group, to start actual implementation of the UN Security Council decisions, and to renew direct contacts between Baku and Stepanakert.

Notes 'Unchanged' Stance on Japanese Ties

LD1008132593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1417 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—The Japanese internal political situation caused by the formation of a new government is an internal affair of this state and the choice of the Japanese people, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing here today.

The diplomat described as a "notable page in the Japanese political life", which requires consideration and analysis, the formation of a coalition government for the first time in many years and the transition to opposition of the Liberal-Democratic Party.

Moscow took into account program statements of Japanese political forces that formed the coalition cabinet on the continuity of Japanese foreign policy. As for the Russian stand on bilateral relations, it remains unchanged, stressed Karasin.

"We consistently favor constructive and comprehensive development of relations with Japan up to the level of genuine partnership," said the Foreign Ministry's representative.

He expressed the hope all the theses will be confirmed in case of a Moscow visit of the new Japanese foreign minister. A possible date of this visit was not specified.

Government To Offer Angola Military Aid

LD1008134493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1240 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Aug (TASS)—Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs information and press department, has laid responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in Angola on UNITA and personally on its leader Jonas Savimbi.

Commenting during a briefing on the development of the situation in this African country, the diplomat said that the Russian side was proceeding in the conditions that have developed on the basis of the advisability of providing the Angolan Government with various kinds of aid, including military aid if necessary, to stabilize the situation.

Grigoriy Karasin recalled the decision made the day before by the British cabinet on lifting the embargo on the supply of weapons to the government of Angola. At the same time,

the diplomat stressed, Moscow advocates consistent and strict observance by the parties to the conflict, first and foremost UNITA, of the fundamental resolutions of the UN Security Council on settlement in Angola and advocates the return of UNITA to constructive talks.

Terms EC Measures on Aluminum 'Restrictive'

LD1008160593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1440 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—The restrictive measures of the European Community regarding export of Russian aluminium taken in a unilateral order under the pressure from some member countries of the European Community, are ignoring Russia's standpoint on the illegality of making Russia responsible for the present situation on the aluminium market, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing today.

This unilateral measure, the Russian diplomat believes, may strike at trade and economic interests of the Russian Federation, cause inevitable considerable reduction in currency earnings and the deterioration of the situation in the branch as a whole.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that it is difficult to understand the steps taken by the European Community in the context of repeated statements of the twelve European countries on banking economic reforms in Russia.

A certain compromise, the Russian diplomat said, was reached between Russia and the Commission of European Communities at the consultations on aluminium in July, 1993 so as to continue the talks on the seach for alternative measures to restrict Russian export. Grigoriy Karasin believes that it is necessary to return to these agreements.

Announces Kozyrev To Visit Sweden 14-15 Aug

LD1008160693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1442 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev will come to Sweden on a working visit from August 14 through 15, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Press and Information Department Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing here today.

The visit program includes negotiations with Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and Foreign Minister Margaretha Af Ugglas to discuss topical international issues, the situation in Russia and the Commonwealth, the situation in the Baltics and Russia's relations with the regional states.

The sides will also dwell on CSCE, including its participation in settlement of military conflicts, in particular those on territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It is planned to discuss regional cooperation in the Baltic area and in the Barents Euro-Arctics region, as well as bilateral relations.

CIA's Woolsey Leaves Moscow After Talks With Primakov

PM1008192393 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 93 p 1

[Vladimir Kravtsov report: "Woolsey Shares Confidences With Primakov"]

[Text] We have learned from well-informed sources that CIA Director J. Woolsey left Moscow yesterday, having completed his official return visit to the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service [FIS]. The FIS Press Service refused to comment officially on the meeting between Ye. Primakov and Woolsey. According to our data, however, questions of cooperation between the two intelligence services over nuclear arms control and the fight against international terrorism and drugs were discussed. I believe that the chief intelligence officers of Russia and the United States did not overlook the armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR. It seems to me that such cooperation between the two intelligence departments will benefit the states, provided that Primakov does not follow the example of V. Bakatin [who presented Americans with details of location of KGB bugs in new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow].

Possibility of U.S. Exploitation of Bosnia Issue Eyed

PM1008153593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 93 p 3

[Sergey Sidorov report: "Americans Still Talking About Air Strikes"]

[Text] There are no differences of opinion within the U.S. Administration over carrying out air strikes in the former Yugoslavia. "The White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department are united on this," General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in Washington.

According to him, the use of military force must at any rate pursue a clear political aim. That aim, in the general's opinion, could be a "desire for all the conflicting parties to come to the negotiating table and the intention of preventing the Bosnian Serbs continuing their operations in the region of Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

U.S. President Bill Clinton spoke about possible air strikes last Sunday, drawing a fine line between events in Iraq and Yugoslavia. "Since we do not have ground forces there (in Bosnia-Herzegovina) we are not in the same situation as we were with regard to Iraq," the president explained during a meeting with journalists. Clinton indicated that he would prefer a political settlement of the Balkan problem, noting that "a better climate has now been created for negotiations." "I think that we have begun to see reassuring results to a certain extent and we must

continue to take the same stance," he said. "And I think that our allies will be with us."

As for the U.S. allies, they are nonetheless of a different opinion. Commenting in Geneva on the NATO Council session's decision on possible air strikes, David Owen, EC cochairman of the negotiating process, drew attention to the fact that during the first five or six days of the Geneva round when the question of air strikes against the Serbs, which had been adopted under U.S. pressure, was still "not the main one," the dialogue between the participants in the consultations "advanced better than at any time in the last year."

Observers point out that the United States stepped up its activity on the Bosnian issue when it became clear that the talks in Geneva had a good chance of success. However, the preparations to use force began long before the Serb forces began their offensive in the area around Igman, which was then used by NATO as a pretext for "punishing" the Serbs. It is quite possible, experts think, that by saying one thing and doing another some great powers are trying to put the negotiating process on Bosnia on a more favorable footing for themselves. If that is really true, the hopes that the main bones of contention may be settled in Geneva by the end of the summer may not be realized.

U.S. Directive on Conflicts Around Russia Criticized

MK1008074093 Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No. 89, 10 Aug 93 (signed to press 9 Aug) p 1

[Oleg Cherkovets commentary in "Protection of Sovereignty" column: "'A Big Stick' for Russia?"]

[Text] FEDERATSIYA has suggested earlier that as a result of a whole number of openly anti-Russian actions undertaken in the recent period, the West is running the risk of bringing about a situation where our people will relate to them without any particular affection, to put it mildly, even in the absence of any communist ideology.

They seem to have acquired a taste for the role of "master of the world's fate" across the ocean. How else can one account for the emergence in Washington of a directive devised by U.S. foreign policy strategists which describes "a more active role in the conflicts emerging around Russia's perimeter" in order "to prevent further interference by Moscow in the interrelations of its neighboring states"? This document, whose essence was recently revealed by THE WASHINGTON POST, was already reported by the Russian press. Here is a reminder of its contents in brief. The U.S. administration is determined to step up "diplomatic intervention" in resolving conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. But even this is not the main thing. Although the use of U.S. armed forces in these conflicts (!) is described as "extremely undesirable," that nonetheless is not ruled out.

This is what we have come to! The notorious "American interests," about which generations of our political scientists have quite justifiably been talking as "extending" over the greater part of the globe, are now quite officially ready to be extended to the territory of the former Soviet republics, near our borders. And what next? By the way, what about the national interests of Russia itself, which has not yet (at least officially) been excluded from the list of great powers?

In the opinion of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all diplomatic efforts by any states to render assistance in settling conflicts near our borders are welcome but must be coordinated with the Russian Federation and with the parties to these conflicts themselves. A timely statement but apparently insufficient in the present situation. Where is the guarantee that politicians from across the ocean, in the event of this directive being officially approved by the administration, would want to "coordinate" these "efforts?" And if they have an urgent need—despite the "extreme undesirability"—to use their forces in the "neighboring states," as in Somalia, would they wish to coordinate such actions with anybody?

Is it not time for the Russian authorities to declare more decisively that some U.S. actions in the zone of OUR interests are totally inadmissible? And should some people's deputies not think more about protection of their borders?

Termed 'Interference' in Russian Affairs

PM1008155093 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 93 p 3

[Manki Ponomarev article: "Washington Decides To Show Its Hand. Presidential Directive on Interference in Russian Affairs Prepared"]

[Text] In time history sorts out, weighs up, and evaluates everything. The veil of secrecy over past events falls away and our descendants find out the details of things that we, the people of the day, could not even guess at. For instance, the real role played by the United States in the fate of the Soviet Union and Russia.

But it sometimes happens that for various reasons policymakers find it necessary to lay their cards on the table and then it is as if a floodlight is illuminating current events, clearing up something that was being kept a deep secret. The reports from Washington of a new foreign policy directive that has been formulated there are just such a floodlight. This directive envisages "diplomatic intervention in a series of regional and interethnic conflicts affecting some of the 15 states of the Soviet Union that recently became independent."

Even during the "cold war" years such blatantly cynical documents as this directive were rare. It was apparently by mistake that the word "diplomatic" showed up there. It is by no means a question of "diplomatic," but of outright brazen interference in the internal affairs of Russia and a number of neighboring states.

The aims stated in the directive at first glance look quite decent—putting an end to conflicts on the territory of the former USSR. But in actual fact the aim is to poison some parties to these conflicts against others and all of them against Moscow in order to complete what was begun

under Reagan and Bush and undermine once and for all the already unstable situation in Russia. The authors of this plan do not, moreover, balk at the likelihood of a deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations.

In actual fact, how can one regard the commentaries on the latest directive published in THE WASHINGTON POST by high-ranking administration representatives as anything but setting some states on the territory of the former USSR against others. "Our lever for influence (on events in Russia and on its borders—M.P.) rests partially on the fact that many parties to the conflict have better relations with Washington than with one another or with Moscow," said this representative, who wanted to remain anonymous. And another point: "U.S. plans to offer Russia and neighboring states economic aid are also a source of influence for Washington."

The idea that the United States will develop its policy depending on the CIS countries' readiness to follow a course that suits Washington is voiced clearly here. In return they can count on dollar handouts.

The sections of the U.S. plan which talk about Russia's Armed Forces look particularly provocative. You can clearly trace there an attempt to cause confrontation between the Russian authorities and the Army. There seems to be no limit to the aspersions cast on the latter. It apparently wants to use present and future conflicts "as a pretext for aggressive military intervention outside Russia." Russian troops stationed near conflict zones apparently "are in some cases taking sides or causing difficulties." What is more, according to U.S. intelligence, the aim of these troops is either to extend their stay in these zones on the pretext of defending Russians living outside Russia's borders or "to help Moscow reestablish its control over territory that it once ruled."

The claim that the Russian Army often acts contrary to the course pursued by President Yeltsin, who will supposedly hardly "be able on his own to put a stop to interference from the Russian military," also smacks of deliberate provocation. Moreover, both "General Staff officers in Moscow" and commanders at local level "who have been untrue to their duty" are being groundlessly accused of this "interference." In other words, this constitutes an unconcealed desire to see a headlong collision between the Russian political leadership and the military so as to undermine still further the situation in the country and deprive the Kremlin of a mainstay like the Armed Forces.

Counting on the success of their plans and the further weakening of Russia and the CIS, people in Washington are also hinting about outright police, or rather, gendarme actions on the territory of the former USSR. In an extremely unusual way. The Clinton administration is ready, it is announced, to approve the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces here.

But, according to another U.S. document—draft Presidential Directive No. 13—the CIS will have no right to influence these forces' operations. And, if Russian troops are involved in them, the United States will not back UN payments to Moscow for their peacekeeping activity since they may allegedly suppress regimes that they find awkward or political groupings involved in the conflicts. And, in order to provide total clarity, Directive No. 13 says: "The United States must tell Russia with supreme clarity that the United Nations will exercise very real control over any operation, which may cause political differences between the Untied States and Russia over the mandate, scope, and even the advisability of these operations." In short, whether Moscow likes it or not, it can dance to someone else's tune.

There is evidence that all this is no bluff: Washington has already appointed an official responsible for implementing the plan to interfere in Russia's internal affairs. He is James Collins, a highly experienced diplomat who spent many years working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He will now be working for the independent states department (that is the states formed on the territory of the former USSR) at the U.S. foreign policy department as "coordinator of regional problems."

That, in very concise terms, sums up the content of the U.S. Administration's latest directives. Admittedly, they have not yet been ratified by the President, but they have already gone through all the stages of discussion and coordination in Washington's corridors of power and are lying on his desk. Informed people have no doubt that the President's signature will appear on these documents before the month is out.

I should perhaps end here. But the following matter is still not clear: Why should Washington suddenly reveal its hand and stake everything? In my view, there is one obvious reason. The Clinton administration has begun to come under attack increasingly often for supposedly taking little trouble to maintain U.S. world leadership and it is growing appreciably weaker. Such authoritative figures as former Secretary of State James Baker or President Bush's national security adviser Brent Scowcroft have issued blunt statements on this subject. Similar criticism has also come from the United States' West European allies.

"Make no mistake, we will continue to exercise our leadership," incumbent Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in response to this criticism. In actual fact the Washington administration is asserting itself increasingly vigorously on the international arena. Hence such strong-arm actions as the air raids on Iraq or the plans to expand U.S. Armed Forces operations in the former Yugoslavia. But some people across the ocean consider this too little and talk is now turning to flagrant intervention in Russia's affairs.

The aggressive response of some members of the incumbent U.S. Administration to world events is well known. Such a well-informed newspaper as THE WASHINGTON POST writes about it openly (in connection with the drafting of the latest presidential directive). Certain Russian press articles which regard this directive almost as a panacea to all our ills and refuse to even see its true thrust are all the more puzzling. Yet the thrust of this directive is obvious. It seems that people in the United States thought

it time to go for broke and reveal their hand. Only world politics is not a game of cards and the methods used by some people in that game are not at all suitable here.

Gives Impression of 'Arrogant Force'

MK1108075893 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 33, 15 Aug 93 (signed to press 10 Aug 93) p 7A

[Article by Aleksey Pushkov, deputy chief editor of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI: "The U.S.: Against or With Russia?"]

[Text] Predictably, after Moscow and Washington cleared up their global relations, they turned to clarifying them along concrete, so to speak, applied directions.

There are not a few difficulties here. These include the fairly obvious differences over a settlement in Bosnia where the Americans are constantly toying with the idea of air strikes against the positions of Bosnian Serbs, while Russia just as consistently although not always publicly is trying to stand up against this option. These are also disagreements over the delivery of Russian submarines to Iran that should net Moscow $600 million but which makes Washington jittery as it fears that the military balance in the Persian Gulf could be upset. Other disagreements include the long wrangling over the Russian-Indian rocket engine contract, which is undoubtedly essential for Russia but which does not fit into the United States' long-term interests.

One gets the impression that the sphere of friction between these two countries in the near future could expand, spilling over into the territory of the former USSR. The U.S. State Department has devised a directive on Washington's policy with regard to ethnic and regional conflicts in the CIS that is now awaiting signature by President Clinton whereupon it will become an official guideline. The directive, judging by reports in the U.S. press, proclaims a more active U.S. role in settling these conflicts, also involving the UN and the CSCE in addressing this task.

In principle these aspirations are quite understandable and should only be welcomed—especially given the amount of nuclear and other weapons located on the territory of the former Soviet Union and the number of nuclear power stations and other sources of danger not only for ourselves but also for the entire world. Noteworthy, however, is the directive's fairly tough tone, smacking of "arrogant force." Neither does it suggest that Russia would be particularly reckoned with in pursuit of U.S. peacekeeping operations in the CIS. Here is just one quotation: "The United States must make it clear to Russia that oversight by the UN of any operation will be real and consistent and can cause U.S.-Russian political disagreements with respect to powers, scope, and even the desirability of such operations."

Since such information is almost invariably an inspired leak, it could be easily concluded that the main addressee of such a leak is Moscow. Moreover, quite obviously Moscow is regarded here not so much as a partner (the tone is too unpartnerlike!), as an object of possible U.S. pressure. In fact, Russia is being shown its place and the limits of its possible maneuverability, and nowhere else but in the CIS.

The timing of the directive is surely not accidental. It is clearly linked with the developments on the Tajik-Afghan border, Russia's enhanced military activity in the region, and the possibility of a strategic military alliance being formed between Russia and four republics of Central Asia. Signs are that the U.S. administration is concerned by the possibility of imperial trends reemerging in Russia's foreign policy, and it seeks to convey a signal to Moscow: There are certain boundaries that must not be overstepped.

Washington is also alarmed by the lack of control on the part of Moscow over the Russian armed forces located in the former Soviet republics or on their borders.

There are grounds for that alarm. Participation of Russian aviation in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict on Abkhazia's side is not quite clear, and just as unclear is the general role of Russian military units stationed in that republic. Questions are being raised by the presence of the 14th Army in Moldova. The impression is that very often, the power to make concrete decisions in crisis situations has been turned over to local military commands, who are guided by their own understanding of the situation or by partiality more than by directives from Moscow (most of the time, apparently, owing to the absence of such directives).

The directive's authors should perhaps have paid more attention to the fact that for Russia, the CIS is not simply a region but a sphere of special geostrategic, economic, and other interests, just as Latin America is for the United States. Interaction with Moscow would be the most productive option here, since there is no way it can be squeezed out of this region. A peremptory tone and ultimatum-like statements, even considering Western economic assistance, are of no use here, and might become counterproductive and even complicate the partnership that has begun to take shape in Russian-U.S. relations.

When I shared my thoughts with a highly-placed U.S. diplomat in Moscow, he assured me: "No, no, the directive should be perceived as the United States' intention to act not against Russia, but with it." I should like to hope that this is really so. It is a pity, though, that the latest U.S. document gives cause for different interpretations.

Commentary Views Drug Trafficking in Afghanistan

LD1008165193 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Commentary by Vladyslav Kozyakov; read by announcer]

[Text] Armed attacks from Afghanistan against border guard outposts and communities in Tajikistan have yet another aspect: drug trafficking. Vladyslav Kozyakov comments.

Shortly after Tajikistan declared independence, that former Soviet republic was swept by a tide of drug business, which has long flourished in Afghanistan. Drug smugglers took advantage of the civil war and the openness of the state border. The flow of opium and heroin has produced a situation in which drugs have become the equivalent of a local currency. A survey issued by the Paris-based geopolitical observatory monitoring the drug situation, and having representatives in 50 countries, says in Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, 500 grams of opium can buy a pair of boots.

It is quite clear the emergence of another trouble spot in the world of international drug trafficking is a headache not only for the local residents. What is much worse, one of the main regions of the world supplying drugs to Russia and Western Europe, as well as the United States, is about to receive a new impetus. According to UN experts, Afghanistan is the world's number one producer of raw materials for narcotics; it is even ahead of Europe. This year tens of thousands of hectares have been sown to opium poppy. This year's crop is estimated at 2,000 tonnes of opium, which would produce 200 tonnes of heroin.

The narcotics will end up in the hands of pushers in other countries, most of them in the West. According to the international police agency, Interpol, some 80 percent of the heroin sold in Western Europe and about 50 percent of heroin sold in the United States originates from the area called the Golden Crescent—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. One of the routes to deliver drugs to the West lies through Tajikistan and other former Soviet republics in Central Asia, Russia, and Poland. A recent mission carried out within the framework of the United Nations drugs control program has found quite a few confirmations of that. Reports published in Russia point in the same direction.

What is most significant, among those Afghans who supervise opium poppy plantations and manage drug laboratories, there are quite a few commanders of extremist groups. An ASSOCIATED PRESS correspondent in Kabul reports that fundamentalist Islamic parties are the first to blame for the production and smuggling of drugs. One can not but recall the fact that it is precisely those groups in Afghanistan who were once the main recipients of American financial aid and military supplies. These days the same extremists and militants are pouring oil on to the fire of another war, using feuds in Tajikistan. One of their aims is to destabilize the situation in Central Asia and preserve one of the transit routes to deliver opium and heroin to West European and American cities.

Nazarbayev Visit Seeks To Clear Up 'Misunderstandings'

PM1008151893 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Aug 93 p 4

[Pavel Shinkarenko commentary: "Presidents Discussed Priorities for Integration"]

[Text] The postponement until the fall of the Council of CIS Heads of State session planned for 16 July evidently did not fit in with the Kazakhstan president's plans. So he decided to use his current visit to Moscow to speed up the processes of integration on a bilateral basis, and not only in the economic sphere. All the more so as recent events have raised the question of unity of action in a particularly acute manner. For example there is the decision of the Central Bank of Russia on the exchange of old money which came as a surprise to the partners, the bloody crisis on the Tajik-Afghan border which is exposing the Central Asian states to the threat of protracted interethnic carnage, and the difficulties with financing and servicing the Baykonur cosmodrome.

Nursultan Nazarbayev has been consistent in his support for bold steps in the process to bring the ex-USSR's former republics closer together. The halfheartedness of many decisions taken in the CIS and the hesitancy and inconsistency of their execution could not have suited him. This evidently was behind his arrival in Moscow to meet with Boris Yeltsin.

When this issue went to press, details of the talks had not yet been announced. But, we may surmise, there was first and foremost a discussion of the possibility and expediency of holding a "great CIS summit" in the near future, for which the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan recently put forward a plan in Almaty. In their opinion the main task of such a conference should be to provide with specific content the declaration adopted in Moscow in May on the economic integration of eight CIS countries. "The economic union—and we should not now be afraid to talk about a political union as well—is the only guarantee there is for calming the peoples on former USSR territory and preventing bloodshed," Nazarbayev emphasized on arriving in Moscow. No doubt with the agreement of President Karimov, Nursultan Abishevich put forward arguments in favor of opening the CIS Interstate Bank as quickly as possible, and proposed discussing the future of Kazakhstan's involvement in the ruble zone. Although the republic's government and National Bank confirmed their desire not to part with the Russian ruble, the decision of the Central Bank of Russia on the exchange of old bank notes created many doubts in Almaty as to the correctness of this step. For example, Serikbolsyn Abdildin, speaker of the Kazakhstan Parliament, has already stated that the republic will introduce its own currency. According to him, this "question has been resolved and it is only a question of timing."

According to reports from Almaty certain doubts have also surfaced there in connection with the recent signing by the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian premiers of a document on the necessity for an economic alliance between these three countries. There was particular surprise there at the Moscow specialists' arguments linking the creation of an "economic union of the CIS's Slavic countries" to the results of the Istanbul OECD session in which the leaders of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states participated. No doubt Nursultan Abishevich cleared up these misunderstandings and tried to persuade Boris Nikolayevich to return to the concept of collective integration instead of a "separate Slavic union."

In our opinion, the conclusion of a military treaty between Russia and Kazakhstan should not be delayed. This document could contain a clause on forming a political committee at the level of presidents, defense ministers, and foreign ministers, and joint armed formations to service the Baykonur cosmodrome and test ranges. As we know, the leaders intended to discuss these problems at the end of July. The summit was, however, postponed. As ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI has learned, the reason for its postponement was differences of opinion on a number of very important articles in the treaty concerning defense cooperation as well as the cosmodrome's fate. The time has now come to put an end to mutual claims.

One would like to believe that the decisions which the presidents have adopted will help not only to maintain trust between our peoples but also to strengthen it.

Developments in Talks on Troop Withdrawal From Lithuania Eyed

PM1108082593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition p 7

[Report by correspondent Yuriy Stroganov: "Treaty on Verge of Breakdown"]

[Text] So the meeting of the presidents of Russia and Lithuania scheduled for 5 August did not take place. President Algirdas Brazauskas did not come to Moscow. It was intended to sign an important political document—the agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic, which has already been going on for many months now: The timetable constitutes the sole document regulating this complex process. The last Russian soldier is due to leave Lithuania 31 August, but an agreement is nevertheless essential not just to give due legal form to the process but because it will lend legitimacy to the demands in the sphere of social safeguards for former servicemen remaining in the republic, military pensioners, and so forth.

The meeting did not take place, and Russian television broadcast that it was postponed at Brazauskas' request. You got the impression that there was a technical slip. However, judging by the stance adopted by Ambassador at Large V. Isakov (leader of the Russian delegation at the talks with Lithuania) at the Russian Foreign Ministry press center, the real cause of the postponement of the meeting is far more serious.

According to Isakov, discussion of the text of the agreement, which it proved impossible to sign last September, had long been put off by the Lithuanian side on various pretexts, and the delegations met again only this spring. After long arguments the Russian side agreed on the Lithuanian draft. That meant that the text was agreed and could be signed by the heads of state. No amendments were forthcoming from Lithuania throughout the ensuing months, and then, with just days left before the meeting, the Lithuanian side stated that the text was not... agreed. Isakov said that the Lithuanian side proposed adding to it a question on compensation for the damage caused Lithuania by the Soviet Union since 1940. Instead of a meeting of presidents we got a meeting of delegations.

The ambassador at large regarded this move as an attempt to wreck the agreement. The problem of indemnification is a stumbling block in Russian-Lithuanian relations, but it is seen differently by the two countries' politicians. However, according to the ambassador, it should have no bearing on the agreement on the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania but should be discussed separately, in an in-depth and comprehensive way.

President Brazauskas has come under fire from the opposition precisely because of his readiness, as his opponents see it, to make concessions to Russia on the question of indemnification. This Baltic country sees Russia as the legal successor to the USSR and as responsible for all that has happened in the last 50 years. And the damage caused the republic, in the opinion of certain of its experts, comes to... $146 billion! Here they do not, of course, take account of the Soviet Union's contribution to Lithuania's economy. While most of Russia's oblasts lay in ruins after the war a large contingent of specialists was sent to Lithuania. Plants and factories were constructed and cities regenerated. The difficult process of clarifying relations and defining positions is under way. Russian diplomats reject a hard-line formulation of this question, but Lithuania is uncompromising. However, the agreement on troop withdrawal was ready for signing as they had stopped linking this issue to the problem of paying damages. This served as grounds for the attacks on Brazauskas. Urgent closed sessions of the Seimas were held. Even the word "impeachment" was heard in the corridors of parliament.

According to leaks from the Seimas, it was learned that Brazauskas had, it transpires, sent to Moscow a draft document which he had not agreed with the delegation. But it wasn't that which served as grounds for suspicion. The draft sent to Moscow did not envisage that the Lithuanian side's statement demanding indemnification be registered at the United Nations. The opposition received an opportunity to accuse Brazauskas of harboring sympathies for the former empire.

The president, however, has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to a somewhat different policy—balanced relations between East and West. After the opposition's accusations explanations were not long in coming. The local news agency carried Brazauskas' reply to a Radio Free Europe question about whether Lithuania intended making overly large concessions to Russia for short-term economic gain. The president stated in no uncertain terms that this would not happen: "We have no doubt that compensation must be paid for the damage caused to Lithuania and its people," he said.

Brazauskas noted that negotiations might be long. That is, the search for compromises which both sides find possible. "However, that does not mean that we are ready to make fundamental concessions," he noted.

A report has been carried on a letter Brazauskas sent to Yeltsin which says, in particular, that the withdrawal of

troops is proceeding efficiently in accordance with the agreed timetable. "I think," the president writes to the president, "that in this situation the signing of an agreement on troop withdrawal loses its point."

At the same time Brazauskas did propose to Yeltsin that a free trade treaty be signed.

In Lithuania itself, differing opinions on the agreement are to be heard: That it is completely unnecessary, that Russia is... trampling on Lithuania, and that the specific question of damages must be linked to the withdrawal of troops, which have now virtually been withdrawn. Purely pragmatic considerations are also possible. It is small wonder that you hear the idea of a free trade treaty expressed. Isakov, who has repeatedly stressed Russia's benevolent attitude toward Lithuania and its problems, did nevertheless note that such treaties operate only within the structure of the CIS. Lithuania, however, is seeking to distance itself altogether from any post-Soviet structures and unions—and not just political but economic ones too. An appropriate law has even been adopted on this score.

However, the republic is able to influence Russia's "behavior" so long as there exist the problems of social safeguards for former servicemen and pensioners and the transit of Russian troops across Lithuania and Kaliningrad Oblast, whose energy and transport arteries cross the republic's territory. In short, discussion is clearly not going to be easy. But Russians diplomats think that commonsense will prevail...

Government Threatens To Reconsider Withdrawal Plan

WS1008144993 Tallinn BNS in English 1034 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Moscow, Aug 10, BNS—Moscow threatened to resort to "extreme measures" of reconsidering a withdrawal timetable, if Lithuania continues to delay a withdrawal agreement.

A senior Russian diplomat told BNS that Lithuania insists on conditions that are wittingly unacceptable.

In his view, Lithuania is deliberately trying to delay the agreement until the Aug. 31 deadline for the withdrawal. "Obviously, when the withdrawal is over, the agreement regulating the process will become useless," he said.

The diplomat called last week's talks a failure. He said Russia refused to even discuss Lithuania's proposal to include a clause for further talks on compensations.

Chinese Army Delegation Arrives on Official Visit

LD1008143393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0953 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Colonel-General Zhang Wannian, who arrived here Monday evening, began his official visit to Russia by going to the Kubinka air force garrison near Moscow in morning today. The Chinese officers were shown the latest models of Russian aircraft. Russian pilots displayed their flying skills and the performance of their aircraft to the Chinese guests.

Colonel-General Zhang Wannian will visit the military academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in the afternoon today, where he will acquaint himself with the tuition process and the equipment used for this purpose.

On August 11 Colonel-General Zhang Wannian will meet First Deputy Defence Minister of Russia Andrey Kokoshin and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov. The meeting will take place at the Russian Defence Ministry.

The Chinese delegation will also visit the cosmonauts training centre, the motorised infantry brigade of the Moscow military area, and will travel to St. Petersburg and Volgograd.

Zhang Wannian's current visit to Russia, which will last until August 17, is a continuation of the contacts between the defence establishments of the two countries. Thus, a Russian military delegation, led by First Deputy Defence Minister of Russia Andrey Kokoshin, visited China in October 1992. Kokoshin and Chinese Defence Minister Colonel-General Qin Jiwei had discussed matters linked with the promotion of bilateral military relations. They declared their intention to contribute to the further development of these relations on the basis of mutual benefit and equality, for the sake of security in the Asia-Pacific region.

'No Plan' To Sign Agreements

LD1108101593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0858 GMT 11 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Aug—Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of general staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, had a meeting today with Colonel General Zhang Wannian, chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army of China, who arrived in Moscow on 9 August. They had an exchange of views on a number of military-economic problems concerning the interests of both countries.

Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov stressed in a conversation with the ITAR-TASS correspondent after the meeting that "there is no plan to sign any documents whatsoever during the visit by my colleague. This is an exchange of views, the establishment of personal contacts, generally speaking, work toward the long term."

Colonel General Zhang Wannian is also to meet Andrey Kokoshin, First deputy minister of defense of Russia, today.

Turkey Perceives Russian 'Pressure' on Azerbaijan Over Oil

LD1108093093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0000 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Report by correspondent Vladimir Khovratovich from Istanbul]

[Text] After Azerbaijan's new leadership had stated that the agreements signed in March 1993 for the construction of an oil pipeline across Turkish territory must at least be revised, virtually all of the mass media in Turkey launched a massive attack, first and foremost, against Russia. They say that the Russian leadership, in order for the oil and gas of the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan to be conveyed only through Novorossiysk, is bringing pressure to bear on Geydar Aliyev and his entourage.

Oil was poured on the blazing fire of tension between Russia and Turkey by Russia's ambassador in Ankara Albert Chernyshev. He said that Turkey, under an agreement signed in 1936, is obliged to let through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles any civilian vessels, including of course Russian tankers with oil. It is possible that it was this which literally stirred up the Turkish public. Things went so far as the Istanbul newspaper TERCUMAN demanding that its government declare Chernyshev persona non grata. Other mass media are also not excessively considerate in their choice of anti-Russian outbursts. Such nonacceptance [nepriyatiye] towards Russia and towards Russian-Turkish relations, general consul Leonid Manzhokin said in a conversation with me, has not been observed even during the years of the cold war.

Be that as it may, on Monday the Russian ambassador was summoned by Turkey's Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin and was asked to convey to Russia's President Boris Yeltsin two important messages. The first concern is the Karabakh problem. The second one is directly connected with the problem of Baku oil.

Delegate Speaks on Liberia at UN Security Council

LD1108100393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0918 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] New York, August 11 (TASS)—Russian chief delegate to the United Nations Yuliy Vorontsov said at a U.N. Security Council meeting that an agreement signed in Cotonou on July 25 creates real chances for peace in Liberia and the return of refugees to their homes.

"Russia has been consistently advocating, including the Security Council, a solution of the Liberian problem on a regional basis.

"In this connection, it is indicative, in our opinion, that the peace agreement was reached under the aegis of a regional organisation—the Economic Community for West African States, and we congratulate this organisation.

"A positive precedent has been created to look for ways of settling military conflicts and crisis situations on the African continent in the framework of African efforts."

Vorontsov noted that "the Russian Federation, for its part, will support actions by African states aimed at settling military conflicts and crisis situations on the continent in the framework of regional efforts".

Political Issues

Yeltsin Urges 'Resolute Action,' Criticizes Supreme Soviet

LD1008164693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1555 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Moscow, 10 Aug (ITAR-TASS)—A meeting was held in the Kremlin today between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and a group of members of the Presidential Council. Under discussion was the current political, social, and economic situation in the country. Ways of consolidating and invigorating positive market development vectors were analyzed. Those attending the meeting stated that the expansion of positive shifts in developing reform was being hampered by the unconstructive position of the Supreme Soviet, whose aggressive actions toward the president and government recently were bringing more and more nervousness into society. This was reported by the press secretary of the president of the Russian Federation.

In the economic part of the discussion, it was noted that the prerequisites existed in the country's economy for consolidating the positive results of reform. Yegor Gaydar, who took part in the discussion, noted in particular that the results of the government's efforts were providing serious opportunities for reducing inflation.

In the political part of the discussion, note was made of the need to invigorate action in defending democratic gains with the support of the results of the referendum.

Boris Yeltsin, who spoke at the meeting, noted that "people were tired of the senseless behavior of one of the branches of power" and that he was ready for resolute actions in the interests of the population and the stability of Russia. The president heard proposals from those attending the meeting on strategic and tactical aspects of policy, and in particular, on the progress of the constitutional process.

The meeting was held without the attendance of the press.

Foresees 'Hot' September

LD1008170893 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 10 Aug 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin, who has been silent for quite some time, made an unexpected statement today. It was unexpected if only because he addressed journalists who came to attend a normal diplomatic protocol affair—the president received credentials from the ambassadors of the Netherlands, Colombia, and Nepal. If I do not appear on television all that often now, it does not at all mean that I have fallen ill, the president said, and added:

[Begin Yeltsin recording] It may well be that August is not a politicaly busy month, as it were, but very serious internal work is under way in preparation for September. September will be a hot month indeed. It will be a month when constitutional issues will be tackled. It will be a month when election issues will be tackled. All in all, it will be a month when we should arrive at a decision regarding power in Russia. That is why this kind of work is under way now, in August and that is why if I do not often appear on television, as it were, it does not mean that it is necessary to put out information that I must have fallen ill. [end recording] [video shows Kozyrev by Yeltsin's side]

Yeltsin Terms Reports of Ill Health 'Rubbish'

LD1008161493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 10 Aug 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] In Moscow President Yeltsin has stated that events are really expected to heat up in September. This will be a month when the questions of the constitution and elections are tackled. The president said this to journalists following a ceremony for the presentation of credentials by foreign ambassadors. Yeltsin also said reports that he was ill were "rubbish".

BILD Alleges Yeltsin Takes 'Psycho Drugs'

AU1108091493 Hamburg BILD in German 11 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Yeltsin Takes Psycho Drugs"]

[Text] Moscow—The bear walks unsteadily. Boris Yeltsin (62), the second most powerful man in the world, is physically in good health but suffers from extremely high blood pressure and cardiac palpitations, as his doctors have confirmed.

—Yeltsin takes medication to lower blood pressure, beta blockers, and psycho drugs.

—Yeltsin's main problems are stress situations in which he drinks alcohol (despite a ban). Alcohol increases blood pressure and heart problems. Taken together with psycho drugs, alcohol leads to speech problems, fidgety movements, poor concentration, and sleep problems.

Kostikov Says Khasbulatov Becoming 'Increasingly Dangerous'

LD1108110393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1005 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Moscow, 11 Aug (ITAR-TASS)—Vyacheslav Kostikov, press secretary to the Russian Federation president, has released the following statement:

"In the last few days, the actions of the Supreme Soviet, and in particular the tone of its chairman's speeches, have reached a critical stage in terms of aggressiveness and have become openly provocative. Ruslan Khasbulatov's address to the conference on social and legal protection of servicemen was a direct challenge to the Russian state and an outrage upon its national goals and interests.

"His attempt to draw the Army into politics reveals a new and probably the most dangerous aspect of R. Khasbulatov's political repertory. By hounding the Army at the executive, R. Khasbulatov has in effect turned from a

policy of demoralizing civilian authorities to that of breaking down both the statehood and the Army.

"His accusations that the executive is allegedly acting 'in the interests of the international intelligence community' reveal not just the degree of his political extremism but also the maniacal instability of his personality, as his actions become increasingly dangerous for society.

"The statements by R. Khasbulatov, who speaks on behalf of the Supreme Soviet, place in an ambiguous position that legislative body itself, which shares with other state bodies the responsibility for the country's fortunes. Society is entitled to expect the Russian corps of deputies to express their attitude to the stand taken by the speaker of parliament and to draw appropriate conclusions."

Yeltsin Aide Interviewed on Federalism, Constitution

PM1008134193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 2

[Interview with Anatoliy Sliva, leader of Constitutional Conference group of experts and deputy chief of the Russian Federation president's State Legal Administration, by Petr Akopov; place and date not given: "In Search of a Formula for Federation"]

[Text] Anatoliy Sliva, leader of a Constitutional Conference group of experts and deputy chief of the Russian Federation president's State Legal Administration, talks about the Constitutional Conference, federalism, and German experience.

[Akopov] Anatoliy Yakovlevich, first of all a very "simple" question. Has the constitutional process gotten under way?

[Sliva] The constitutional process connected with the Constitutional Conference is only three months old. But the constitutional process connected with the formation of the Constitutional Commission is three years old. Just compare: three years and three months. In these months we have already produced a very definite, albeit not a final, result—an agreed draft constitution in which much has been taken into consideration. In the time that the Constitutional Conference has been working, many innovations have been produced, including in such a difficult problem area as the consolidation of a realistic federal system. Although the draft still has many shortcomings, unfinished elements, and contradictions, progress has been made. This is clear if you compare the three years to the three months, but we should now move more quickly toward the Constitution in the specific political situation in which we find ourselves. You cannot talk about two constitutional processes—a presidential and a parliamentary one. At the Constitutional Conference the words "Constitutional Commission" were pronounced more often than any others. Rumyantsev knows this full well. I can say that in three years the Constitutional Commission's draft did not receive such careful attention as now from competent people having an interest in it.

Today several fundmental questions remain on which it is necessary to reach agreement. First, it is necessary to find an agreed formula for the Federation and a mechanism for consolidating it—the Constitution. This is the most difficult of tasks but the most necessary. The situation is such that unless we ensure a constitutional route to federalism, we will constantly come up against attempts to secure inordinate strengthening of the state's role and will never achieve unity for the Federation.

Second, it is necessary to provide guarantees for the first level, the foundations of a civil society—local self-government. Third, it is necessary to agree on organizing a system of federal power incorporating the president, parliament, government, and judicial bodies.

At the moment I would single out as the Constitutional Conference's greatest success the work done in the second group, where representatives of the Federation's components worked. This was the hardest, most difficult group, but it was actually among its members that the process of recognizing that a democratic Russia can only be a federal Russia was strongest. And the fact that they managed to find common formulas and got through the stage of coordination is just as significant as the stage of coordinating the Federation Treaty in 1992.

After 12 July, when the Constitutional Conference's participants approved the draft Constitution, a fundamentally different phase of the constitutional process began. This is the phase of coordination. We should envisage the possibility of developing the constitutional process by stages. The first phase—the production of a draft—was completed by the creation of a unified text for the draft Constitution agreed by conference's participants. After the completion of the second stage—coordination—which we are at the beginning of at present, the third stage of the constitutional process will begin: reaching agreement on the procedure for adopting the Constitution. And the final stage is the adoption of the fundamental law.

The special features of the coordination stage are that the very problem hinges on the relations among power structures. The emphasis is placed on coordination with the organs of power, with the Federation component, kray and oblast administration and government heads, presidents and republic governments, and soviets, with all the Federation subjects' organs of representative power. Representatives of these structures took part in the Constitutional Conference's work, and now it is a question of coordination with the structures themselves. Not just with the Federation components' leaderships. It would be good if in the near future something like the All-Russia Constitutional Conference took place within the framework of each of the components, which would give the rayons, cities, and local self-government an opportunity to join in discussion of the Constitution. This is necessary in order to ensure civil peace and harmony and the constitutional process' democratic credentials.

In short, the president had all the legal and moral grounds to propose in his edict of 24 July a route to the stage of coordination.

[Akopov] Won't the constitutional process' second stage simply become one more political battlefield?

[Sliva] The various political forces can use anything however they like. In order to preserve the constitutional process we must actively develop work to coordinate the draft Constitution.

Coordination does not merely mean securing the approval of everyone or the majority, although this is vitally important as a result of the work. When I say coordination, I mean continuing work on the text, supplementing, clarifying, and polishing it.

[Akopov] Do you mean particularly regarding issues of federalism?

[Sliva] Federalism is not just a section in the draft Constitution, although it does contain a chapter devoted to the Russian Federation. Federalism should permeate the whole text as the principle behind the whole state system. The entire future Constitution should be a federalist one. The question of the organization of power at the federal level is fundamental here. Today our center—both the executive and the legislature—not only is not but does not feel itself to be a federal center. You need only look at the central administrative organs' structure to see a lack of federalism even in the very structure of the organization of power, not to mention in the minds of many people who work there.

[Akopov] The process to equalize the status of the Federation's components has been gaining strength recently. Is this strengthening the Federation?

[Sliva] In principle this trend is correct. But this takes time, it requires a transitional period. We should not now fear a degree of individuality among the Federation's various components, or differences between the republics and the remaining components of the Federation.

But you cannot forget the fact that federalism and local self-government are different levels of a single structure. At the moment many regional leaders, while demanding decentralization from the center, are themselves not doing anything to develop local self-government in their own areas.

I have not yet seen a single serious program within the framework of the Federation components on the reform of local self-government on their territory. Under these circumstances, the democratic central federal power may be a guarantor of the development of local self-government. However, I do not yet see any grasp of this question's importance, including among the majority of the Constitutional Conference's participants.

[Akopov] It is not only the politicians but society which does not realize the significance of local self-government...

[Sliva] Yes, unfortunately this really is the case. I saw this for myself yet again when I compared our situation with the position local self-government occupies in the FRG. I recently made a special visit to Germany to this end, and saw for myself how well developed the system of local self-government and federalism is there. To quote just one example. We still do not have any structure at the level of the federal center to ensure and guarantee federalism. The Soviet of Nationalities is not such a structure, and within the system of executive power there is also no body which represents all the Federation's components. But there is such a body in Germany—the Bundesrat. I tried to get a definition of the Bundesrat from my German colleagues. Several of them said that that it is parliament's upper chamber, others denied this, and still others said it is a unique institution combining the representative principle with the executive. Representatives of the laender (from three to six persons), including the government heads, sit in the Bundesrat. At the sessions, held once every three weeks, decisions of political significance to the Federation and the laender are adopted jointly, in a coordinated fashion. Do we need a similar device? It is, of course, first and foremost needed by the Federation's components. It may be either an upper chamber of parliament, as enshrined in the Constitutional Conference's draft, or some other kind of body. The Federation's components should put forward their own solutions to this problem. If we do not have such an empowered assembly of representatives of all the Federation's components at the federal level, we will not succeed in building a Federation. This is the main component of federal relations, without which no individual law on implementing the Federation Treaty will achieve anything.

German experience may in general be very useful to us. In each of Germany's laender there is an instrument for cooperation between the land government and the federal center—a Ministry for Federation Affairs. Each land has such a ministry! In the organs of power of each there is a specialist on federal legislation. A land minister receives the same salary as a federal minister. That is, a land official is as responsible, and as well protected—even materially—as a federal official. He considers himself to be not simply a representative of the the land but also a person defending general federal interests.

One more comparison. We now have missions of the Federation components in Moscow. But what are they attached to? The government. In Germany the 16 laender also have missions in Bonn, but these are "missions attached to the Federation" (mission heads have ministerial status). For them the Federation is a living, permanently functioning common organism!

[Akopov] In your opinion how are the demands for early parliamentary elections linked to the constitutional process?

[Sliva] If we raise the question of adopting the Constitution after the elections, then this too is part of the constitutional process. It would, of course, be ideal if the Constitution were adopted before the elections, and at the moment this scenario is still possible. If this does not happen, early elections may really be a solution to the situation. After all, the electoral law is a natural extension of the Constitution. The new Constitution should begin to act quickly, and for this it is necessary to invest the new

structures with new powers. What is more, this should happen in all the branches of power: in both the legislature and the executive, and at both the federal level and that of the Federation's components. Therefore, I think that the Constitutional Conference cannot avoid the Law on Elections.

Renewal of the corps of deputies is as inevitable as the replacement of the soviets by the new representative organs. The system of the soviets as a system of cosubordination wherein the higher soviet leads the lower one (as enshrined in the current Constitution), is incompatible with federalism and local self-government. Nobody is against the representative organs, but if a federalist democratic Constitution which accepts local self-government as a fundamental tenet contains a note on the system (!) of representative bodies—this is a falsehood. In a democratic state a deputy cannot order another deputy around. So you want to be called soviets? Be my guest, but you should not replace a parliamentary system by a system of soviets. Incidentally, in the Constitutional Conference's draft Constitution the word "parliament," which has not appeared in a single Supreme Soviet legal act over the last three years, is actually used for the first time.

What is more, if you trace the genesis of the Supreme Soviet over the last three years, you see that positive steps have been taken—the institution of the presidency has been created, judicial reform is being carried out—but there is one extremely important question affecting the state which has not been raised over these years. I mean the reform and transformation of the supreme legislative organ. Nothing was done about this even after 31 March 1992, when the Federation Treaty, which fundamentally changed the political situation, was signed. Today it is already impossible to escape the fact that we need a new structure for the representative organ. If the deputies cannot adopt a decision on their own, this means that it is necessary to help them.

For all the importance of particular political figures, their behavior depends to a significant degree on what structures they are acting within. Therefore if we put the present corps of deputies in another structure, this will radically change the deputies' behavior. Of course, that is if they are politicians and not merely playing at politics. A politician is a responsible person, a person responsible to society. A person who is responsible to the state, if he is within the state power structures. Even new chairmen of Supreme Soviet committees who represent the parliamentary majority and who came in after the shake-up of the committees are not what they used to be a little time ago. It was one thing when you used to speak rebelliously from the podium as a rank and file member of the opposition, criticizing and deploring everything, but another thing entirely when you have become head of a Supreme Soviet committee and have become, if only from the official point of view, a statesman, responsible for a faction or a political movement. And the more such a person says "Down with..." or "I am against..." the more he will expose himself to the public. So I hope that these politicians are also coming to understand that they are responsible for Russia, for civil harmony, for a strong constitutional system here. This should happen at both the federal and local levels.

[Akopov] The complexity of the political situation is prompting many people to conclude that, as has often happened in Russian and world history, the constitutional crisis can only be overcome by force...

[Sliva] Yes, in the past there are many examples of force being used to resolve constitutional impasses. But that is the past... I nevertheless insist that it is necessary to look for peaceful and legitimate ways of doing this. You might ask: What ways? People are asking this all the time, and I always answer that if there is a constitutional process, if it is developing in a democratic manner, then ways and means of adopting the Constitution will be found and will be born of experience itself.

Burbulis Interviewed on Reform Policy

AU1108062293 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Aug 93 pp 107-108

[Interview with Gennadiy Burbulis, adviser to President Boris Yeltsin, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "The Hour of the Doers"]

[Text] [Reporter] Mr. Burbulis, Russia quickly needs a new constitution; the Constitutional Assembly has approved a draft. You, as Yeltsin's confidant, have had great influence on this draft. Are you satisfied?

[Burbulis] In the most difficult stage of the reform the new constitution offers a legal basis for everything that we have to do within two to three years: redistributing property, changing the economic structures, ensuring employment, stabilizing finances—with the ruble as the national currency.

[Reporter] Then you can hardly approve of the fact that the monetary reform that your president has just authorized has again caused unrest among the population and has further weakened trust in the ruble.

[Burbulis] The Central Bank made this absurd decision. The president only tried to alleviate the consequences by intervening.

[Reporter] What were the reasons for the exchange of money?

[Burbulis] Political reasons, not economic ones. At the moment, the opposition is currently distinguishing itself by a number of such activities: The Supreme Soviet has halted privatization, is expanding the state budget, which already has a high deficit, is trying to impose media censorship, and is angrily attacking the president's closest associates under the pretense of combating corruption.

[Reporter] And this parliament also opposes the draft constitution.

[Burbulis] The conference on economic reform, which was staged by its chairman Khasbulatov and was supposed to try once again to depose the president, was aimed into the same direction.

[Reporter] Could it succeed?

[Burbulis] All this is an evil game by clever manipulators from the communist-fascist underground. However, our people have long rejected them. Above all, we must prevent the Soviet communists from staging a come-back.

[Reporter] Will Russia become a stable rule-of-law state with its new constitution?

[Burbulis] Not yet. The prepared text is a good basis, but it will not yet manage to overcome the past. This will be a long process, which will take many years.

[Reporter] Who is going to put the constitution into force—the Supreme Soviet, that is, the formal parliament, or a people's representation, which has to be elected anew, or the people directly via a referendum?

[Burbulis] I suggest that a new parliament should be elected, which would discuss and adopt the new constitution and that, together with the elections, a referendum be held on the basic principles: The distribution of power within the Federation, private property, and human rights.

[Reporter] Are human rights sufficiently safeguarded by the text of the constitution?

[Burbulis] Basically yes. There was hardly any dispute about that; we are in agreement with the entire civilized world in this respect; there was no resistance by the Soviet communists, either.

[Reporter] Is the position of the president in the new constitution sufficient for you?

[Burbulis] I organized the campaign for the presidential elections in 1991 for Boris Yeltsin, and afterwards as state secretary I was directly responsible for the construction of the presidential system. I cannot be fully satisfied with the rights that are now given to the president. The constitution is a compromise with the current way of thinking, the endless attacks by the majority of the deputies. The text is not the last word, there can still be some polishing.

[Reporter] The president may be as strong as he likes, but all of his power is of no use to him if the individual republics get more rights.

[Burbulis] We have to struggle with the Soviet legacy, with the fact that, on the one hand, the republics were established on the basis of the nation state principle, and, on the other hand, there were 66 administrative districts with arbitrary borders, which did not correspond to the will of their inhabitants—a communist perversity.

[Reporter] In the new constitution the non-Russian republics are considered "sovereign," while the Russian Government districts expressly have equal rights but are not sovereign. The consequences: They also declare themselves as republics, because they want to decide themselves what to do with their taxes and their raw materials.

[Burbulis] That is the point.

[Reporter] This might lead to the disintegration of Russia.

[Burbulis] If we had ideal conditions, we should form 15 to 20 governments, with their own legislative power and with completely equal rights, such as the laender in Germany, for instance. This would be the best version, at least for a transitional period of five years.

[Reporter] Your home town of Sverdlovsk in the Urals, which is now called Yekaterinburg, has a strong, functioning industry—even the gigantic machine-building corporation Uralmash has sufficient orders. If it were independent, the region might live better than today, when it is not.

[Burbulis] In Sverdlovsk some people are even thinking about a Ural republic. This is a dangerous trend. The Urals have become Russia's industrial core because of the efforts of all of Russia, and, there, in the future, too, only the state administration in Moscow, after coordination with the regions, can make sure that underdeveloped areas make progress.

[Reporter] Can you still go home to Yekaterinburg with this view?

[Burbulis] I was there recently. Some people support me, others do not like me, even hate me. Many who elected me as deputy in 1989 are loyal to my principles and myself.

[Reporter] When elections are held soon, there is only one party with a nationwide organization and about 40 percent of followers: the Communist Party. In the new parliament, the State Duma, they are faced by about a dozen fragmented groups. This could hardly be different from the old Supreme Soviet.

[Burbulis] I favor electing the new parliament for two and a half years, and to link the elections of the next parliament with the presidential elections, which are due then. In the State Duma three blocks will probably form then. In addition to the communist revanchists and the democratic reformers—with the president—a third group is emerging, whom I would like to call the pragmatists.

[Reporter] How do you define these?

[Burbulis] Now is the hour of the doers. We know what must be done, and we are the experts to put the economy in order. We create legal security, so that each citizen may freely pursue his business.

[Reporter] Thus, your three blocks represent the Communists, the Westerners, and those who represent the Russian virtues of practical reason and improvisation.

[Burbulis] Where do you place me?

[Reporter] It is said that it has always been your quality to maneuver between the frontlines, firmly keeping in mind the goal of achieving reforms.

[Burbulis] Thank you. That is politics.

Barsukov on Barannikov Ouster, Yakubovskiy

PM1008140093 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 93 First Edition p5

[Interview with Lieutenant General Mikhail Barsukov, chief of Russia's Main Directorate of Protection and Kremlin commandant, by Sergey Mostovshchikov; place and date not given: "Kremlin Passions, Through the Eyes of the Kremlin Commandant"]

[Text] The Russian authorities' struggle for power in Russia has moved into a phase of exposing how much your political opponents have stolen. The sides have set up commissions to measure the degree of corruption of key figures in the state. By virtue of the extreme secrecy surrounding events, it is rather hard to tell: Is the amount of compromising material about each other still being measured in suitcases, or have we moved on to even bigger units?... At the moment the population has to make do with rumors. Following Viktor Barannikov's removal from the post of security minister for violating mysterious ethical norms, it is being said that the clash of titans will most likely end in a coup d'etat, and even that Boris Yeltsin is close to death. In an attempt to obtain information about the real state of affairs, IZVESTIYA met with someone to whom certain sources assign one of the most significant roles in the current events. He is 46-year-old Lieutenant General Mikhail Barsukov, chief of Russia's Main Directorate of Protection and commandant of the Kremlin.

[Mostovshchikov] Mikhail Ivanovich, judging by what I have heard and read about you recently, a great deal depends on you in this country. They say you are a powerful figure with a very substantial influence on the president...

[Barsukov] I too have heard and read a lot about myself recently. Apparently Boris Nikolayevich and I are on a friendly footing, and more or less all questions relating to the country's life are tackled by the two of us together...

My job is to protect the Kremlin, safeguard its normal work, and protect the president. And those are the tasks I fulfill. My relationship with Boris Nikolayevich is that of subordinate and boss. I am a serviceman and I follow the requirements laid down in the Regulations. All the rest is common gossip.

[Mostovshchikov] You know, I rather like common gossip. The common people account for the majority of the country's population. It was the common people, incidentally, who elected President Yeltsin and have their own way of looking at what is happening know. I don't know whether it is the same in the Kremlin, but among us, on the other side of the wall, it is being said, in particular, that it was your directorate that collected the compromising material on Viktor Barannikov, listened in on his telephone conversations, and kept him under surveillance. Is that true?

[Barsukov] No. I do not even have the technical facilities to do that. The directorate has a technical operations section, but it is concerned not with bugging, but with the equipment needed to protect the president and other individuals. Metal detectors, special government communications lines, etc. My people do not know how to keep people under surveillance—their skills are different. Covert observation, which my security guards are trained to do, and constant surveillance are different things, from the professional point of view. So I can tell you absolutely clearly: We did not keep Barannikov under surveillance and we did not bug his telephones.

[Mostovshchikov] Mikhail Ivanovich, if you are trying to convince me that you are not in the know, I still do not believe you. The president removes the security minister from office. So was there was some kind of threat to the president's own security? The president's security is your responsibility...

[Barsukov] I do not think Viktor Barannikov was removed from office because his department had begun to represent a danger to the president. Obviously something else is involved here. Viktor Barannikov and the president had a very good personal relationship. But arguments were probably put forward that made Boris Nikolayevich do what he did. As I understand it, the decision to remove the security minister from office was not easy for the president. He agonized over it.

[Mostovshchikov] ...And now, from the meager information that filters through to us, we learn, for instance, that Viktor Barannikov, former friend of the president, is now virtually under house arrest, with all communications cut off...

[Barsukov] Following the president's edict, as a former official, he was cut off from government communications, and the special switchboard does not serve him. But the city telephones work, and there are absolutely no restrictions on his freedom of movement. Viktor Barannikov's dacha is, as usual, under the protection of Security Ministry staffers. He has also kept his car and his personal bodyguard.

[Mostovshchikov] Incidentally, coming back to the question of friends. Before parting, it would be no bad thing to have things out. Did the president meet with Viktor Barannikov on the eve of his edict?

[Barsukov] The day after the Security Council session at which the question of the Tajik border situation was discussed, Boris Nikolayevich had a personal meeting with the security minister at 1100 hours. I do not know what they talked about... And at 1500 the president met with the Security Ministry leadership.

[Mostovshchikov] Not many people know about Yeltsin's discussion with Barannikov, to this day. Why is it, do you think, that neither the president nor the dismissed minister

has tried to explain to the country what lies behind the mysterious phrase about ethical violations?

[Barsukov] I think it will all become clear to everyone when the Russian Federation Security Council interdepartmental commission on combating crime and corruption, which is studying cases of bribe-taking by top state officials, publishes its findings.

[Mostovshchikov] But I still don't understand: Are we talking about an ethical violation, or corruption?

[Barsukov] I cannot say anything about that. Let us wait for the commission's findings.

[Mostovshchikov] Another question, then. What does a young man by the name of Dmitriy Yakubovskiy have to do with all the recent scandals?

[Barsukov] What I know of this young man is that he is a very resourceful "comrade" and was able in a very short time to organize conversion affairs in our country in such a way that he became useful to a fairly large number of very high-ranking people. He had good connections: He drove around Moscow in a Mercedes in the government lanes, with a personal bodyguard of 15 people hired for hard currency. The GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] escorted him....

[Mostovshchikov] And not only the GAI, so they say. It is well known that Yakubovskiy visited the Russian Prosecutor's Office a few days ago, flying into the country on an aircraft specially allocated to him for the purpose. And it seems that your people had something to do with this too. Wasn't the young man met at the airport by the "Alfa" group, which is subordinate to you?

[Barsukov] No, that is not true, "Alfa" did not meet him. He flew in quietly by himself and quietly flew home to Toronto.

[Mostovshchikov] But there are documents circulating in Moscow in which, for instance, General Korzhakov, chief of Yeltsin's bodyguard, is described as an influential person who simply hates Yakubovskiy and cherishes a plan to put this exceptionally well informed young man behind bars.

[Barsukov] I don't know about "hates" him. It simply became known that Dmitriy Yakubovskiy was presenting himself in some circles as an adviser to the criminal police, attorneys, the prosecutor's office, the Security Ministry, the MVD [Internal Affairs Ministry], the Russian Federation Government, and other very important departments. But even that was not enough for him, so he even called himself a presidential adviser. He was never a presidential adviser. Only a crook would behave like that. But that is my personal opinion. Let the appropriate bodies concern themselves with the facts.

[Mostovshchikov] Mikhail Ivanovich, I personally have the impression that at the moment we have a quite excessive quantity of bodies, all of which are concerning themselves with the facts, and all of which are promising to unmask everyone. As a result there is talk of an impending coup d'etat and of the total impotence of Boris Yeltsin, who is taking various strange steps in a panic...

[Barsukov] I think the talk of a coup is a result of the third wave of attacks on Boris Nikolayevich. But he is strong enough to deal with that and much else besides.

[Mostovshchikov] Then why does he make virtually no appearances anywhere and why does he not explain the nature of events in the country?

[Barsukov] Because he is a serious politician and does not want to make statements or take steps in undue haste. He is making a sober assessment of the situation.

[Mostovshchikov] But you know, while he is making his sober assessment, people are saying that he has more or less turned to drink, his liver has packed up, and he will not live beyond the new year. And so Aleksandr Rutskoy is doing his exercises every day...

[Barsukov] I am not going to say anything about this rubbish. Come with me... [interview ends]

After these words I was led along well guarded corridors to the Kremlin's Marble Hall, where a government session on economic matters was in progress. By way of the main argument in favor of stability in the country, I was shown, through the door, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin personally, sitting in the presidium. In addition, I was informed that at 1800 on that day the president would be playing tennis with Nursultan Nazarbayev.

So life goes on.

Shaposhnikov on Use of Corruption Claims for Political Ends

PM1108085593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Aug 93 p 1

[Russian Security Council Secretary Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov article under the "Security" rubric: "'Not Worth Counting 'Suitcases' in Struggle Against Corruption,' Security Council Secretary Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov Considers"]

[Text] The question of the struggle against corruption is a most important factor in stabilizing the economic situation in the country and also for the people's confidence in their present and future. Unfortunately, this struggle has now reached deadlock. It is increasingly acquiring a political complexion. What is going on is not a search for the genuinely corrupt figures who find it convenient to fish in troubled waters, but rather one branch of power is looking for compromising materials against the other. Discussion centers around who has the most "suitcases" [of evidence; allusion to Rutskoy speech] and the like. What is more, a section of the law enforcement agencies is gradually being drawn into this. Their staffers cannot but begin to wonder: Are they doing the right thing? Will this turn out badly for them later on? This is the most dangerous of signs. In my view, the law enforcement structures should not be subjected to pressure and should be rescued from the syndrome of involvement with any branch of power. They

should work for the state, in the interests of the people, and not for a separate group of people.

I wish that organs of power, officials, and the mass media would refrain from judging the actions of particular figures. In a normal society it is the courts and nobody else which have the right to deliver a legal judgment and to describe a representative of the authorities as corrupt or a criminal. Otherwise society becomes polarized and begins to fragment into supporters and opponents of particular political groups.

Economic Issues

Chernomyrdin 6 Aug Report to Council of Ministers

PM1008143193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Aug 93 pp 1, 2

[Report delivered by Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation, to a 6 August enlarged session of the Council of Ministers: "Viktor Chernomyrdin: Government's Economic Measures Are a Platform of National Accord"—first four paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] **The socioeconomic situation of the country and measures designed to stabilize it were the focus of attention of the participants in a session of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation held at the Kremlin yesterday under the chairmanship of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The presidents and supreme soviet chairmen of the constituent republics of the Russian Federation, leaders of the central organs of federal executive authority, and heads of administrations and chairmen of the soviets of krays, oblasts, and autonomous formations took part.**

Opening the session, President Boris Yeltsin proposed a minute's silence in honor of the memory of Russians who have died on the Tajik-Afghan border and in Vladikavkaz.

A report on the state of the Russian economy and its development prospects was delivered by Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation.

Leaders of ministries and departments of the constituent republics of the Russian Federation and heads of administrations of krays, oblasts, and autonomous formations took part in a discussion of the report.

Esteemed President,

Esteemed members of the government and participants in the session of the Council of Ministers,

Today's enlarged session of the government coincides with a difficult time in Russia's existence. The situation in the national economy is difficult, and the situation in the political sphere is as difficult and, maybe, even more so. And these processes, moreover, intersect, as it were, and influence each other—and not always positively. We all have to understand that the current state of our state system is the main constraint on the course of forming a market economy in Russia. The government considers that in present conditions only one option—namely, the completion of the work started by the Constitutional Conference—provides the optimal political conditions for advancing the reform. However, we must first of all come to terms with what is happening in our own house and impose order there, since many shortcomings and difficulties have emerged in the Russian economy as a result of the fact that a uniform sociopolitical policy has not been elaborated and, most importantly, that no mechanism for its implementation has been created.

Seven months ago, when it embarked on this work, the present government was clearly aware that it had to continue the reform launched in 1992, to advance unhesitatingly, and to consolidate and develop the progressive changes wrought in economic life and the outlook of the active section of the people. At the same time it was essential to analyze and objectively evaluate the real situation in Russia's economy and the results of reforming it in 1992. It was necessary to pinpoint the basic trends of development in the national economy and the main sore points and major problems which the Russian economy is contending with in the transitional period. Finally, it was necessary to carry out an audit of all our available financial, material, production, and intellectual resources, that is to say, the real resources available for tackling the problems facing us. The important conclusion drawn at that time was that, economically speaking, present-day Russia is a completely different state. It is not the RSFSR, which formed a constituent part of the single economic organism of the former USSR. Russia has become politically sovereign, but economically it is a far from free country. Its economy is still firmly bound by thousands of threads to the economies of countries which have now become Russia's nearest foreign neighbors. With each independent step that Russia and the former union republics take along the path of reforms those threads break and have a painful effect upon the general state of their economies and the standard of living of their peoples.

Russia and its neighbors have common concerns or concerns which are in many respects similar. They are countries with a deformed economic structure. They are countries where the state is only just determining its new role with regard to the individual, civil society, and the external world. They are countries where the political activeness of the population in no way matches its ability to adapt to market relations and new conditions of life. Today we have a better idea than before where we have come from, what we have lost, what we have acquired, what we have, and where we intend to go. A number of documents have been drafted recently which form integral elements of such a unified policy. They are, first, the joint statement of the Government and the Central Bank of Russia, which articulates the basic avenues of financial and credit policy. Second, there is the privatization program. And finally, there is the federal program for the structural restructuring of the economy through 1995. However, all these elements of socioeconomic policy were drawn up by different departments without any coordination whatsoever. We suffer from the fragmentation and disjunction of the

components of our single state mechanism. That is why I consider it imperative that we create in the very near future—with the direct involvement of all the federal organs of executive power and the regions—an effective mechanism for the implementation of the Russian Government's uniform socioeconomic policy. The government report on the state of the Russian economy and the prospects for its development, the text of which has been presented to you, could serve as the basis of that work. The draft of the government's work program, prepared on the basis of the report, has also been distributed. I would ask you to express your opinions on the substance of the provisions contained in those documents. And to look at the problems in a somewhat wider context, in the light of the fact that society expects answers to the following question: "Where are we?" "Where are we going?" and "What do we want to achieve by launching radical transformations in the economy?"

However, I will first of all address **the state of the economy today and the basic trends in its development in the first half-year.**

The economic situation remained in the first half-year of 1993, as in 1992, extremely difficult. However, analysis shows that on the whole no deterioration of the situation has occurred in 1993 compared with the end of 1992. Moreover, the first signs of an abatement of the crisis situation are emerging. Note, I am not talking about stabilization—we are still a long way off that. But I am talking specifically about **signs** of improvement. What do I mean? I will dwell only on the major problems. As far as the level of inflation is concerned, here there are positive, albeit small, improvements. After the rate of growth of inflation approached the 30-percent mark in January and then February of this year, it fell off dramatically to 16-18 percent in March-April, and then did not exceed 20 percent right through to July. This has to be seen as a positive fact. The dynamics of output in **industry** have become quite different. In the first seven months of the current year the volume of industrial output fell by 16.6 percent as against 25.3 percent in the same period in 1992. If you measure the volume of industrial output in percentage terms against the preceding month, then in the 10 months starting September 1992 the level of industrial output only varies slightly from last September's level. If you take into consideration the fact that the State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat] is virtually working in the old way, but bear in mind that many enterprises have long been reprofiled to produce other output and that many new joint-stock companies, societies, and private enterprises have emerged which are also not taken into consideration by Goskomstat, then the actual level of output will be considerably different, namely, higher. At the same time it has not proven possible to fully rectify the situation in industry. The adverse trends formed in recent years persist in virtually all sectors.

The situation in the Russian economy in terms of the results of the first half-year bears out the conclusion drawn by the government back in April, as you will remember. We remain in a state of temporary, unsteady balance. On the one hand, the prerequisites for gradual attainment of the trajectory of economic growth are taking shape. On the other hand, however, the danger of the deepening of the crisis processes and of their acquiring the characteristics of stagnation is obvious. In point of fact we have, since the start of the year, been in a new stage of economic reform where the question of creating a new mechanism for the state to influence the development of national economic processes has been posed more keenly than ever before. That, strictly speaking, is what the drafts of the documents presented for your attention today are oriented toward. Now let us address the painful subjects, the **most urgent problems**. The most important sphere of activity continues to be **the stabilization of the financial situation in Russia's economy and the fight against inflation**. You cannot "cancel" inflation by edict or decree. In this situation the state does not have all that many levers: It can restrain the budget deficit and the growth of the money supply. At the same time, the government is aware that, being realistic, you cannot use "shock therapy" methods and aim to eliminate the deficit within one month or one quarter without causing irreparable damage to the economy.

We have reached agreement with the Bank of Russia concerning the gradual reduction of the rate of increase in credit emission: that is, restriction of the increase in the money supply in the economy. There has been some success in reducing state expenditure by giving up ineffective programs. But if we relax even for a moment and abandon the restrictions we have placed on ourselves, then all previous efforts will prove to have been in vain and the country will be thrown backward. In this situation, the stance of the Russian Supreme Soviet, which has ratified a "historic" budget with a republic budget deficit of unprecedented size—around 23 trillion rubles [R]—is absolutely incomprehensible. In other words, less than half of state expenditure will be covered by the taxes that are collected. The rest will be financed via the printing press. But let us imagine for a moment that the government implements the Law on the Budget adopted by the Supreme Soviet. What can we expect? The amount of money which has to be printed before the end of the year will be more than double the amount in circulation today. Savings, earnings, investments, pensions, budget allocations, and funds in enterprise accounts will depreciate to half of their previous value. Money will even depreciate in the short space of time while a person is standing in line at the cashier's desk.

Unfortunately, it has not been just the Supreme Soviet's decrees but also the decisions of the executive that have made their contribution to shattering the logic of the reform and destabilizing the budget. What is the value of measures to financially "pacify" the regions if, as a rule, these measures are of a hasty and expedient nature and are mainly tied to resolving strictly political rather than economic problems. The only possibility of ensuring the recovery of the economy today is by means of the consistent but judicious continuation of the government's tough financial policy, and the gradual reduction of the budget deficit. The state must live within its means. Every ruble of additional budget expenditure financed by credit from the Bank of Russia is an accelerator of inflation and destroyer

of the economy. In the second half of 1993, the government has outlined a whole range of additional measures to significantly reduce expenditure and increase budget revenue. In particular, on the revenue side of the budget it is planned that an excise duty will be introduced on gas and the rate of excise on petroleum will be raised to 30 percent.

A decision has been adopted on transferring to free prices in the sale of coal as of 1 July 1993. At the same time, with the aim of restraining the rise in coal prices, state support for the coal industry has been retained at the level of the subsidies envisaged for 1992. There is no doubt that the rise in the price of energy sources exerts an influence on the growth of energy tariffs. Admittedly, for the sake of fairness, it must be noted that power industry workers are also making their "contribution" to the headlong price race by shamelessly setting charges for industry and railroad workers too high, and at the same time unjustifiably extending the circle of preferential consumers (for example, the Rostov and Ulyanovsk power systems).

I cannot avoid broaching the painful subject of recent events connected with the well-known decision of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to exchange the money dating from 1961-1992. This apparently technical action, which had the necessary rational basis, proved not to have been duly calculated or prepared either at the organizational or political levels, or even, if you like, at the psychological level. The Russian president made the necessary amendments to this decision. I would like specially to stress: We are talking about a mistake and a miscalculation which must be rectified, and from which lessons must be learned. To look for some kid of "plot" here, a deliberately prepared and conducted action to destabilize the situation in the country, is to think too highly of those who devised this precise method for exchanging bank notes. The fuss over the exchange of the old money is dying down. According to Bank of Russia figures, R903 billion had been handed in as of 4 August, of which R241 billion was through savings banks. The Russians only exchanged R10 billion yesterday, against the R47 billion handed in 3 August. The government's practical activity in the sphere of financial stabilization is not limited to elaborating and implementing measures for the routine regulation of the budget revenue and expenditure. At present work has started to elaborate the 1994 budget, which, it is intended, will involve the beginning of the cardinal reform of the budget system.

On Taxes. It must be noted that in the first six-and-a-half months of 1993 the situation in respect of tax collection improved somewhat: Over R12.8 trillion was paid into the budget. The amendment of the tax legislation and more clear-cut work on the part of the tax services, where the Department of the Tax Police is developing its activity, have had an effect also. However, at the moment the scale of tax evasion (10-15 percent of the total of receipts, according to assessments) is great, and the nonpayment situation is adversely impacting on the stability of tax collection. It must be said that the **nonpayments problem**, which time and again rises to the level of a threat to the stability of the economy, cannot be resolved overnight, since it is rooted in the behavior of many enterprises which are still operating according to the old ideas. The habit of accumulating as many resources as possible "as a reserve," channeling the funds received not into paying for output supplied but into wages, and saving the dollars earned from exports until better times is still a tenacious one. How else can it be explained that as of 1 June 1993 almost $9 billion had built up in the accounts of commercial banks in our country alone? For what reason and why are they not being put to work? Many people automatically see the reciprocal offsetting of debts and the system of preferential credits practiced throughout Russia as the solution to the nonpayment problem. We have already been through this. That method can only provide temporary relief, but will not radically cure us of nonpayments. Let us be blunt: There will be no more automatic offset payments [zachety]. The strategy is different now—the transfer in the immediate future to commercial bills of exchange with the use of these promissory notes to speed up transactions, and also the bankruptcy process. Strictly speaking, all the necessary conditions for this, including legal and legislative conditions, are in place. And if payments are not made, then you should not appeal to your "benefactor" in the government but to the courts, and institute legal proceedings to declare a particular debtor bankrupt.

The point and intention of our policy in this sphere is to teach enterprises to pay their debts off instead of being stupefied by the credit drug. In this connection we see our main task in this sphere as the speediest implementation in economic practice of the financial clearing-up [sanatsiya] procedures envisaged in the Law on Bankruptcy. Incidentally, I would recall again: Bankruptcy is not quite the same as the liquidation of insolvent enterprises. In European countries and the United States, several enterprises go bankrupt every day, but the countries do not fall apart and no particular tragedies happen to the workers. On the contrary, they find themselves in different circumstances: with able and businesslike leaders, and life goes on and, as a rule, gets better; and our aim is primarily recovery and financial support at the reorganization stage. So what is stopping us from using the Law on Bankruptcy—which came into force some time ago—in practice? This is a question for the State Committee for the Management of State Property [Goskomimushchestvo] and the Ministry of the Economy. So where is your role? Why are there no proposals, dear leaders Chubays and Lobov?

And now, something about our **industrial policy**. I have frequently—including at the previous enlarged Council of Ministers sitting—named the basic principles of selective [izbiratelnyy] state support for production, and listed the priorities of this policy. At present, work is continuing on the Federal Program for the Structural Restructuring of the Russian Economy Through 1995. The mechanism for the realization of priorities is being constructed not only using state structures but, in particular, with the active involvement of private and joint-stock companies, joint enterprises, and their capital, in the renewal of production. The start of the construction of a seaport near St. Petersburg can serve as an example of this. We are also exerting serious efforts in galvanizing small and medium business,

and developing healthy competitive principles. The relevant government documents which grant privileges and create conditions for the development of entrepreneurship have been elaborated, and it is a question of putting them into practice. One of the important aspects of industrial policy should be assistance on the part of the state in the formation of modern industrial joint-stock companies with a diversified production ensuring sufficient stability. Such companies should bring together assembly-line plants, scientific research institutes, and design bureaus. The creation of financial-industrial groups is designed to be the highest form of the creation of strong components [subyekty] of the Russian economy. This is dictated both by world experience and by the historical peculiarities of our country, and meets the needs of Russian industry to win a worthy place in world markets. The process of creating such organisms has already begun, but the relevant government organs must intensify work with each other in this sphere and coordinate it more clearly.

Targeted structural [strukturnyy selektivnyy] policy presupposes not just the priority status of certain spheres of industrial activity but also reliance on strong, really market-oriented leaders and producers who are capable of running enterprises profitably and ensuring that Russian companies break into the world market, who do not constantly beg for state budget resources but show initiative and thus merit the various forms of state support customary in civilized states. Here it would be completely wrong to set major companies off against small or medium ones. World experience shows that industry and the economy prosper on the whole in those countries where you have an optimal combination of high-powered major industrial companies and concerns and numerous small and medium enterprises. I want to dwell, in particular, upon the **defense sectors** of industry. Enterprises in that complex—scientific and industrial enterprises—are going through a tough time. The conversion process has not yet acquired stability. Since the 65-67 percent cut in the defense order in 1992 the volume of defense orders in the overwhelming majority of them is now down to 20-25 percent. However, the conversion process, or, better put, the transformation of many defense complex enterprises, has not yet become steady and purposeful. I had the opportunity to see this for myself in Severodvinsk and Saratov.

At the same time certain positive shifts have become apparent. There has been an increase in the production of equipment for the agro-industrial complex, light industry, the textiles industry, and the fuel and energy complex, where new home-produced technology is being introduced. The draft state program for the conversion of the defense industry for the period through 1995 was recently adopted. At the new stage of reforms conversion has to be seen above all as one of the most important socioeconomic processes for reforming the Russian economy and as a very important component of targeted structural policy. Russia is one of a mere handful of countries in the world which possesses the unique ability to produce highly sophisticated technical systems and structures. We must not lose this ability, an ability located above all in the highly skilled cadres and strong organizations of the defense complex of the former Soviet Union, but must carefully redirect most of it toward tackling the tasks of developing the civilian sector of the economy. However, there are more than enough problems here for the time being. The state's debt to enterprises carrying out state orders and for military goods produced exceeded R260 billion rubles in the first seven months of the year. The receipt of conversion credits was also delayed. As a result many enterprises have not paid out wages in the last two-three months. In some regions a prestrike situation has emerged. The government assumes the responsibility of preserving our national asset—the defense "core" of science and industry. The proposals submitted to the government by the Defense Ministry are designed to secure the state defense order for 1994 at a level which ensures the maintenance of advanced technologies and the minimum profitability of defense production. To this end the Defense Ministry must, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry and the Ministry of the Economy, continue pursuing the line of concentrating defense orders at those enterprises which best meet the requirements for the production of military equipment. The Defense Ministry must submit its long-term program through the year 2000 and beyond by the very tight, government-set deadline of 1 September. Industry is anxiously awaiting this new program. It is essential to see through to the end the work launched on an interdepartmental basis to complete the basic tenets of military doctrine and military policy.

Questions of **privatization** are closely linked to problems of industrial policy. The nonstate sector of the Russian economy has grown from 13 percent at the start of 1992 to 42 percent at present. This shows that privatization has already yielded results which are irreversible. At the same time there are no few problems here. I have to agree with the criticism leveled at us here. The introduction of the state privatization program has been protracted. But if you are to advance privatization it is essential above all that you increase the amount of property being privatized, this being done first and foremost by increasing the scale of share flotations and the sale of property and ensuring absolute implementation of the Russian Federation president's edict "On Additional Measures To Protect Russian Citizens' Right to Participate in Privatization." In point of fact, **the postprivatization support of enterprises**—including the establishment of credit terms, rendering methodological assistance, and exercising state monitoring of the activity of enterprises and facilities engaged in the defense of national interests and the performance of statewide tasks, including those related to social protection of the population—is a new priority area of activity for Goskomimushchestvo.

Let's us now look at our **agrarian policy**. This year the government adopted a number of important decisions concerning financial support for agriculture, and we ensured the availability of credit to meet the priority needs of agriculture, deliveries of fuel, equipment, and fertilizers. All this made it possible to conclude without substantial complications the overwintering of livestock and to carry

out the spring field work. There has been a slowdown in the rate of decline in livestock and poultry numbers. The yield from cows has in recent months exceeded last year's level.

Getting the harvest in is the most important current task of both government and local administrations. This year, given good organization of the harvesting, the country can and must bring in around 120 million tonnes of grain. The peasants in our country now have the opportunity not just to purchase but also to trade in grain for themselves in the world market. We have pretty good preconditions for a good harvest of grain and other agricultural crops, while in a number of oblasts an all-time record crop has already ripened in the fields. In the second half of the year we plan to considerably cut back on purchases of imported food and grain. We are keeping only the most essential. At the same time, as my recent trips to Saratov and Orenburg and the south of Russia showed, the mechanisms for supporting agriculture and getting money to each farm operate intolerably badly and slowly. How can you explain that money appropriated with such difficulty from the budget and credits take 10-12 days or more to get from oblast to rayon centers and as many days again to reach the farms—how are they to purchase fuel, spare parts, and so forth?! We are not entitled to put up with this. It is time to ask financial organs and banking structures to account for why this is happening. And to ask that question at every level. However, I will say quite frankly that we are at the limit of the state's ability to finance the agrarian sector. In tackling these problems we must not reduce the whole matter to increasing soft loans and subsidies, which mostly disappear into a great hole, as it were, and yield no return.

Nor must we forget our long-term programs or the technical standards of production. This work has hardly been carried out at all in the last couple of years. Demand for new strains of seed and pedigree livestock has fallen off sharply, and little attention is being paid to improving soils and introducing mineral fertilizers. We are thereby condemning ourselves to losses and backwardness in the very near future. I would like to dwell, in particular, on the prices of grain from the new harvest. Their level ultimately determines food prices. During purchases for the federal food stocks the government determined them on average at the level of R60,000 per tonne of grain, with around R70,000 per tonne in August once indexation is taken into account. Given existing conditions, this is the most acceptable solution, as it provides, on the one hand, for support of agriculture and, on the other, ensures a restrained growth in foodstuff prices. However, in this event considerable sums will be required from the state to subsidize low-income groups in the population. Budget subsidies for grain destined for baking bread will be maintained until the end of 1993. Subsidies for livestock products will also be continued.

In view of the particular features of this year's harvest, the government has resolved to accept the entire grown crop for safe custody at the elevators, essentially free of charge, from all structures—sovkhozes, kolkhozes, private farms, and others. The demonopolization of the system of state grain purchases should also be considered. Figuratively speaking, we will very soon need not one Cheshinskiy but five, ten, or twenty Cheshinskiys, who will be able to compete with one another and establish real market prices for grain. Many questions regarding the agro-industrial complex were discussed yesterday at a major conference conducted by V. Shumeyko and A. Zaveryukha, the proposals of which will be taken into consideration in the Council of Ministers decision.

When enumerating the government's policy priorities we sometimes don't get as far as those items which, by bad tradition, usually end up at the very bottom of every possible list—that is to say, the problems of **science and culture**. I would like to avoid on this occasion the charge of ignoring those issues, particularly as science, fundamental science above all, and our national culture have entered the "danger zone" today. Our task in the immediate future is to preserve Russian scientific and cultural potential. We will find the money for this, we will have to slim down elsewhere, in other areas, but we will not abandon this priority sphere. But preserving does not mean mothballing. We will create a system of state scientific centers, form a new mechanism for the implementation of state scientific and technical programs, make use of nonstate forms, too, and, in particular, develop small-scale, innovatory enterprise. We also need a well-defined policy to prevent the brain drain and safeguard our most valuable scientific schools. In the sphere of culture the government regards the maintenance of historical and cultural monuments, museums, libraries, and archives, and state support for young talents, as priority areas for budget financing. Of course, you cannot finance everything out of the budget. Therefore the government is drawing up measures to make use of new ways and means of attracting and allocating resources to the sphere of culture.

Now for our **social policy**. This section of the government's work is virtually the most vulnerable and difficult today. It is a fact that more than three-quarters of the population of Russia have incomes below the minimum subsistence level. The measures taken by the government of Russia in the sphere of maintaining realistic incomes for the population (the levels of pay, pensions, benefits, and grants have been frequently revised) has made it possible to mitigate somewhat the social consequences of the present phase of reform, and the decline in living standards has on the whole slowed. The upcoming structural restructuring and the enactment of legislation on bankruptcy will inevitably entail a marked worsening of the situation in the labor market. A procedure is envisaged by the government to provide social safeguards for workers in the event of the reorganization or closure of their enterprises. The rights of regional administrations to determine the socially acceptable level of unemployment and to adopt additional measures to contain it are being widened. Exercising the right of legislative initiative, we intend to speed up the establishment of the legal base of social support for the population, to coordinate the efforts of central and local organs of power, and to adhere strictly to the principle of departmental responsibility [adresnost].

The state of affairs in the social sphere does depend, of course, to a large extent on the work of the relevant ministries and departments and on their coordination of state policy in the sphere of social relations with our economic policy as a whole. Unfortunately, collaboration between the Labor Ministry and the Finance and Economy Ministries of Russia is unsatisfactory. Of late the Russian Labor Ministry has been endeavoring to send the basic draft decisions to the local level for agreement. But what is the upshot of this? As a rule, blanket demands to increase revenue and boost benefits. But who will seek out the sources of the funds and revenue for those purposes and provide a socioeconomic evaluation of the drafts submitted?

The government attaches paramount significance to the elaboration and implementation of **regional policy**. Only by correlating statewide interests with the interests of all components of the Federation and making them congruous will we be able to carry out economic reform. The problem of the equality of the components of the Federation is one of our most acute current problems. Eliminating the historically shaped differences here by a one-shot action is clearly a nonstarter. The task therefore is to make make gradual progress in that direction through joint efforts. High-handed spontaneous acts—be they the proclamation of new "republics" or a desire to obtain unjustified advantages over other components of the Federation—run counter to our course of pursuing the reform and preserving the integrity of Russia. I address this specially to Rossel, head of administration of Sverdlovsk Oblast, and a number of other leaders. Calculations, actual calculations, show that there is virtually no single region in Russia, including Sverdlovsk, which will survive on its own, not simply won't get by, but won't, I stress, survive! Is that really not clear?

Unfortunately, we are carried away by the political and legal aspects of regional policy, often forgetting about its economic foundation. In conditions of the transition to market relations only a regional economic policy is capable of serving as the basis of a federal state, a state built on the basis of the fundamental economic interests of the regions rather than the short-term considerations of politicians. That applies to Tatarstan and others. Surely the tragedy at the Kama Truck Plant is a lesson! Could a single republic restore it? Of course not. I will say frankly that the efforts in carrying out the economic reforms will be pointless if the components of the Federation, led on by the arrogance of certain of its leaders, start independently introducing restrictions on the import of goods by enterprises, setting up their own customs barriers, violating the bases of the budget system and tax legislation, establishing export quotas, and so forth. The retention of that policy is impermissible and, in point of fact, means the start of the collapse of the economic area of the federal state. In general we have a paradox: Many CIS countries are waiting in line, ready now to share their sovereignty at least with Russia, while some of our own components are getting carried away with the idea of sovereignty.

The government regards the **normalization of economic ties with the countries of the former Soviet Union and the elaboration of an effective mechanism for cooperation** as one of the priority areas of its economic policy. Specific measures have been taken—and they are already yielding results—to create conditions for restoring and deepening direct ties among enterprises, sectors, and regions of the former union republics. The process of converting the technical credits granted by the Central Bank of Russia to the countries of the Commonwealth, Azerbaijan, and Georgia into a state debt owed by those countries to the Russian Federation is nearing completion. On the whole it has to be said that encouraging positive moves have been seen of late in relations among the Commonwealth states. Grounds have emerged for the signing of the Treaty on the Creation of an Economic Union, which is designed to put collaboration among CIS countries on a qualitatively new level. The Russian Federation Government attaches the same major importance to the accord achieved on implementing closer economic integration with Belarus and Ukraine. We regard this route as promising and also applicable to bilateral relations with other Commonwealth states.

Now for a few words about **foreign** affairs. Our fundamental approaches have been set out in the documents made available to you. For that reason I would like, without repeating myself, to dwell on just a few aspects of them.

We need both the West and the East, but they need us just as much. For instance, the industrially developed countries can no longer avoid the danger of new energy crises without Russia. I had, incidentally, interesting conversations about this during my visit to Germany. And we understood one another. Bilateral projects in the energy sector (including the development of deposits) are already in train. I will say bluntly that considerable potential opportunities for growth in the economy have developed in our country. However, it is also necessary to see the problem here, a problem that is essentially a nationwide one. Our very rich country does not have enough transportation branch lines, border storage facilities, or ports. Therefore our route toward the world economy sometimes looks like a sack race—cheerful and absurd—although some people are carrying off the prizes for themselves. We need a decisive breakthrough in exports. We will channel streams of private domestic and foreign investments into such projects and determine the extent of government and regional participation in them. Today this is becoming one of the most important priorities of state policy.

The relative significance of the tasks connected with defending the economic interests of the country in our foreign economic activity is to grow considerably. Much has already been done here, witness the results of Russia's participation in the meeting with the G-7 leaders (7-9 July 1993). The G-7 assumed specific commitments in Tokyo geared to Russia's priority needs. The main content of the dialogue with the West is no longer so much the amount of credit and financial assistance for Russia and its scheduling but the **creation of optimal conditions for Russia to**

reach the international markets that are important for us (nuclear materials, the provision of space services, and so forth). The preconditions for this are now in place. There has been a shift toward curtailing discriminatory restrictions affecting Russia at the level of COCOM and national legislations. The Russian-American agreements on cooperation in space are, in particular, an indicator of this. The utilization of these agreements could generate an income of $2 billion for Russia.

Foreign policy may do a great deal to ensure that reform proceeds in a stable fashion in other spheres too. First of all this means political-diplomatic endeavors to **eliminate conflicts in "trouble spots"**. Russia cannot afford the thoughtless luxury of getting involved in them. Our efforts to settle the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict were dictated by this. We will firmly adhere to the same line in respect of events on the Tajik-Afghan border.

I would like to say specifically that: Using the methods of a political settlement, we will exert every effort to maintain the line of neutrality from the viewpoint of national reconciliation. This is a Tajik-Tajik conflict, and not a Russian-Afghan conflict. We will not allow another Afghan war to happen. I think that common sense and responsibility are prevailing and that we will achieve stability by means of joint efforts. Sometimes here in Russia we are told: Get out of there! But what about the lives of hundreds of thousands of Russian-speaking inhabitants? The protection of the rights of our citizens and compatriots in the former Union republics is acquiring increasing significance in Russian foreign policy. And here we intend to resolutely use the entire spectrum of means of influence available to Russia—from political-legal means right through to economic means. We will strictly link the examination of our neighbors' proposals on cooperation in the credit, military, and economic spheres with their reciprocal specific steps to implement the lawful rights of the Russian-speaking population.

The protection of human rights is indivisible by definition. Therefore there cannot be two different approaches to the human dimension of the conflicts in the former Union republics and in Russia itself. I say this primarily in connection with the situation that has formed on the state of emergency territory in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. We do not intend to watch unconcernedly the undying flame of hostility and mistrust. If we were unable to avert this conflict, then now we must get out of it wisely and with dignity. The only way is through the joint efforts of the peoples of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, with respect for one another's interests (a moratorium on the revision of borders). This is the fundamental policy of the president and the head of government, expressed in our joint address dated 29 July. And no provocations by extremists can stop us from implementing this fundamental line. Particularly since this policy has been paid for with the blood of people whose loss is irreplaceable. I find it particularly bitter to talk about this today because the tragic death of Viktor Petrovich Polyanichko, head of the Interim Administration on the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and of his comrades in arms affected us deeply.

Questions of military organizational development, the activity of the Armed Forces, and the social protection of servicemen occupy an important place in the work of the Russian Federation Government.

Today we are indebted to the Army in the direct sense of the word. In terms of monetary payment [denezhnoye soderzhaniye] alone, budget indebtedness is R216 billion. There is not enough money for other items either. We will seek and find the necessary resources, although the state of the budget does not allow us to give everything out immediately, as you yourselves must understand. Pressure will not help here, irrespective of who exerts it. The inflationary financing of the defense budget will only hit the people of military labor and their families.

Decisions have already been adopted to eliminate the pay and allowances debt. Their real level and degree of indexation should correspond to the special nature of military service. Many events of recent times show that our state must have worthy Armed Forces. But we will not form them if we do not restore the former prestige to military service and all protectors of the Fatherland. I believe that programs for the social protection of servicemen and the equipping of the Armed Forces must be categorized as priorities and all possible measures must be taken to implement them.

I also cannot avoid making mention of another problem which is now worrying the government more and more. Threats to **the country's economic security**. All in all, according to figures from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the past six months in Russia the number of exposed instances of misappropriation by officials committed on a major or particularly major scale and cases of bribe-taking and corruption rose by a factor of almost 1.5 in comparison with the same period last year, 2.7 times more violations of the rules of currency operations were intercepted, and 12 times as many crimes connected with illegal trade activity were exposed.

According to figures from the Control Administration of the Russian president's Administration, a multitude of violations have been exposed in foreign economic activity, particularly in the work of "Oboroneksport," in export operations involving rare and rare-earth metals (cesium, scandium). The chairman of the "Oboroneksport" association, Karaoglanov, was recently dismissed from his post. At the same time, there were also many complaints made against the leaders of a number of other departments, including Deputy Minister of the Economy Olkhovikov and others. Obviously the number of crimes committed and the damage caused is many times greater than what the law-enforcement organs and the monitoring organs uncover; they are not yet meeting the new conditions and are working in the old way. We will not spare either manpower or resources to ensure that this whole system works effectively. But the initiative should come first of all from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Security, and other "official organs," so to speak.

And something about another very important issue. If we seriously intend to carry out the outlined program, then we

are simply obliged to assert a new management culture in our work. The level of executive discipline in ministries and departments is by no means up to the scale of the processes going on in the economy or to the seriousness of the adopted decisions. We ourselves devalue our own work, we erect new obstacles in places where there could be none at all. Thus, in the first six months of this year the execution of 167 instructions contained in edicts and directives of the Russian Federation president, government decrees and directives, and the prime minister's instructions was delayed. This includes: by the Ministry of Finance (Minister B. Fedorov)—32 instructions; by the Russian State Committee for the Management of State Property (Committee Chairman A. Chubays)—27; by the Russian Ministry of the Economy (Minster O. Lobov)—24; by the Russian Ministry Foreign Economic Relations (Minister S. Glazyev)—12; by the Russian Ministry of Transport (Minister V. Yefimov)—8; by the Russian Ministry of Health (Minister E. Nechayev)—8; by the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy (Minister Yu. Shafranik)—6. Thus, the Russian Ministry of Finance has still not presented materials concerning proposals on additional sources of financing for sociocultural and municipal services facilities handed over to the control of local organs of executive power during privatization. A coordinated draft decree on the preparation of normative documents on the procedure for financing and crediting capital construction has still not been submitted. The Russian Ministry of the Economy has not resolved the question of preparing a federal program for the structural restructuring of the economy for the period through 1995, whose deadline was 20 April, and the draft of a State Program for Developing a System of Import Replacement has not been submitted to the Russian Federation Government. The question of the preparation of a list of federal targeted programs for 1993 has remained unresolved since March.

The Russian State Committee for the Management of State Property has deplorably delayed the elaboration of a model charter for state-run enterprises, a model contract with leaders of state enterprises, a model act on securing property for state enterprises with the rights of full economic control thereof, as well as a number of other important documents. Given the need to raise executive discipline in ministries and departments, the Council of Ministers Presidium examined this question at its 1 July sitting. On the basis of the results of the discussion, the leaders of a number of ministries and departments—A.P. Vavilov, I.S. Materov, A.I. Ivanenko, and P.P. Mostovoy—were severely reprimanded for failing to ensure the timely execution of instructions from the president and the government.

The state of affairs concerning improvement of the management structure is also unsatisfactory. A typical example is the red tape around the formation of Russia's Federal Service for Currency and Export Control. The idea was that the first practical results should have been expected from the service two months after its creation. However, its employees are still involved exclusively in chasing up financing, getting hold of office space, and so on. And this is not the only example.

A lot of complaints have been made about the quality of work of the government apparatus. We often have overloaded agendas at the Council of Ministers Presidium, and they contain many questions which need to be settled in a timely manner. The fact that an average of 25-30 days are used up on preparing and issuing a government decision testifies to the red tape involved in the coordination of documents. Unfortunately, poorly prepared, uncoordinated, professionally weak decisions have almost become the norm. Republic leaders and regional administrations virtually do not participate in their elaboration. There is an intolerable distortion in favor of "expenditure" decisions when the crux of the matter involves allocating funds, granting various kinds of privileges, and so on. Questions connected with setting up the necessary market regulation mechanisms are almost never asked.

Obviously, in speaking about the basic trends of government policy I have not been able to embrace all the problems and all the details. But, in conclusion, I would like to dwell on the main element: How to make sure that the model of socioeconomic policy we have devised is put into effect. I am convinced that it is possible to do so only by creating an efficient mechanism of national accord. We cannot fail to see that, despite the acuteness of the political confrontation, the objective preconditions for achieving national accord in reforming Russia's economy have now been formed.

Indubitably, we are faced with acute conflicts of interests between the various social groups, between regions, and federal and local organs of power. Indubitably, the unconstructive stance of the Supreme Soviet on a number of key questions of economic policy remains. This was displayed during the recent All-Russia Economic Conference, for example, whose results would have been far more weighty and substantial if some of the organizers had listened to the government's opinion on the timing and ways of holding it. Nevertheless, the government deems it expedient to make use of any real possibility of achieving national accord and is prepared to exert maximum efforts to this end. We accept Russia as it is. We have this Motherland and no other. But we must create a new, strong, rich, and flourishing Russia. No one else will do this for us. This can only be done by us Russians.

First and foremost we must shape the movement of national economic solidarity begun by the "roundtable" declaration in such a way as to ensure that all significant sociopolitical forces and regions of Russia will be represented and that no one can use it for the political ends of their own narrow grouping. Without claiming any monopoly, the government is prepared to take upon itself its share of the responsibility for organizing this work. I think that the report presented to you could be our first significant contribution to this patriotic cause. The ideas contained in it could be a kind of platform of national accord in the economic sphere. We are offering this platform for discussion to all social forces which are really interested in getting the country out of the crisis, ensuring that it flourishes, and strengthening and developing the democratic achievements.

I state once again: In terms of the economy the government is opposed to any extremes, any sudden movements in a particular direction. We support the policy of centrism, the only possible "middle" course, which is at the same time the only possible vector of the reforms. And we will pursue this line firmly and consistently.

Rutskoy Views Country's Economic Decline

PM1108091193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Vice President A. Rutskoy by Marina Chernukha; place and date not given: "Rising From Our Knees"]

[Text] [Chernukha] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, your present tour of Central Russia and a number of others have given your enemies cause to say that you have started an election campaign. Is that true?

[Rutskoy] My trips do not of course have anything to do with an election campaign. The people whom you call my enemies are well aware of that.

Now let me say a word about the purpose of my trips. I don't know about the government, which is claiming that a process of stabilization has begun in the economy, but it is obvious to me that Russia is on the brink of economic catastrophe.

[Chernukha] Do you think that our present leaders are responsible for the crisis that Russia's economy is experiencing?

[Rutskoy] They are not the only ones. This crisis was born of the extremely formalized administrative-edict system of the eighties. Its instantaneous, total destruction has not brought Russia a free market but has given rise to anarchy and chaos, which are the reason for the current state of the Russian economy. The truth, as always, is somewhere in the middle. First Japan and now China have become aware of that. Japan has already become one of the leading world economic powers, while China, where production is rising annually at a rate of 15 percent, is on the road to that. It is still not too late for Russia to take this road, although time has in many respects been wasted: It will take the country at least 10 years to get back to the economic indicators of 1990.

[Chernukha] Could you give us your impression of your trips?

[Rutskoy] I once again received confirmation that the government and the president's entourage are with inexplicable consistency trying to turn Russia into a supplier of raw materials for the West. People are saying: The president has not done this or has failed to take that into consideration. That is probably true. But the president is now having a very difficult time. He is coming under tremendous pressure from those people whose unskilled work is causing the original plans to reform Russia with which we went together to the elections to be overturned. We must not persist with mistakes, they must be rectified. That is what I see as my goal.

However, the "strange reform" is continuing at the moment. Take, for instance, the military-industrial complex. Last year Russia lost $15 billion in arms exports. That is several times the $2.5 billion that the G-7 promised to give Russia during the meeting in Tokyo—a large proportion of which is in the form of tied credits. That is, the money that we take in credit must in fact go to work not in Russia but in the economy of the donor countries.

I visited an aviation plant in Komsomolsk-na-Amure, which manufactures the renowned Su-27's. A paradoxical situation has arisen there: There are more than enough countries wanting to buy these aircraft for hard currency, but our "partners and friends" are obstructing the deals. And the plant is effectively on the verge of bankruptcy. The plant's director, Anatoliy Petrov, told me bluntly that Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is effectively blocking any chance of selling these aircraft abroad. His "contribution" ensured that a major deal with Libya did not go ahead—instead of Russia's Su-27's, that country ultimately bought U.S. F-16's and F-18's. Talks with Taiwan, which wanted to buy 150 Su-27's, ended equally unsuccessfully. From that one deal alone Russia would have earned $4 billion—and, moreover, the question of prepayment [predoplata] had been settled. But Kozyrev said that the deal could not go ahead since Russia does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Such considerations are not so important for the Americans: They sold Taiwan their F-16's.

The situation at the Komsomolsk shipbuilding plant is even gloomier. The management is now carrying out the government's instructions and carving up virtually finished submarines for scrap. Yet the deterioration of the diesel submarines in the Russian Navy is reaching critical level. However, the most unpleasant thing is that we will not be able to revive production, if necessary, since it is not only the submarines that are being destroyed but also the building slips. I do not want to frighten anyone, but Russia is still situated on our sinful Earth where anything is possible. And Russia has never been fought in jest.

Russia must not stand "with outstretched hand." It has tremendous constructive potential and vast raw material reserves. All that must be geared to guaranteeing its peaceful and stable development, to rigorous consideration of its national interests, coupled, of course, with the interests of the world community. Getting Russia on its feet means ensuring just such a future for it.

[Chernukha] The discussion of the draft of the new constitution at the Constitutional Conference generated a host of disputes: Should Russia be a parliamentary or a presidential republic? Where do you stand?

[Rutskoy] Russia undoubtedly needs the institution of the presidency. Russia with its huge territory is a kind of bridge between Europe and Asia, and the president as head of state must personify the statehood of a great power. I think there should be four branches of power in Russia: the legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative [rasporyaditelnyy] branches—the latter in the person of the president.

Government Adopts Program To Fight 'Dollarization'

LD1108085993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0425 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] A working program to develop the reforms and stabilize the economy in period 1993-95 has been adopted in principle at a sitting of the Russian Government. The program points at the need to put forward proposals on urgent measures aimed at achieving financial stabilization, including the normalization of money turnover, reaching mutual settlements between enterprises and organizations, and improving the work of banks.

The government has instructed the Finance Ministry, in conjunction with the Central Bank and the Federal Service for Currency and Export Control, to carry out specific actions aimed at unconditionally implementing measures to fight against dollarization of the economy and to strengthen the Russian ruble.

Bank, Government Differ on Supplying Cash to CIS States

PM1108094393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Ivan Zhagel report: "While Admitting CIS Countries to the Ruble Zone, Russian Wants To Keep Hold of the Levers for Controlling the Money Supply"]

[Text] As we know, at the end of last week there was a meeting between the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan during which it was decided over two weeks to agree to terms for entry into the ruble zone. These agreements will be thrashed out within the framework of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the Commonwealth Member States [Goskomsotrudnichestvo]. We contacted German Kuznetsov, first deputy chairman of this committee, and asked him to answer some questions of interest to us.

First of all G. Kuznetsov noted that before the talks with delegations from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Armenia, which have already expressed the desire to use the ruble on their territory, it will be necessary to coordinate the positions of Russian participants in the talks. Therefore a meeting will be held Monday 9 August between representatives of the Central Bank of Russia, the Ministry of Finance, the Goskomsotrudnichestvo, and other interested parties.

To put it simply, the meeting's central question will be the following: How much sovereignty will have to be "wrested" from other republics for the money supply [denezhnoye khozyaystvo] to be controlled effectively? It is quite clear that in today's complex situation for the other republics Russia has an opportunity to dictate its terms. However, it is important not to go too far, as any agreements reached within the framework of the Goskomsotrudnichestvo must subsequently be ratified by the national parliaments. Unlike previous talks which envisaged setting up a national banking organ regulating ruble circulation, in the current situation Russia wants to keep hold of the main levers for controlling the money supply. At any rate, for now it is not proposed to put representatives of other republics on the Central Bank of Russia board.

However, as G. Kuznetsov said, until such a time as the parliaments of other CIS countries approve the agreements reached, Russia simply will not give these countries cash rubles, or else it will do this on a commercial basis within the framework of the accords reached on granting interstate credits.

However, there is now information that last week the Central Bank of Russia sent Uzbekistan 50 billion rubles [R] in cash, and in new notes. In the light of this, Russia's Ministry of Finance circulated to the mass media a statement saying that despite its official request to the Central Bank it has not received any documents confirming the "sale" of bank notes. The statement notes that to dispatch cash in such a way is a direct violation of intergovernmental agreement with Uzbekistan on state credit.

In turn, Russian Central Bank Deputy Chairman A. Khandruyev declared Saturday at a meeting with journalists that the R50 billion sent to Uzbekistan "were not simply handed over but sold as part of the state credit," and that these actions conform with intergovernmental agreements. He also noted that "during the emergency [chrezvychaynyy] period for conducting talks," which will be held in August, the Central Bank intends to support with cash other countries wishing to stay in the ruble zone. But these deliveries will not exceed R120 billion in August, including the sums already dispatched to Uzbekistan.

Agriculture Conference on Harvest Viewed

PM1008151193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Aleksandr Gavrilyuk report under "Government" rubric: "Agrarian Matters Discussed at Height of Harvest"]

[Text] A government conference with Russian kray and oblast administration heads devoted to the harvest has ended in Moscow.

It was a strange meeting. First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko suggested calling it just this. Strange because harvesting is already in full swing. Also because an accused person, Vasiliy Starodubtsev, was seated in the presidium on the right hand of Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, who was in the chair and is in charge of the agrarian sector, while Vladimir Shumeyko, who is under investigation, was on his left hand. The feeling of the absurdity of the situation increased still further when it came to light that there is essentially nothing with which to pay peasants for the grain of this year's harvest.

The thing is that, according to a statement by Leonid Cheshinskiy, leader of the "Roskhleboprodukt" Corporation (which will purchase grain from the peasants), it does not have the money for this. Leonid Stepanovich explained that it is planned to purchase approximately 40 million tonnes at the price set by the government. This will

require 4 trillion rubles [R]. That is, collective farms, state farms, and private farmers have to be paid R500 billion each week. But the Ministry of Finance promises just R70 billion. It becomes clear that it will take approximately 15 months to acquire the grain of this year's harvest. It is not hard to guess what will happen to the peasants during this time: They will roam the world lonely and naked.

A pointed debate flared up at the conference over the price of grain. The government passed off the new prices as a great achievement—a little more and, in its opinion, we will have gotten close to world prices. To all appearances, this is the chief task today. But Mikhail Lapshin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's agrarian faction, calls this a "terrible deception" of the peasantry.

The crux of his arguments is as follows: The government set the prices when harvesting was already coming to an end in certain regions, whereas under the law "On Grain" this should have been done a month before it started. For a long time agrarians did not agree to the price of R60 per kg of wheat, but they were talked into it. But just three days later, when the decree appeared, nothing was left of that accord.

First, the very concept of the "starting price" had vanished and been replaced by the "recommended" price—a change of just one word. For example, after agreeing the prices for such age-old Russian crops as rye, barley, and oats (R60 per kg in the contract), in the decree oats came to be worth R51, rye R46, and barley R47.

In addition, there is no guarantee that the peasants will get even this money on time.

By the end of harvesting they will have accumulated credits worth at least R6 trillion. But even given this year's unusual harvest, their earnings will not exceed R2.5 trillion—this will not cover even one-third of the costs.

The head of Penza Oblast Administration also needs money. According to him, reformers have destroyed approximately 100 profitable farms in two years and gotten away from agrarian matters. To V. Shumeyko's question about where it is to be found, he replied: "Let us earn it." It turns out that 500 tonnes of meat that nobody needs is lying around in the oblast, and they do not know what to do with cabbages and carrots. In general, priority must be given to agriculture above all. Everybody understands this apart from Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, who, in the opinion of the administration head, is blocking funding for the agro-industrial complex by any means.

Fuel was also added to the flames by a statement by Boris Fedorov himself in which he bluntly declared: "...Aleksandr Zaveryukha is deliberately seeking to mess up the state's financial policy,... is constantly pushing economically unsubstantiated decisions through the government,... and expresses gratitude to the Supreme Soviet for its support." So, it is as though the Supreme Soviet is the CIA, and it is considered criminal, according to Fedorov, to thank it.

But Vice Premier Boris Fedorov's main grudge against Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha is that the latter supported the 50-percent subsidy of mixed feed production, without which neither public nor private livestock raising will survive.

Various things from the recent past come to mind on reading and listening to the arguments of Finance Minister Fedorov, including an anecdote.

An old Jew renowned, in addition to everything else, for making tasty tea is dying. Afraid that he will take his secret with him, his relatives ask him to share his recipe. Then he says in a weak voice: "Jews, do not stint the brewing." The secret proved simple. Likewise in this situation. If we want to have our own meat, we will, alas, have to invest funds in livestock raising, for there is no other way.

Nevertheless, Aleksandr Zaveryukha reacted calmly to his colleague's statement and said to me: "This came as a surprise to me. I will not descend to having the matter out with Fedorov, although I do have something to say. My conviction with regard to subsidizing livestock raising, in particular, remains as before: We will subsidize it."

So believe, after this, the statement by Oleg Soskovets, another vice premier, that "no fundamental disagreements exist in the government today, and it acts as a unified team."

The conference ended without essentially working out any constructive proposals. But I believe that this was merely reconnaissance before the main event—an enlarged session of the Council of Ministers, at which the head of government will have to report back on six months of work.

Unions Prepare General Strike for October

MK1008135693 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 10 Aug 93 p 14

[Olga Garbuzova report: "Military-Industrial Complex Strike in the Urals. Trade Unions Ready for General Strike"]

[Text] Russian trade unions have launched an offensive against the president and the government. First-warning strikes were held yesterday at coal enterprises in Rostov, Kuzbass, and Vorkuta. The miners' strike is to be joined soon by employees of the agro- industrial complex, communications personnel, and medics. Preparations have begun for an all-Russia inter-sectoral strike on the decision of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia [FITUR].

A 24-hour warning strike began yesterday at 38 pits of "Rostovugol" and a major part of the "Rostovshakhtstroy" mine construction enterprises. Called by the Rostov Territorial Committee of Coal Workers' Union, the strike was joined by miners in Kuzbass and Vorkuta. The main demands of the strikers is to get the customers pay their chronic debts, eliminate the lack of credit resources; and get the government to honor the sectoral tariff agreement,

provide timely subsidies, and adopt a special program of social guarantees to miners in the event of closures of loss-making pits.

A 24-hour warning strike was also started by nearly 70 percent of enterprises in Primorskiy Kray. Vladimir Akimov, head of the group of experts of the FITUR council, told your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent that "the local workers organized the strike not without the local administration's participation, and if their economic demands are not met by the Russian Government, they would speak in favor of the creation of a Far East republic" because "Moscow is not capable of performing its functions." The handling of cargoes was stopped in eight ports in Primorye, and the idling ships sounded their sirens to announce the start of the strike to local residents. In Omsk, 12 major oblast's defense enterprises went on strike on 6 August. In addition to demands of making their wages match the minimal consumer budget, indexation of defense funds, and stopping energy hikes, the strikers in most of the enterprises demanded resignation of the Russian Government .

A plenum of the Central Committee of the Coal Miners Union scheduled for 12 August is to discuss further protest actions. To start collective protest actions on the same day is the agro- industrial complex trade union. Mass meetings on that day are scheduled in all regions in Russia, while the central one will be held in Moscow outside the White House. Communist organizations have also applied to take part in this meeting. Your KOMMERSANT- DAILY correspondent was told at the FITUR press service that agriculture people, however, intend not to let Communists speak at the meeting. If the government fails to react to the peasants' action, they would bar railroads in the evening to protest the government's purchase of grain from the West at prices several times those the authorities offer to Russian agriculture people. The latter would be joined by communications, culture, and public health employees.

According to the FITUR collective actions plan, after summing up the results of actions by sectoral trade unions, there will be in September an all-Russia assembly of representatives of trade unions, to which would be invited the government and president of Russia. If demands are not satisfied, an all-Russia strike of all sectors would be announced for October.

FITUR Collective Actions Plan [following is boxed text]

- 1-8 September, a protest actions week: meetings, marches, picketing of local administration buildings, warning strikes. Prestrike readiness to be announced in sectors and rayons, expanded sessions to be held of FITUR Collective Actions Committee with regional representatives taking part,

- 6-15 September, all-Russia sectoral conferences are to be held to sum up the results of reconciliation arbitration procedures and to announce an all-sectors all-Russia strike starting 2-5 October 1993.

- 10 September, an intersectoral conference of solidarity and unity, and unity of actions of budget-financed and production sphere.

- 19 September, an all-Russia meeting of trade union representatives with the government and president of Russian being invited.

Military & Space Issues

Kobets Notes Yeltsin's Concern for Servicemen at Conference

LD1008184893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1337 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Aug—Everything has been done to provide in a material way for the operations of the border guards in the conflict region on the Tajik border, said Army General Konstantin Kobets, deputy minister of defense, replying today to questions from the participants in the all-Russian conference on the social-legal protection of servicemen and their families. The general stated that there exists a decision of the president and the Security Council to the effect that the entire coordination of the activities of border guards in Tajikistan specifically lies with the Russian Federation minister of defense. The necessary resources and material-technical means have been directed there at the ministry's expense.

The social security of servicemen "is constantly in the field of vision of Boris Yeltsin," the deputy minister stated. Last year and this year alone, the Russian president has signed 13 decrees on this subject, the general said. Among these are decrees on the activity of the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan, on measures for the social support of large families, and on increasing payments to individuals on military duty. In addition, during this period 12 orders have been published, including those on regulating the process of negotiations with the Baltic countries on the withdrawal of Russian troops, on the signing of agreements between Russia and the Ukraine, on implementing a special programme of construction for the troops leaving Germany, and on benefits for certain categories of servicemen.

"The personal participation of the president and of the Supreme commander of Russia are perceived as being synonymous. How his orders are fulfilled is another matter," the deputy minister said, acknowledging that "the mechanics of how they are fulfilled require fine tuning."

Social Protection Legislation for Military 'Working Badly'

PM1008161193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 93 p 3

[Vladimir Yermolin report: "Why Are the Laws Designed To Protect Servicemen 'Working' Badly? Participants in Conference That Opened in Moscow Monday Try To Answer This Question"]

[Text] The conference is being held at the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Hall of Sessions. Its main topic is "On Urgent Measures To Ensure That State Organs of State Power Carry Out Russian Federation Laws on Military Matters and Questions of the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families." The conference is being held at the initiative of the parliamentary Committee for the Affairs of Invalids, War and Labor Veterans, and Social Protection for Servicemen and Their Families. The participants include representatives of executive organs, local soviet deputies, and public organizations.

In the morning speeches were heard from Valentin Agafonov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet (chairing the conference); Aleksandr Korovnikov, chairman of the parliamentary committee; and Army General Konstantin Kobets, Russian Federation deputy defense minister.

In effect, all the speeches were devoted to the same problem: Why a batch of military laws—primarily those which should ensure the social protection of servicemen—are being implemented poorly. The discussion focused mainly on the law "On the Status of Servicemen" adopted at the start of the year. It was noted that only a third of it has currently been carried out. The Finance Ministry, Ministry of Railways, and Ministry of Social Welfare were named among the ministries which are sabotaging its fulfillment. In particular, Agafonov defined the Finance Ministry's position as one of "fierce opposition" to the implementation of the military package of laws.

Aleksandr Korovnikov spoke of the need to adopt a long-term comprehensive state program of social protection for servicemen. He agreed with the criticism of the Supreme Soviet as regards parliamentarians' poor monitoring of the execution of adopted legal acts.

In his speech Korovnikov named the draft laws whose adoption is expected this year—on special guarantees for persons discharged from the Armed Forces without a pension, on compulsory insurance for servicemen and their families, on veterans, and a number of others. But, recalling the theme of the conference, he stressed that, without tough controls over executive organs, all of these laws could be valid on paper only.

The situation which the Army currently finds itself in as a result of meager and irregular financing was termed "very serious" by Army Gen. Konstantin Kobets. The Finance Ministry is allocating the Defense Ministry just one-twelfth of the funds needed and is delaying its debt payments, 60 percent of servicemen have not received their July pay, and there are even units where people were last paid in May. As a result, there is growing social tension in the Army and declining confidence in the government. The situation is also being exacerbated by the willful attitude shown at local level to normative acts envisaging certain benefits for servicemen. Some 69 percent of the declared benefits, the Defense Ministry spokesman noted, are not being implemented.

The literally catastrophic draft situation was also noted. With our current deferment system, we are only drafting 14 percent of the total number of draftees. It is expected that this fall the Russian Federation Armed Forces will be short of more than a million privates and NCO's. And this, Gen. Kobets stressed, despite the fact that the "Russian Army is a fighting army."

Unfortunately, the importance of the problems examined at the conference was in no way matched by the level of people attending. Although government leaders and ministers were invited, they did not deign to put in an appearance—at least on day one. For some reason the chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, who had been scheduled to speak, was also absent. It would be very regrettable if the necessary and important discussion about the Armed Forces' drastic problems were reduced to the level of just another event.

WGF Officers Must Sign Contracts by 30 Sep

PM1008153793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Aug 93 p 3

[Sergey Pashayev report: "Western Group of Forces Officers Must Conclude Contracts. By 30 September"]

[Text] On 10 August a session with leadership personnel will be held in the Western Group of Forces [WGF] which will initiate the implementation of the Russian defense minister's directive defining the procedure for concluding contracts with officers serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces abroad.

All measures connected with this are due to be completed as early as 31 August. The most controversial point, which is today evoking contradictory views, is the provision that every officer signing a contract can henceforth be sent to serve whererever there is a shortage of cadres. But there is no choice. WGF officers who have not concluded a contract by 30 September are to be reassigned.

New Weapon-Locating 'Radar Station' Described

PM1108101593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 93 First Edition p 6

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "'Zoopark' for 'King Gun'"]

[Text] There are many instruments without which even the most powerful and accurate weapons, including artillery, are blind and deaf and consequently helpless and useless in real battle.

A special place on this plane is occupied by radar stations. Raised into the air on aircraft, installed on a caterpillar or wheeled chassis combined with an artillery piece or battery into a single combat complex, they increase the power of artillery several times over and transform it into a high-precision fire system.

The new Russian multichannel radar complex, the "Zoopark-1" 1L219 radar station, is part of such a system.

The self-propelled radar station does of course have an unusual name. Even its main designer, Yuriy Zemskov, director of Tula's "Strela" scientific research institute, could not explain to me immediately where it had come

from. We agreed that since the complex is intended for reconnaissance and control of the most diverse systems—pieces, mortars, salvo fire installations, tactical missiles, and even drones and other small targets—then it is for an "animal" or "bird" of any caliber.

And if you consider that the radar station can also observe air traffic in the zone of airfields and pinpoint all aircraft from a deltaplane to a space shuttle then there are no doubts that its name accords with its combat function.

The following detail is also curious. Radars like the "Zoopark" exist in the armies of other states, and consists mainly of the U.S. ANTPQ-36 and 37 air reconnaissance radars. Some are designed merely to locate mortars, others to detect artillery pieces. So far they lack the synthesis of functions of the Russian 1L219 radar station.

In addition their ground-based radar reconnaissance stations are mounted on trucks or trailers, which creates certain difficulties on the battlefield. But the "Zoopark" is a self-propelled station, installed on a small universal lightly armored prime mover (no fear of bullets and shrapnel), can travel on any terrain, even swamp land, can sail, and, of course, is ahead of foreign counterparts as regards these qualities.

In addition the U.S. radar stations are single-channel stations and transmit target designation only to the base piece, while the "Zoopark" services six pieces at once and has reserve channels for additional fire systems.

It is also ahead of its foreign counterparts for other parameters. It can pinpoint a howitzer round at a distance of 12 km, a rocket system salvo at a distance of 45 km, and the launch of a tactical missile at a distance of 60-70 km. Two computers with a capability of 1 million operations per second after the first enemy shot can in seconds provide its coordinates (angular or linear) for their battery. And if the enemy delays even slightly he will never make a second shot or launch.

If the border guards of the 12th post of the Moscow detachment in Tajikistan had had such a vehicle and the artillery battery for it, the dushmans would never have fired on them for several hours with impunity.

Yuriy Gennadyevich Zemskov told me that an artillery system combined into a complex with the "Zoopark" is given the highest degree of fire accuracy by the fact that the three-dimensional radar has a very sensitive active phased array whose area can be increased depending on the task set and also two target area survey systems—a space survey system via satellite and its own system, from a directional [kursovoy] survey vehicle. With its aid the artillery troops do not need to make meteorological and other corrections. They are all taken into account automatically by the radar's on-board computer after the very first trial shot. And then the pieces are automatically targeted.

When the self-propelled "Msta-S" howitzer (the "king gun" which we described in IZVESTIYA's 65th issue) is combined with the "Zoopark" into a single system the saving of ammunition increases by a factor of four and fire accuracy by a factor of three.

The U.S. magazine JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY for 3 June 1993 wrote that the new European system with the "Cobra" active phased array radar (similar to the "Zoopark") may possible go into use in NATO armies only by the end of this century.

In addition while the Western firms' project costs 500 million pounds sterling, the "Zoopark" is 100 times cheaper. It is true that for understandable reasons its transport base is no longer being made in Kharkov, and the Mytishchin plant is beginning to develop it. But that will not affect the equipping of the Russian army.

And in conclusion a few words about Yuriy Zemskov, "Zoopark's" main designer. He graduated from the Tomsk polytechnical institute as a radio engineer. Later he spent two years studying in St. Petersburg, mastering computer technology. He worked for 27 years in Novosibirsk, in the "Antey" concern's system of plants and scientific research institutes. He has spent the past eight years in Tula. He has been elected to the Russian Academy of Artillery Sciences.

'Cosmos-2261' Satellite Put Into Orbit 10 Aug

LD1108112593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1106 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Mission control centre (Moscow region) August 11 (TASS)—the Cosmos-2261 satellite was fired off into space with a Molnia booster from the Plesetsk cosmodrome on August 10.

The satellite carries scientific equipment to continue space explorations.

The satellite was put into a highly elliptical orbit with the following parameters:

initial period of revolution—11 hours 48 minutes,

apogee—39,400 kilometers,

perigee—613 kilometers,

orbital inclination—62.8 degrees.

Apart from scientific equipment, the satellite has the following instrumentation: a radio system for exact measuring of the orbit and a radio telecommunications system to transmit data to the earth on the operation of instruments and equipment.

The equipment installed aboard the satellite functions normally.

The coordination computing centre is processing incoming information.

'Progress M-19' Spacecraft Launched 11 Aug

LD1108032093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0050 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Flight Control Center, 11 Aug—In accordance with the program for the further work of the "Mir" scientific

research complex, at 0223 Moscow time on 11 August 1993 the "Progress M-19" automatic cargo vessel was launched. The main aim of the launch of the spacecraft is to deliver expendable materials and various cargoes on board the manned "Mir" complex.

The "Progress M-19" spacecraft has been placed in orbit with the following parameters:

—apogee: 243 km

—perigee: 192 km

—period of revolution: 88.5 minutes

—orbital inclination: 51.6 degrees

According to telemetric information data, the on-board systems of the automatic cargo vessel are working normally.

Mir Station, 'Progress M-17' Ferry To Undock 11 Aug

LD1108084393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0803 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Mission Control Centre (Moscow Region) August 11 TASS—The flight of the Progress M-17 ferry together with the Mir space station is nearing completion. Specialists plan to conduct its service life testing during many-month independent flight after the ferry is separated from the Mir station. The station and the ferry will be undocked this evening.

Supreme Soviet

Defense, Security Official on Legislation

WS1108085093 Kaliningrad STRAZH BALTIKI in Russian 20 Jul 93 p 1

[Interview with Nikolay Kuznetsov, head of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security, by A. Lobskiy in Kaliningrad "last week": "We Should Resolve Military Problems of Kaliningrad Oblast Together"]

[Text] At the end of the last week, a delegation of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security visited the Baltic Fleet. Our correspondent spoke with the secretary of the committee and head of the delegation, Nikolay Kuznetsov.

[Lobskiy] Nikolay Nikolayevich, what is the purpose of your visit, what kind of problems are you going to investigate, and what prompted such a dignified delegation of the Supreme Soviet to visit the fleet?

[Kuznetsov] Our committee had planned a visit to Kaliningrad to personally investigate problems a long ago, but for a variety of reasons we were not able to come until now. However, we had been scheduled to conduct our visit in May. There are 15 people's deputies in our committee and they all are very busy, especially now, when we must deal with such acute issues as Tajikistan and Sevastopol, among others.

Somehow, we are going to find a solution to all these problems, after we make ourselves familiar with the issues. We will evaluate them during the committee's session, together with representatives of the Defense Ministry and the appropriate Navy offices. We will also ask somebody from here to attend. Our goal is to attract government and Defense Ministry attention to the problems of Kaliningrad, Baltiysk, and Kronshtadt.

We have the impression that all fleets, those in the Arctic and those in the Pacific Ocean, have a great many problems. However, because the situation is quite different, the troubles over there have so far been hidden. Here, they came to the surface and can be viewed in relation to the other fleets. This means that stimulating the Defense Ministry to solve the problems of the Baltic Fleet will somehow help the other fleets.

Our main goal is to evaluate the situation related to the disposition and withdrawal of units. Everybody understands perfectly that a committee of the Supreme Soviet cannot simply pull some money out of its pocket and say: Here, take this and build. However, no matter how the government defames us and blames us for antireform activities, we will never take positions comfortable for them, and we will continue to raise these issues and make all influential ministries and government structures face the task of addressing these concerns.

Here we have not only the problems of the Defense Ministry, but Ministry of Security problems as well. There are some acute issues affecting relations between civic and military authorities.

When it comes to the Kaliningrad Oblast, an issue of military command arises, because here we have the Navy, the Frontier Guard, and the Army. There should be one body of military command, which would be managing and coordinating all parts. As you can see, the issue of reorganizing all command structures must be addressed.

[Lobskiy] Tell me, please, is your visit somehow connected to the expected reaction to the Supreme Soviet decree "On the Status of Servicemen?" It is known that the minister of finance suggested a "freeze" on a series of clauses in this decree.

[Kuznetsov] No, it is not connected at all, since we have already adopted a precise policy on this issue. However, the decree regarding the status of serviceman was not prepared by our committee, but by the Committee for Disabled Servicemen and Veterans and the Committee on Social Protection of Servicemen. Our representatives participated in these dealings and even assumed firm policy. Later, we were accused of hindering this decree. Even then, we kept on saying that this decree had been miscalculated, that many numbers were unrealistic. The authors convinced the Supreme Soviet, though, and the decree was adopted. After that, the government and the Ministry of Finance started to prove that everything provided for by the decree was correct, but there was no money in the budget.

Of course, I believe that there should be no way back, no changes, no freezes, etc. Now, we will have to find the resources and stretch ourselves.

[Lobskiy] Does this mean that the committee's policy is explicit, that the decree should be fully enforced?

[Kuznetsov] Yes, there is no going back. When we began to discuss that, our committee stood firm: This is the government and parliament's business, and we should search for the best solutions so as not to devolve the responsibility on someone else. There must be solutions, but we will surely encounter many obstacles. This is the same way the Defense Ministry, Ministry of Security, and Internal Affairs Ministry are proceeding. We should together settle our accounts with the Ministry of Finance, against which even the Supreme Soviet has very serious grievances.

[Lobskiy] Nikolay Nikolayevich, what decrees from the "military package" are currently being worked on by the legislature?

[Kuznetsov] Today, in numerous committees and commissions another five or six decrees are being examined which could be related to the "military package." These are decrees on supplementary service, procurement, mobilization, and several other matters. However, they are secondary issues, if I can say so. When it comes to the Army, our committee is dealing with the analysis of the effectiveness of existing decrees. It is already obvious that the decree "on defense," among others, should be modified. Our second objective is control. We control the special services as well as the Defense Ministry: How do they function, how do they follow the budget, and how do they respect human rights? All this is aimed at correcting the decrees and adhering to them.

[Lobskiy] Among those goals, you mentioned respect for human rights in the Armed Forces. I think that the Supreme Soviet Committee on Human Rights has completely neglected this issue. Is this due to its status, or do you have to fill an existing gap?

[Kuznetsov] Not to transgress the legislative ethics code, I will only say that the activities of this committee are concentrated primarily on protecting human rights in places of detention and on rehabilitation of the victims of repression. Of course, these are very important and painful problems, but they overshadow the issue of human rights in former Soviet republics and in other social circles of our society. So, we, as well as the Human Rights Committee, have much to do. By the way, the Supreme Soviet has much to do as well. The legislature is today a medley of accidental people, and a few generations of legislators will have to change before it becomes a professional and qualified body. Then, a completely different structure will appear and raids, such as ours, will not be necessary.

[Lobskiy] How would you, personally, judge the Supreme Soviet's resolution on Sevastopol?

[Kuznetsov] I believe that it reflects the emotional background. A resolution like this should be adopted either by the president or the government, but not by the Supreme Soviet. I maintain that this issue must be unraveled. Sevastopol is like a temple for the Russian people and Navy. However, it should be resolved in a more flexible manner, making use of our diplomatic capabilities, unlike the Supreme Soviet has done. Any emotions and extremities lead to confrontation, and that is unacceptable.

[Lobskiy] Thank you for this conversation.

Deputies Asked To Be Available in Aug-Sep

MK1008141693 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 41, 10 Aug 93 (signed to press 9 Aug) p 2

[Unattributed INTERFAX-SEGODNYA report: "While Deputies Are Supposed To Be Ready To Give Information"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet organization section has asked the deputies to submit before the end of the day on 6 August information concerning their precise location in August and September "to ensure rapid transmission of information between the Supreme Soviet sessions."

Parliament Chiefs Install TV Broadcast Outlet

MK1008140893 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 41, 10 Aug 93 (signed to press 9 Aug) p 2

[Unattributed SEGODNYA report: "Ruslan Khasbulatov Ready to Go on the Air...."]

[Text] According to informed sources, the installation has been completed in the House of Soviets of Russia of technical equipment that makes it possible for Supreme Soviet chiefs to go on the air live on television at any moment and address the people. The Supreme Soviet has paid nearly $1 million for the work.

Regional Affairs

Interior Minister Yerin Arrives in Ossetia; Situation Updated

LD1008163493 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1310 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Report from Vladikavkaz by correspondent Irina Lukayeva]

[Text] On 9 August, as we have already reported, Russian Federation Interior Minister Yerin arrived in the zone covered by the state of emergency regime, on the order of the Russian Government. He acquainted himself with the circumstances of the killings of Viktor Polyanichko, Anatoliy Koretskiy, and Viktor Kravchuk on the outskirts of the settlement of Tarskoye, and the progress of the investigation into that crime. Yerin had a meeting in Vladikavkaz with the interior ministers of North Ossetia and Ingushetia and the staff of their law-enforcement bodies.

In an interview for our agency, Viktor Fedorovich said that all efforts should be concentrated now on the fight against crime and the need to lower somewhat the temperature of

political passions. Regarding the investigation into the killings, the minister declared that all the forces and powers for conducting the investigation exist. The criminals will be found and punished without any regard for their nationality. Interior Minister Yerin also left for Moscow yesterday.

Today there was a meeting between the commander of the internal troops of the Russian Federation Interior Ministry, who has arrived in Vladikavkaz, and Akhsarbek Galazov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia. They discussed the subject of closer cooperation in the state of emergency zone between Russian peace- keeping forces and units of the Russian Interior Ministry's internal troops, on the one hand, and local law-enforcement bodies on the other.

Also today, North Ossetian parliament chief Akhsarbek Galazov had talks with (Vyacheslav Nasinovskiy), first deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council. The meeting focused on a range of measures to ensure the safety of civilians and on the search for ways of achieving peace and concord in the northern Caucasus region.

That is our report for today - nothing but meetings and farewells.

Ingush Ministry Denies Link Between Murder, Seized Weapons

LD1008160793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 10 Aug 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] We have just recieved an official statement from the Security Ministry of the Ingush Republic, which denies mass media reports about an alleged link between the death of Viktor Polyanichko [former head of the interim administration in North Ossetia and Ingushetia] and the return by the Ingush side of weapons seized by criminals on 25 July 1993 from a Russian troops subunit stationed in North Ossetia.

Shatalin Views State of Emergency in N. Caucasus

MK1008013093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Aug 93 p 1

[Natalya Pachegina report under the "North Caucasus" rubric: "The Assassins Have Not Been Found, but the Press Was Taken To Task. General Shatalin: State of Emergency Area Should Include Both Republics"]

[Excerpts] Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray's last order on the state of emergency area before his vacation was evidently designed to significantly change the operational situation on the border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia. During a telephone conversation with Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin, acting chief of the Provisional Administration, the latter was asked to replace the provisional administration's press service chief, who, in the deputy prime minister's view, was guilty of "distorted coverage of Polyanichko's murder, and also of mentioning the ethnic origin of those who committed it, in the Russian mass media." [passage omitted]

In the lobby of the deputy prime minister's office, where your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent called for comments on the public relations-vacation order by Shakhray, a secretary's charming voice advised that "the situation should not be overly dramatized." Meanwhile, Colonel General Shatalin, acting chief of the Provisional Administration in the territories of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, concerned about the situation taking shape in the state of emergency area, announced a 2 million ruble award to those who provide any information on the murder of Polyanichko, Koretskiy, and Kravchuk. [passage omitted]

In Shatalin's view, the chief problem currently facing the provisional administration is the sharp heightening of tensions in the state of emergency area: Polyanichko's murder, the ensuing propaganda war between the two conflicting republics, continuing casualties among civilians and Russian servicemen—all this requires that the state of emergency area be extended to both warring territories. This, Shatalin said, will make it possible to bring order to the region. As of today, the colonel general added, 32 Russian servicemen and Russian Internal Affairs Ministry personnel have been killed in the state of emergency area. Since last January, 57 people, including Russian servicemen, have been killed in ethnic clashes. None of these crimes has been solved, Shatalin said, and the provisional administration is unable to prevent terrorist acts. As for large-scale bloodshed, which, as your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent presumed, is considered a possibility by Shatalin, who is fully aware of the operational situation in the state of emergency area, the viewpoint of the provisional administration acting chief is more than clear. The colonel general is ready, without wavering back and forth and not waiting for an order from Moscow, to use force to avert an armed conflict or to thwart attempts to disarm Russian servicemen. "I will always be ready to assume this responsibility, for in such situations, any delay is tantamount to death," Shatalin said. At the same time, the current provisional administration chief, who had repeatedly advocated "people's diplomacy," called on the sides once again to achieve reconciliation "from the bottom up."

Rutskoy Leaves Bryansk for Smolensk

LD1008162993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1347 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Artyushin]

[Text] Bryansk, August 10 (TASS)—Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy ended his tour of the Bryansk Province today. He visited the town of New Sloboda where individual cottages are being constructed for immigrant residents of areas which suffered as a result of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster.

Later the vice-president paid a brief visit to a military air transport base where he saw an AN-124 "Ruslan" aircraft, and met unit commanders, officers of the garrison and their family members.

In the afternoon Aleksandr Rutskoy flew to Smolensk. During his visit to the Bryansk Province the vice-president was accompanied by head of the provincial administration Yuriy Lodkin and chairman of the provincial council Vladimir Sidorenko.

Tatarstan's President on Independence, Economic Reform

LD1008173193

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1420 GMT on 10 August broadcast a 30-minute program entitled "Kira Vladina at Home With the Powerful" which features Republic of Tatarstan President Mintimer Sharipovich Shaymiyev. Reception is good.

The program begins with a short excerpt from the announcer's conversation with Shaymiyev, who says: "Having made a sovereignty declaration, one can have 24 hours of complete independence, and then one has to start restraining oneself of one's own accord. This is a general rule. There is no such thing as absolute independence."

There follows street interviews with Russians and Tatars in Kazan. Asked whether they felt any strains in ethnic relations, they all said they did not.

The announcers conversation with Shaymiyev begins in the president's office and continues in his apartment. There is no indication at any point in the program as to when the conversation was recorded. They discussed Tatarstan's symbol, the snow leopard, then Shaymiyev's career in the old Communist Party. He says he gained a lot in those years, above all with regard to the "ability to work with the people." This, he maintains, influenced him in opting for a soft transition to the market rather than for shock therapy. Thus Tatarstan managed to avoid poverty.

To show that this soft approach works, the announcer goes to a remote village where shops are full of goods. She interviews a family of village teachers, who express wholehearted support for Shaymiyev. The announcer notes that the output of butter increased by 30 percent compared to 1989.

Anas Khasanov, head of the president's press center, interviewed in his office, adds that in the first quarter of this year Tatarstan's agricultural output rose by between 11 and 18 percent. The program cuts to Shaymiyev, who explains that this was the result of a support program for producers of those goods that are in demand.

Announcer Vladina then asks Shaymiyev to what extent Tatarstan's independence was real. Shaymiyev replies: "The most important thing is this: Not once since the adoption of the declaration of state sovereignty have I used the word 'independence' with regard to Tatarstan's sovereignty. Full independence in the usual sense of the word does not suit us. Why? Because of the republic's geographical location, because of the visible and invisible ties that have been established between peoples and cultures, not to mention the large degree of economic integration. So this will not really sound serious today. But provinces ought to have more say."

His views were interspersed with those of Amir Makhmutov, leader of the "Sovereignty" movement, who advocated "100 percent sovereignty and independence" and criticized Shaymiyev for trying to "reform the Russian Federation rather than leave it."

The program cuts back to Shaymiyev, who continues: "We should discuss everything with Russia on the basis of a treaty. We are currently working on this treaty, and let me tell you, there will never be a stronger union. Tatarstan's position will contribute to the emergence of a more democratic Russian Federation. Why? Because everyone, and particularly the top central authorities, are infected with imperial thinking There are no guarantees today that, having destroyed a totalitarian system in the shape of the Soviet Union, we are not building more or less the same thing in the shape of Russia."

Shaymiyev goes on to say that in his view no one has gained from the collapse of the USSR. Now that ties have been disrupted everyone has to overcome difficulties on their own. He also said that wrangles at the top in Russia were bringing the regions closer together. He continues: "Has the Russian Federation Government done anything attractive in the last few years to really draw the regions toward the center? It has been one mistake after another, one failure after another. Take the matter of particular importance for ethnic state entities: There is no single nationalities policy in any form!"

After that Shaymiyev speaks of his family's traditional ties with horse racing. This was followed by interviews with his wife, his six-year-old granddaughter, and his son. Shaymiyev reminisces about receiving the order of Lenin at the age of 29. The announcer asks a couple of students from Kazan University how it felt to study at the university once attended by Lenin. Their replies were somewhat less than enthusiastic.

Presidential aide Damir Zarinov, interviewed in his office, says Shamiyev always attends Tatarstan Supreme Soviet sessions. Talking briefly to Zilya Valeyeva, first deputy chairman of the Tatarstan Supreme Soviet, the presenter marvelled at the good relations between the legislature and the executive in the republic. Ivan Grachev of the opposition "People's Power" ["Narodovlastiye"] faction says that if his friends ever come to power they will make sweeping personnel changes in the top echelons.

In conclusion Shaymiyev is asked to assess himself. He says that since the people took a kindly attitude toward him, he thought he was doing the right things. The most important thing, he says, was to love people and to care for them.

Irkutsk Administration Head Supports Present Cabinet

LD1108093693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0902 GMT 11 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Khody]

[Text] Irkutsk August 11 TASS—Yuriy Nozhikov, head of the Irkutsk regional administration, believes that the present Russian cabinet should not be replaced. This is the primary condition for the Russian economy's stabilisation. Interests of regions can and must be asserted, but the economic development in the country is impossible without strong centralised executive authorities, he said.

Nozhikov made the statement at a meeting with reporters when he shared his impressions from an inlarged meeting of the Russian cabinet of ministers. The head of the irkutsk administration believes the government programme ensures the necessary stability of the monetary system and makes the national economy more manageable.

Economic Problems in Kaliningrad Reported

LD1008162693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1250 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov]

[Text] Kaliningrad August 10 TASS—Lithuania's decision to collect transit fees for the passage of freight and passengers through its territory, to levy customs duties, along with its other discriminatory measures vis-a-vis Kaliningrad region (Russia), have gravely aggravated the situation in the enclave, ITAR-TASS was told by chairman of the "Yantar" free economic zone Yuriy Bedenko. The production slump of the first six months of this year has topped the figures for the rest of Russia and if no extraordinary measures are taken the tendency will persist in the foreseeable future too. The deteriorating socio-economic situation in the region was discussed on the initiative of its leadership during a meeting with Sergey Shakhray, vice premier of the Russian government.

The information tabled by the Kaliningrad delegation has convinced ministry officials of the need to urgently help the enclave, which is cut off from the rest of Russia. Plans are afoot to grant it a long-term easy credit to strengthen the fishing and fish-processing industries, which account for 40 per cent of the region's economy, and also to consolidate its agriculture. Since the region depends on external deliveries of energy carriers and raw materials, and in the light of their growing costs, steps will be taken to step up the development of the local energy potential, to build a second gas pipeline through the territories of Belarus and Poland. Before this is done, the region will get compensation for the difference in tariffs on electric power and transport facilities.

It was moved to step up the conclusion of an agreement with Lithuania on a visa-free transit of Russian citizens across its territory and on the free transit of freight. "All these urgent measures," Bedenko said, "must be guaranteed by a government decision after detailed elaboration in corresponding ministries and departments. Such a decision should be adopted already this September."

Samara Airport Opens for International Flights

PM1008123593 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 6 Aug 93

[By S. Zhdanova and P. Yasko from Samara; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Zhdanova] A window on Europe was opened in Samara today, and also on Asia, America, the Far East, and the Near East. In short, the whole world is open to us now, and we have our own section of the state border. As recently as two years ago, this would have been difficult to imagine. Not just because the city was tightly shut off because of its powerful defense industry, but also because there was no money for construction. However, major enterprises in Samara and Tolyatti have responded to the appeals of the aviation company's management and the oblast administration. The necessary money, including hard currency, was found.

[V. Yefimov, Russian Federation minister of transport] This is yet another proof that Russia is alive and that Aeroflot is working and developing, and not falling apart and disappearing, as some people are claiming.

International Affairs

Official Comments on Ownership, Control of Nuclear Weapons

LD1008221893 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian 1740 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Report by UKRINFORM correspondent Olena Kyrychenko]

[Text] Kiev, 10 Aug—The adoption by the Ukrainian Supreme Council of the basic directions of Ukraine's foreign policy have been widely reported in the media, in particular the clause on Ukraine having become an owner of nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR because of historical circumstances. The document states Ukraine will never sanction their use and excludes from its foreign policy arsenal the threat of using nuclear weapons. Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directorate for arms control and disarmament, commented on this problem at a briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine today.

A statement on the real situation is rendered in this clause, he emphasized, in as far as from the juridical point of view it had already been defined in the law on economic self-determination of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of 1990 and in the law on enterprises, institutions, and organizations of Union subordination located on Ukraine's territory of 1991. These laws are based on the norms of international law regarding the succession of states and on the Vienna Convention of 1983.

As an owner of nuclear weapons, Ukraine has handed over the right to employ them for the Unified Command of the CIS Strategic Forces on condition that it secures on its part control over the nonuse of these weapons. "Therefore, this clause in the document adopted by the Supreme Council is only the recording of the real situation, and there are no grounds for the mass media to make such waves," believes Kostyantyn Hryshchenko.

From the juridical point of view, he stated, unilateral actions by Russia cannot be acknowledged as a juridical fact. So, the Unified Command exists, although without a commander in chief. So the situation remains as it was previously, that is the strategic armaments and the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine are under the operational command of the CIS Unified Strategic Forces, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is implementing only administrative management.

"We do not agree with Russia's efforts to subordinate strategic armaments," said Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, "one should proceed from the position that only those who adopted the decision can repeal it, and not just one side."

Under the conditions of the Lisbon Protocol, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons should also be proportional, he noted, it is incorrect to think that one country is going to reduce its armaments, while another country is not.

It was also reported at the briefing that the process of preparing for the meeting between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia is proceeding at the level of experts. The place and time of the meeting are being coordinated.

Accuses Russia of Playing 'Nuclear Card'

WS1008144293 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] As in the past, Ukraine is conducting a balanced nuclear policy; this was emphasized at a briefing held at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry today. Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, the ministry's representative, criticized Russia's unilateral actions concerning the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In particular, he recalled the agreements that submitted the nuclear complex to the Unified Command of the CIS Strategic Forces, and not the Russian Defense Ministry. The diplomat described the moves to resubmit the nuclear facilities as an attempt by certain Russian circles to play a nuclear card in order to pursue their own interests.

Pavlychko Discusses Nuclear Weapons, Black Sea Fleet

AU1008156293 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 7 Aug 93 p 5

[C. Svitak and T. Zahradnicek report: "No One Is Interested in Our Gestures"]

[Text] Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, held talks in Prague recently with his Czech counterpart, Jiri Payne, and Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra. We took the opportunity to ask him about the future of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the fate of the Black Sea Fleet.

We Will Decide Ourselves About Our Nuclear Weapons

The foreign policy concept approved by the Ukrainian Parliament, which declares the former Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory to be Ukrainian property, merely expands on the legal norms adopted earlier. On 10 September 1991 we approved a law making all property situated on Ukrainian territory belong to the republic. The nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory have to have a proprietor who can decide what will be done with them.

We now have 176 nuclear intercontinental missiles, 46 of which were made in Ukraine. The rest, made in Russia, will be handed over to Moscow for destruction within the framework of the START I Treaty. We will keep the 46 missiles until a decision is made about them on the basis of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The codes enabling direct use of these missiles are in the possession of the Russians; we have technical control over them. The strategic weapons on our territory are administratively incorporated into the 43d Ukrainian Army. They formally belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], but the CIS does not actually have any military forces.

This does not mean we have changed our policy and that we want to become a nuclear power. It simply means that Ukraine—and not Russia, the United States, or anyone

else—must decide at the appropriate moment about the timing and method of eliminating our nuclear weapons. The issue of financing the elimination of these weapons is still open. The United States has offered us $175 million; however, we require $3.0 billion for this.

Are We To Hand Over Our Weapons To a Country Threatening Us?

Commentaries are often published in the foreign press accusing Ukraine of wanting to use these nuclear weapons for blackmail. The nuclear weapons on our territory are defunct. Ukraine has resolved never to use them; this is enshrined in many of our resolutions and laws. At the same time, we have already handed over to Russia tactical nuclear weapons. Russia was obliged to compensate us for the uranium contained in their warheads but it has not done so. No one anywhere in the world has even said "Thank you" to us. We have realized that no one is interested in either this gesture or in our oft repeated intention to become a nuclear-free country. It is necessary to remember that a large percentage of former Soviet arms—including the missiles that are currently deployed, for example, in Russia—were made in Ukraine. The Chernobyl nuclear power station produced the plutonium for the nuclear warheads. Anyhow, we cannot hand over our weapons and not ask for material compensation for them.

The resolution approved by the Russian parliament on the Russian federal statute for the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol created such feeling among the Ukrainian deputies that the majority of them regard the handover of nuclear weapons to Russia as a betrayal of our interests. Are we to hand over nuclear weapons to a state whose legislative body is making such unconcealed territorial claims against us? As long as the Russian Parliament's resolution on Sevastopol remains valid, not only we, but also our western neighbors, are threatened. The Czechs in particular should understand our situation. After all, Russia's claims on Ukrainian territory are reminiscent of Hitler's pre-war claims on Czechoslovakia. We are well aware that Russia is our largest neighbor and we want to get on well together. However, our compromising steps cannot be interpreted as capitulation. Had Russian President Yeltsin and his administration not come out against the Moscow parliament's resolution on the Russian statute for Sevastopol, we would now most probably be at war with Russia. Our relations with Russia are not regulated only in accordance with our wishes, but, in my opinion, they also depend on the position of European states, including the Czech Republic.

A Mistake in the Lisbon Protocol

Not long after the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol as one of the START I Treaty countries. It is stated in the fifth point of this treaty, however, that we are a country without a nuclear statute, which is a mistake. If we are one of the START I Treaty countries, then, of course, we have a nuclear statute. A great deal of water has passed under the bridge since this treaty was signed and the international situation has in many ways changed. We will ratify the Lisbon Protocol in parliament, but without the fifth point. This is the will of parliament. At the same time, the controversial former Soviet nuclear weapons cannot be decisive in determining whether Ukraine is a nuclear state. We now have such scientific and industrial potential so we can manufacture nuclear weapons ourselves.

No One Needs the Fleet in its Current Form

Russia is playing the following game: It is persuading officers and rank-and-file sailors to support the unity and inviolability of the Black Sea Fleet. We, on the contrary, support the elimination of this fleet. It is not needed in its current form either by Russia or by Ukraine. We have already expressed ourselves in favor of demilitarizing the Black Sea region and we have initiated, for example, the removal of nuclear warheads from the submarines that used to belong to the USSR. Not even in the future do we intend to strive to become a military power in the Black Sea region. We do not even intend to build a strong Ukrainian fleet here. The huge Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR represents the militarization of this region. Moreover, it is obsolete and in poor condition. Ukraine would like to have a smaller fleet in the future, which it could use economically.

The issue of the Black Sea Fleet is, however, a "matryoshka doll" that conceals within itself the problem of the Crimea and the financing and the future of the 10,000 Russian sailors in the fleet. Russia still has a large number of its troops stationed abroad, but it cannot afford to bring them home and guarantee them an appropriate future there. Russia must start paying us for allowing its ships to anchor in our ports and its units to be deployed in the Crimea.

It would be nice if, after the division of the fleet, we could in the future—as some people think—sell some of the ships from the fleet to other countries, for instance, to Iran in exchange for oil. We would be doing the same as the Russians who, despite great concern on the part of the United States, are now selling components for nuclear weapons to Iran and India. The snag is that these ships are only good for scrap.

Crimean Deputies Express Concern About Military Buildup

LD1108083893 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0530 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] A group of deputies of the Crimean Supreme Soviet has sent a letter to the presidents and parliaments of Russia and Ukraine, which expresses concern in connection with the buildup of armed forces on the republic's territory.

The letter says that army corps stationed in the Crimea have increased several times. Sixty two armored personnel carriers, flamethrowers, and thousands of assault troops of western Ukraine have been transferred to Sevastopol.

The letter's authors demand that the troops be withdrawn from the peninsula's territory, that the division of the Black Sea fleet be stopped, and that 650 billion rubles of Ukraine's debt to Russia be returned as these funds are mainly being used for the militarization of Crimea.

Preparations for Kravchuk-Yeltsin Summit Continue

LD1008171993 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Constructive preparation for the upcoming Ukrainian-Russian summit is continuing, Yuriy Serhiyev, head of the information service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told journalists today. He emphasized that the necessary consultations and business-like talks between the relevant experts are taking place. When the work is completed, according to him, the planned meeting of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia is to take place.

ITC Charges Kiev Selling Uranium at 'Dumping Prices'

LD1108090893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0730 GMT 11 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Text] New York August 11 TASS—The U.S. International Trade Commission [ITC] has accused Ukraine of selling highly enriched uranium for dumping prices and has imposed sanctions on it, according to which Ukrainian exporters of uranium, used for manufacture nuclear weapons, will have to pay duties equivalent to the price difference, the U.S. "Journal of Commerce and Commercial" reported on Tuesday with reference to its own sources.

The commission's decision came as a reply to the complaints of local uranium manufacturers and the international petroleum, chemical and atomic industry workers union. The journal stresses that Ukraine was accused of selling uranium in the United States at prices that should have been 115.82 per cent higher in accordance with the American laws ensuring their fair level.

The U.S. Department of Commerce had disclosed last year that Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were supplying to the American market uranium at 50 per cent of its market price. After that the governments of these countries promised to alter their price policy. However, the "Journal of Commerce and Commercial" says, the dumping sales are growing rapidly. The U.S. International Trade Commission has already arrived at the preliminary conclusion that the U.S. uranium industry had suffered huge losses as a result of such imports. The newspaper notes that if the other republics of the former Soviet Union did not stop the dumping, they would be subjected to similar sanctions.

France Delivers Nuclear Safety Equipment to Ukraine

LD1008161293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] A news conference has been held at the French embassy in Ukraine on the occasion of modern equipment to heighten safety at nuclear power plants being handed to our state. Taking part in it were representatives of the Institute of Nuclear Protection and Safety from France and Germany, and of the Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety Issues.

German Joint Venture To Help Nuclear Power Industry

LD1008162393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 0000 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Ukraine's nuclear power industry, the nation's endless headache since the Chernobyl accident, is expected to somewhat improve its technical safety, reliability and overall performance with the aid of (UNA), the newly established German-Ukrainian joint venture. Its co-founders include the Rivno nuclear power plant, the Kiev-based Energy Project Institute and Germany's (Kraftwerk Sundenlagenbau). The new joint venture is supposed to introduce advanced technologies and supply spare parts and up-to-date equipment necessary for the Ukrainian nuclear power industry.

German Defense Minister To Sign Cooperation Accord in Kiev

WS1008145693 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 9 Aug 93

[Text] Kiev—German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe will arrive in Ukraine for a three-day visit on 16 August. During his visit, two agreements are expected to be signed by the Ukrainian and German Defense Ministries—on conditions for mutual support in conducting official and working visits and on military cooperation. The visit of the German guest expands contacts between the two ministries initiated during the visit of Major General Heorhiy Pankratov, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to Germany last year.

Ukrainian, Hungarian Delegations Discuss Border Issues

LD1008161793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] In Yalta, negotiations have taken place between the Ukrainian delegation, led by the chairman of the state committee for guarding the state border, Colonel General Valeriy Hubenko, and the Hungarian delegation with the Republic of Hungary's Interior Ministry's chief of border protection, Major General Balazs Novak, at the head. The negotiations were held in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding.

Taking account of the situation at the border between the two countries, the negotiations discussed a mechanism for

implementing plans for carrying out agreements on border issues signed in Budapest at the beginning of the year.

Dmytro Tkach, the Ukrainian ambassador to Hungary, took part in the negotiations.

Report Details Activities at Polish Border

AU1108080893 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian 7 Aug 93 p 3

[Report by unidentified ZA VILNU UKRAYINU correspondent: "Border Guards Are on the Alert"]

[Text] Eight Romanian citizens were detained by Ukrainian border guards 500 meters away from the Ukrainian-Polish border. They explained that they had wanted to illegally enter Germany in search of a living. One day later, late at night, thanks to information received from local residents, the attempts by two Ghanian and one Kenyan citizens to cross the border to the Polish side was thwarted. Nor do our compatriots abandon such attempts. For example, on 15 July, residents of the border zone village of Hubychiv in Starosambirskyy Rayon informed the border check-point about the appearance there of two suspicious strangers. They turned out to be Ukrainian citizens who intended to enter Poland illegally.

Altogether, over the seven months of the current year, officers of the North-Western Administration of Ukraine's Border Troops detained 1,264 border infringers and confiscated contraband worth 573 million karbovantsi [K]. At the border with Belarus, an attempt to smuggle considerable amounts of weapons was foiled. At the Lvov stretch of the border, the results are not bad either: 658 transgressors failed to fulfill their plans and smuggle contraband worth K350 million.

The border guards' service is not easy. However, they cope with their duties quite well. By a Ukrainian presidential edict, the chief of the North-Western Administration Mykola Yoltukhovskyy was promoted to the next rank—lieutenant general, and the chief of the Lvov unit, Volodymyr Rylkov, to the rank of major general.

Government Recognizes Polish Consul General in Kiev

WS1108081193 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Government recognized Mr. Tomasz Leoniuk as consul general of the Polish Republic in the city of Kiev. The consul district, where Mr. Leoniuk will perform his duties, covers the entire territory of Ukraine.

Commentary Views Lithuania as Model for Economic Reforms

AU1008170693 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 7 Aug 93 p 1

[Ihor Lyashenko commentary: "It Appears That Reforms in Ukraine May Follow the Baltic Scenario"]

[Text] Conclusions can be drawn from the fact that relations between Ukraine and the Baltic states have recently become much more active. Hardly a month had passed since Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma's visit to Estonia and Lithuania, when Prime Minister of the Lithuanian Republic Adolfas Slezevicius arrived in Ukraine on a return visit. If we also add to this the enthusiasm with which the Ukrainian premier speaks about the economic reforms in those countries, the idea that Leonid Kuchma is seriously planning to implement economic reforms in Ukraine using Lithuania as a model is not without grounds.

There are three main trends in implementing reforms where Ukraine could follow Lithuania's experience. Last year, Lithuania had 1,163 percent inflation. In the first half of 1993, the corresponding estimate was 119 percent, and last month—just two percent. This factor, as well as the availability of the necessary stabilization fund, made it possible to put into circulation Lithuania's own currency—the lit—and maintain it at a suitable conversion level. Leonid Kuchma believes that similar work must precede the introduction of the hryvnya. According to him, monetary reform in Ukraine is presently at the stage of creating a stabilization fund.

The second trend is land reform. Over several years of its implementation, Lithuania has suffered quite a number of bumps. Ukraine's job is to avoid mistakes by learning from other people's experience.

The third trend lies in looking for a escape from dependence upon Russian oil. Lithuania is just about to begin building a terminal for receiving oil from tankers. Ukraine is also close to resolving the problem of building an oil terminal.

Therefore, there is much in common. This is precisely what was stated by Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma and Lithuanian Prime Minister A. Slezevicius at the news conference held by them on the results of interstate negotiations. As for the specific results of the meeting: A document was signed on cooperation in the sphere of science and culture, customs problems were settled, an agreement on free trade was signed, and work was done on resolving the question of housing exchange.

Cabinet Supports Proposal To Send Meat to Abkhazia

AU1108050593 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 7 Aug 93 p 2

[Unattributed report published under the rubric "Governmental Decisions"]

[Text] In view of the fact that there is an uninterrupted influx of refugees to individual areas of Abkhazia and that there are quite a number of Ukrainians among them, in order to ensure the functioning of the "Ukrayina" Sanatorium situated in Abkhazia, a directive issued by Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers has supported the proposal by the Chernihiv Oblast State Administration to send 100 tonnes of meat to the Abkhazian Republic.

National Affairs

Coal Miners Urge Wage Indexation, Threaten To Strike

WS1108080993 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] The Independent Trade Union of the Ukrainian Coal Miners demanded that the president, government, and the legislature of our state immediately review the minimum wages and the rates of tariffs and salaries. This demand was put forth in a letter of the union's leader Oleksandr Rel which he addressed to the Ukrainian leaders. The above payments, the document says, should be indexed according to the rising cost of living. If their claim is ignored, the coal miners threaten to resort to forceful pressure.

Donbass Democratic Deputies To Implement Ukrainian Laws

WS1108073893 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 3 Aug 93 p 3

[Report by Alla Topchiy: "To Awake Consciousness"]

[Text] The Initiative group of the Oblast and City Councils' people's deputies has discussed at a joint session the issue of the convocation of a constituent assembly of the Donetsk Region People's Deputies' Association. The newly created bloc of democratic deputies will be supporting the implementation of Ukrainian legislation and the awakening of voters' public consciousness. Such activities are particularly important on the eve of the referendum. The proposed name for the association is "For Democratic Ukraine".

Members of the organizational committee for the convocation of a constituent assembly of the association have expressed their views on the issues of bilingualism and regional autonomy, which were discussed at the regular session of the Oblast Council. In the opinion of the democratic deputies, bilingualism is illegitimate, because it contradicts the Languages Act. The referendum on bilingualism will be costly. Today, money is needed to resolve social demands of the region not for whimsical problems. The Languages Act, taking into account Donetsk regional circumstances, provides for implementing Ukrainian as the official language by the year 2000.

The deputies are surprised that the bilingualism issue is not being investigated by linguists. Even Potebnia [Ukrainian linguist] claimed that early learning of cognate languages is harmful to the evolution of individuality. If this is true, a man is not able to fluently command both Russian and Ukrainian languages. Bilingualism also affects spelling. There is evidence that at universities some chauvinistic oriented professors are collecting signatures for a referendum among students, during classes or directly before exams.

The democratic deputies are also concerned about the Oblast Council demand for Donbass' autonomy. "Khasbulatovshchyna" is widespread in the Donetsk Oblast, which is not strange at all. It is obvious that the orthodox nomenclature, Russian and Ukrainian "red barons," are using such tricks to hamper economic reforms, preserve economic privileges in their hands, protect the flourishing of mafia structures, and strengthen their control over the fooled people and the government frightened by the plotted strikes. The democratic deputies unanimously stated that the Donetsk Oblast is an integral administrative part of the independent Ukraine.

Parliament Commission Examines Ecological Situation

LD1008184993 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] The standing commissions of the Supreme Council of Ukraine do not have any fewer troubles these hot August days. A group of people's deputies of the commission for issues of ecology and the efficient use of the environment is carrying out checks on adherence in the provinces to legislation regarding protection of small rivers.

In accordance with the plan of work for August, the commission has studied the hydrogeological state in Transcarpathia, which has been complicated by prolonged rain. Relevant material is currently being prepared for presentation to Ukraine's Government. This same commission is planning to present forestry and water codes of Ukraine to the eighth session of the Supreme Council. It is currently finishing work on these codes.

The commission for issues of human health is working on a draft law on the public health and epidemic [as heard] well-being of the population, introduced by the Cabinet of Ministers. Proceeding from the fact that an unsatisfactory ecological situation has arisen in a number of Ukraine's regions and many districts have suffered from the Chernobyl disaster, members of the commission believe that the prepared draft law should be aimed at resolving the above-mentioned and other urgent problems.

Leading specialists from the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Health, the Academy of Medical Sciences, practicing doctors, and representatives of industrial enterprises that work in health protection will be included in the final elaboration of the draft law.

Electricity Generation Drops 6 Percent in First Half Year

LD1008163593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 0000 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] According to the Ukrainian Ministry for Power and Electrification, electricity generation in Ukraine dropped by six percent in the January-July, 1993, period as compared with the same 1992 period. Ukraine's power industry generated a total of almost 137 billion kWh of electricity during 1993's first seven months.

Chronic shortages of fuel, badly hitting the industry, were partially alleviated by the government's natural gas supplies. Repair work on power plants has been lagging behind the schedule because of material and spare part shortages, the Ministry sources say.

A total of 1.6 billion kWh of power generated in Ukraine was exported to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia during the period. The bulk of these exports went on a barter basis, with the Ukrainian power plants getting spare parts, aluminium for (?wiring) oil fuel. The Ukrainian State budget got currency revenues from the industry in the ball park of $1.9 million.

UNA-UNSO Employ 'Beating With Sticks' Method Against Corruption

AU1108050493 Ivano-Frankivsk HALYCHYNA in Ukrainian 3 Aug 93 p 2

[Unattributed commentary: "UNA Knows How To Fight Corruption"]

[Text] Eduard Shufrych, member of UNA [Ukraine Nationalist Assembly] and chairman of the Transcarpathian SUM [expansion not known] believes that UNA may actually win the elections in highland areas of the Carpathian region. When asked if there is a guarantee that, after coming to power, UNA functionaries will not become involved in corruption, E. Shufrych said: For eradicating such an affliction, there exists an old and effective Ukrainian method of punishment—beating with sticks—that is already being successfully employed within the UNA-UNSO [Ukrainian People's Self- Defense] structures.

'Political Motivations' Suspected Behind Burglary

AU1008121293 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 6 Aug 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "It Will Take Time Before the Radio Will Start Broadcasting"]

[Text] During the night of 3-4 August, the editorial office of the program "The Crimean Island," which was to be broadcast in Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar languages, was pillaged. The program had been coordinated with the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar editorial boards of Crimean Radio.

The bandits stole a whole set of equipment for live broadcasting worth at least 5-6 million karbovantsi in state prices. Personal records that Leonid Pilunskyy had made at meetings (including closed ones) of the Crimean Supreme Council during the August putsch of 1991 also disappeared. At the same time, however, the thieves did not take factory-packed foreign-made cassettes that were also there.

The radio correspondents do not rule out political motivations behind the burglary. They hope that everything will become evident during an investigation. However, there is little hope—one and a half years ago, a similar burglary of the "Crimean Island," although on a smaller scale, took place, but, to this day, there are no investigation results.

Belarus

National Bank Cannot Pay Wages of Russian Servicemen

PM1008115793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Mikhail Shimanskiy: "Russian Servicemen in Belarus Left Without Wages"]

[Text] Minsk—Stanislav Bogdankevich, chairman of the National Bank of Belarus, has decreed that no wages be paid to servicemen of the Russian strategic troops stationed on the republic's territory.

This directive has caused extreme dissatisfaction among many thousands of officers and soldiers. But, S. Bogdankevich has announced, there is simply nothing with which to pay them. The National Bank of Belarus has absolutely no Russian money. "In the time since the well known action by the Central Bank of Russia we have not received a single ruble," stated S. Bogdankevich.

New Air Defense Commander Appointed

WS1108072393 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Report by V. Nikolayev: "New Commander of Armed Forces Has Been Appointed"]

[Text] In accordance with the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic, General Major Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostenko has been appointed new commander of the Air-Defense Forces [PVO] and comes under the authority of the minister of defense. This Belarusian national was born in 1945, and before the present appointment had been serving as a first deputy commander of the PVO, the headquarters of which had been located in Tbilisi.

Having assumed the office, the new commander presided over a meeting of the PVO's military council. Issues of reforming the air defense forces, enhancement of on-duty vigilance, and consolidation of combat discipline were discussed at the meeting.

Officers Condemn Popular Front's Actions at Congress

WS1108072693 Minsk VECHERNIY MINSK in Russian 2 Aug 93 p 1

[Report attributed to BELINFORM]

[Text] The Council of the Belarusian Officers' Union issued a declaration concerning the recently held first world congress of ethnic Belarusians. Describing the congress as an important political event for the Republic and the first representative forum aimed at uniting efforts of Belarusians regardless of their place of residence and political convictions, at the same time the Officers' Union noted that certain political forces—the Belarusian Popular Front in the first place—attempted to give the event a distinct political tinge. This was eagerly supported by some representatives of the Belarusian diaspora that include those who, during the war, compromised themselves by collaborating with the fascists.

National intolerance, the declarations point out, creates the kind of environment that, sooner or later, will give rise to chauvinism, racism, fascism—traits that are alien to the Belarusian people.

The Officers' Union condemned the "direct interference of the same forces in the solution of the problem of military building, which is one of nationwide importance," by adopting an unlawful statement giving a biased assessment of the Republic's Armed Forces and "expressing offensive distrust toward the Defense Ministry and the officers' corp." "In this connection, the Union of Officers' of the Belarusian Republic resolutely protests against the use of Belarusians from all over the world by the Belarusian Popular Front in its foul political struggle as well as against its attempts to kindle national animosities among the peoples residing in the Republic..."

Kravchanka To Visit Lithuania in Late August

WS1008114893 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1000 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] According to the Information Department at the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka will pay a working visit to the Lithuanian Republic 23-24 August. The visit's agenda includes a meeting with Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius, and Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys.

Moldova

Parliament Debates Dissolution, New Elections

AU1008190393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1625 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Chisinau ROMPRES, 10/8/1993—The addresses made in the sitting of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova by the representatives of various groups pointed to the existence of two currents of opinion about the current situation: One in favor of the immediate dissolution of the present parliament and of early elections, based on a multiparty system, and another one against the dissolution. Parliament still has to cope with urgent problems of the republic, the drafting of the constitution included, and then start organizing local elections followed by the parliamentary poll.

Parliament President Petru Lucinschi proposed the adjourning of the proceedings by the beginning of September, when the two bills on parliament's election would be analyzed and afterwards the date of the future elections should be set.

President Mircea Snegur of the Republic of Moldova stressed that there was a fight for power going on in parliament and that those who wanted the power were offered this possibility through early elections.

The deputies then voted the continuation of the proceedings with discussions on the bill of adjusted state budget.

Debate Analyzed

MK1008104693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Aug 93 p 3

[Aleksandr Tago report: "Early Parliamentary Elections Idea Is Getting More and More Supporters, Something Even the Speaker Inclines to Favor," in the "Moldova" column]

[Text] Changes took place in the political situation in the republic over the past weekend, a time off also for Moldova's parliament. The idea of dissolving parliament, which has been hovering over the upper legislative body for a few months, is garnering more and more supporters. An increasing number of politicians and observers are becoming inclined to recognize that the present legislature's face can only be saved through prudently disbanding, passing an election law, and calling early parliamentary elections. Even Parliament's chairman, Petru Lucinschi, is becoming persuaded that parliament should disband. He called for this live on national television Monday. Luchinskiy said it is time to put an end to the shameful theater in parliament and decide on its future. Observers think this change of heart in the speaker signals the possibility of an early termination of the deputies' powers. The Monday news conference held by the Social Democratic Party of Moldova called loud and clear for an early dissolution.

The party chairman, Oazu Nantoy, stressed that the dissolution was needed if only to stop the shameful horse trading between the so-called majority and the so-called opposition. Explaining the expression "so-called," Oazu Nantoy stressed that there exists no opposition and no majority in Moldova. They had consolidated during difficult times. Over the recent year, the work of the deputies was only motivated by their desire to keep their credentials and perks. Social Democrats also flayed the draft multiparty election law. Some political forces and the parliamentary chairman, Petru Lucinschi, are coming to favor a law that would allow election of 50 percent of the deputies from party slates and 50 percent, as in the past, from the constituencies. Social Democrats think that would be copying the present parliament at its worst and would not democratize society. Social Democrats spoke categorically in favor of elections from party slates. In order to avoid a boycott of early elections by Dniester inhabitants, they suggest that the republic should not be divided into constituencies. Social Democrats declared that their list would include candidates from the Dniester, and that would prevent the republic's splitting further.

Legislature Not Dissolved

AU1008190293 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Today's session has proved that the parliament has been salvaged and that it will continue to function, stated Gheorghe Ghimpu, the leader of the parliamentary group of the democrats, after the conclusion of the extraordinary parliamentary session of the Republic of Moldova.

We would like to mention the fact that today's proceedings, which were scheduled to resume at 1600 [1300 GMT] after the intermission, could not continue because there was no quorum. The draft bill on the readjusted state budget was to be discussed. Petru Lucinschi, the chairman of Moldova's Parliament announced that within a few days the Presidium of the legislature will summarize the conclusions drawn from the current extraordinary session and will establish the date and the agenda of the next parliament session.

The fact that the legislature was not dissolved today is considered by [Moldova's] democratic forces to be a victory demonstrating the parliamentarians' desire to continue their work, our Chisinau correspondent, Nicolae Mircea Nastase, reports.

[Chisinau BASAPRESS in English at 1730 GMT states that: "Today in the afternoon the President of the Parliament, Petru Lucinschi, declared the suspension of the extraordinary session of Parliament because only 148 from 251 of deputies were present in the session hall. Lucinschi mentioned that the next session will be organized on the first days of September."]

Deputy Premier To Negotiate Fuel Deliveries in Moscow

AU1108050993 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1513 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Chisinau ROMPRES, 10/8/1993—Valentin Kunev, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, left for Moscow this morning, to negotiate with responsible factors of the Russian government the settlement of the oil and other fuel deliveries to Moldova.

The Mozyr oil refinery alone desists the supply of 100,000 crude to Moldova [sentence as received]. "The crude will be supplied if the issues of taxes and customs duties are settled," said responsible factors of the Fuel Association of the Republic of Moldova. The country will have to pay the soonest at least a part of its debts on fuel, which stands at around 15 billion rubles, MOLDOVA-PRES reports.

Tajikistan

Protest Sent to Afghanistan Over Border Incursion

LD1108081093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0648 GMT 11 Aug 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 11 August—It was reported today at a briefing for local and foreign correspondents held at the Information Department of the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the heads of the Republic's Foreign Policy Department had sent a statement to the Afghan side that expresses serious concern over another armed provocation on the Pamir stretch of the Tajik-Afghan border. The document stresses that on 10 August, a group of armed individuals from the Afghan settlement of Moy-May attacked a vehicle carrying Russian and Kazakh border guards in the vicinity of the Darvaz village of Kurgovad.

As a result, two border guards were wounded and an officer of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan and five Russian border guards were captured by the transgressors and taken over into the territory of Afghanistan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan regards this fact as a deliberate act of provocation to foil the meeting of the heads of state of Afghanistan and Tajikistan that is being prepared. It demanded that the Afghan authorities return the captive border guards immediately and that the perpetrators of this provocation be severely punished.

The text of the statement was given today to Afghan Foreign Minister Hedayat Amin Arsala, who is in Dushanbe on an official visit, by Tajik Foreign Minister Rashid Alimov.

Government Prepared for Talks With Afghanistan

LD1008142593 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 1000 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Tajikistan is prepared for dialogue with Afghanistan on a settlement of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. This was said in a letter from Laqim Qayumov, permanent representative of Tajikistan at the United Nations, distributed at the headquarters of the community of nations as a Security Council document. The Republic of Tajikistan, the document notes, in obtaining independence, embarked on the creation of a legal system and the necessary corresponding structures and democratic institutions for an independent state. The Tajik opposition, however, using methods of force, in May 1992 seized power and transformed Tajikistan into a hotbed of civil war.

Having been defeated, this opposition moved to the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

Laqim Qayumov indicated that strong and well-coordinated aggressive armed attacks by certain groups of Afghan mojahedin and the Tajik armed opposition from the territory of Afghanistan on the territory of Tajikistan, and against Russian border guards guarding the border with Afghanistan at the request of the leadership of the country, were directed at undermining the stability of Tajikistan and the whole Central Asia region. He noted that these terrorist actions are evidence of the existence of a previously worked out subversive plan aimed against the Tajik people.

The most dreadful thing is that the Tajik armed opposition and groups of Afghan mojahedin, and also those who are helping them, are trying to oppose and incite to armed conflict the peoples of Tajikistan, Russia, and Afghanistan and to kindle widescale interethnic and interstate conflict.

The Government of Tajikistan is taking active steps to normalize the situation on the border by means of political negotiations and is ready for peaceful dialogue with the Afghan side at any level, including direct meetings and negotiations by the heads of state of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, stressed the Tajik representative.

Gorno-Badakhshan Hails Forthcoming Summit With Afghanistan

LD1108095493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0931 GMT 11 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, August 11 (TASS)—"The leadership of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region hails the forthcoming meeting of Imamali Rakhmanov, chairman of the Tajik Supreme Soviet, and Rabbani Borhanoddin, the president of Afghanistan, which is expected to take place this August. It regards the summit as a major step towards a political dialogue between the top leaderships of the two neighbouring states," vice-chairman of the Gorno-Badakhshan Regional Council Shirinsho Dondorov told ITAR-TASS by telephone.

"Negotiations, not further confrontation and mutual accusations, are the only chance to stabilise the socio-political situation in the region, including on the Tajik-Afghan border," Dondorov stated. He suggested that leaders of the Tajik opposition, now in emigration, should take part in the negotiations process too. Dondorov believes national reconciliation and the ending of the fratridal conflict in Tajikistan can be achieved only by means of a compromise.

Touching on the situation in the Nagorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, Dondorov said it was tranquil, stressing that the sound forces of there had received with satisfaction the results of the agreement between the government of the Tajik Republic and representatives of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. He mentioned among the agreements concluded a few days ago the decision to jointly guard the Haburabat mountain pass on the road from Dushanbe to Horog, to step up the delivery of food and fuel to the Pamir area. The first large truck column with humanitarian cargoes has already reached Tavildary district in the foothills of the Pamir range. They included food, fuel, building materials and other vitally

important goods for the population of the Nagorno-Badakhshan region which suffered had from a long economic blockade.

Egyptian Embassy Denies Aiding Opposition

LD1008154693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1425 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow, 10 August—The Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Moscow has sent a letter to ITAR-TASS denying a report from that agency dated 1 August this year referring to informed sources and concerning Egypt and other states giving financial and military aid and also sending military instructors to the Tajik opposition in Afghanistan.

The embassy believes that the facts set out in that report go against one of the fundamental principles of Egypt's foreign policy—non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and settling all disputed issues by peaceful means. Egypt is striving for security and stability to be established in the region.

Tajik Opposition Leaders Comment on Badakhshan, Russia

MK1108083093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No.33, 15 Aug 93 (Signed to press 10 Aug 93) p A8

[Interview with Tajik opposition leaders Said Abdul Nuri, chairman of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, and Khodzhi Akbar Turadzhanzoda, former chief of Tajik Moslems by correspondents Sanobar Shermatova and Dodozhoni Atovullo in the "Islamic State of Afghanistan"; date not given: "We Are Ready for a Dialogue With Russia and With Russia Alone"]

[Text] [Question] How do you assess the results of the meeting of the leaders of the Central Asian states and Russia in Moscow?

[Answer] The Tajik opposition's confidence in Russia is nearly exhausted, for we saw the Russian and Uzbek servicemen initially helping the People's Front to destroy and force into flight to Afghanistan a part of the Tajik people and then to bring the current Tajik government to power with their bayonets. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's pronouncement after the meeting in the Kremlin, however—that a political dialogue and not military pressure is of primary importance—arouses hope.

[Question] Are you ready for talks with the Tajik authorities?

[Answer] We want to hold talks with Russia and with Russia alone, because the Tajik authorities by themselves have no weight without Moscow and would not be able to survive for two days without Moscow's support. We believed in the pledges, promises, and tears of Emomali Rakhmonov himself and his supporters when we signed peace agreements a number of times and were deceived. We no longer trust him.

We, the opposition leaders, abandon the struggle for power. Let Tajikistan be governed by new people—businessmen, economists, and politicians who are not encumbered by any ideology. This is the only way to overcome the chaos of civil war.

[Question] What is your attitude toward the idea of building up Russia's military presence in Tajikistan and on its borders?

[Answer] We agree that the Tajik-Afghan border should be guarded by border troops from CIS countries, including Russia. In our view, however, the buildup of the military presence plays into the hands of the current regime, which has been trying to destroy its political opponents with Russian bayonets.

[Question] What is your view of Russian-Tajik relations?

[Answer] The Republic's economy is 90-percent linked with the Russian economy, and this is the main factor that has to be taken into account. We favor political, economic, and cultural ties with Russia provided they do not infringe on the Republic's sovereignty and the national dignity of the Tajiks. We want the Russian-speaking population to remain in the Republic, and we will guarantee their security.

[Question] Some politicians think that Tajikistan is seriously threatened by Islamic fundamentalism.

[Answer] Formerly our peoples were frightened by U.S. imperialism—now by Islamic fundamentalism. Don't serious politicians see that these arguments are illusory and baseless? Islam is a religion of the patient. It cannot threaten anyone. If it is the desire to build an Islamic state that is meant by Islamic fundamentalism, then that is devoid of any practical meaning as well. We want people in Tajikistan to be able profess any religion and to express any opinion without having to pay for this with their lives or freedom, as is the case right now. We want everyone to have a possibility to engage in private enterprise, and we disagree with the communists on all these counts.

[Question] What are your forecasts as to the further development of events?

[Answer] We are ready for talks attended by Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, representatives of the United Nations, the CSCE, and the Islamic Conference. The rest depends on Russia's stance. We are concerned that while peace-loving speeches are heard in Moscow, the kishlaks [villages] of Gornyy Badakhshan are being bombed from the air and shelled by tanks. The Russian military deny their involvement; so does the Tajikistan Defense Ministry. Who is doing the fighting in Gornyy Badakhshan, then? For six months the Rakhmonov government kept Badakhshan in an economic blockade; people even had to eat grass. Unable to starve them to death, they decided to quell the uprising by

military force. So, what is taking place? To destroy all and then to sit down at a negotiating table? The hostilities in Gornyy Badakhshan have seriously undermined trust in the CIS' peacekeeping efforts.

Roundup on Fighting in Tavildara Rayon

LD1008165993 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Russian 1000 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Confrontation has now been going on for over two months in Tavildara Rayon. Over the past week firing by the opposing sides in Tavildara has spilled over into large-scale combat actions. According to operational information received at the Ministry of Defense of Tajikistan, it was explained that the main areas of tension remain the Kalaikhumb border rayon. The road leading from Tavildara is being fired at by antigovernment forces along a length of 60-80 km.

The Ministry of Defense of Tajikistan still declares that the Air Force is not taking part in combat operations.

The Military Department has reported a number of successful operations, during which U.S. antitank mines, Chinese and Pakistani guns, and a large quantity of cartridges of Chinese make were captured from opposition forces.

Subunits of the Ministry of Defense, together with troops of the national security service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, successfully carried out on 1 August an operation in Tavildara Rayon against gangs of opposition formations. A correspondent of the KHOVAR agency was told this at the press center of the Ministry of Defense. In an operation on 9 August, the last line of defense of the enemy was taken in Khabu-Rabot Pass. The beaten armed group of irregulars that had long been in this region lost their arms and ammunition. During the operation, government forces of Tajikistan seized several dumps of weapons and ammunition, and two strongpoints of opposition irregulars were routed. Sappers cleared mines on the road from the village of Langar to Dashti-Jerra.

The situation in Tavildara Rayon is back to normal. Road communications along the Dushanbe-Khorog highway have been restored. As is known, gangs of the opposition formations had been in control of the Dushanbe-Khorog highway, the only road connecting the administrative centre of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast with the center of the Republic. Today, accompanied by government troops, a large convoy with food, medicine, and necessities will set off from Tavildara to Khabu-Rabot Pass. There it will be handed over to the leadership of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast for further transport to regions in the Pamirs.

Deputy Minister: Talk of Cholera Epidemic 'Premature'

PM1108094593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 Second Edition p 5

[Lyubov Latypova report: "Too Early To Talk of Cholera Epidemic in Tajikistan"]

[Text] Anatoliy Kopyltsov, Tajik deputy health minister, has called the reports of a cholera epidemic in Tajikistan somewhat premature. Although there is a certain amount of tense expectation in this respect, it is impossible to give an unequivocal answer at the moment—this will be done during the next 10 days.

According to Kopyltsov, the following situation has developed. Since the second 10-day period in July there have been cases of diarrhea—that is, stomach upsets—among refugees returning home from Afghanistan. Insofar as around 3,000 cases of cholera have been recorded in Afghanistan's northern provinces, the possibility of its appearing on Tajik territory cannot be ruled out, especially as the diarrhea is widespread among people returning home by an unofficial route: They are crossing the Pyandzh on the border in places where it is "transparent" using any improvised means and are evading quarantine control, unlike those who are returning officially via Termez.

The cholera vibrio has not yet been unequivocally isolated not only because it is quite hard to distinguish from a multitude of others that are widespread and do not present a threat to the population, but also because there is a lack of standard diagnostic and medicinal kits and necessary medicine, which is distributed literally piecemeal. This year it was not possible to procure it in sufficient quantities because of the ending of payments between Tajikistan in Moscow [as published], as a result of which the Republic has not received the necessary resources for diagnostics and treatment to the tune of approximately 700 million rubles. It has now appealed to international organizations, UNICEF in particular, requesting the promised aid.

The situation is complicated by hunger in the border areas. It is known that nutritional disorders can cause symptoms similar to the manifestation of cholera. But the specialized institute is located in Almaty, which lengthens the time taken to make a precise diagnosis. On the whole, statistics concerning diarrhea illnesses do not differ from the average long-term statistics, and there are no grounds yet for panic.

Nevertheless, the latest assault team has set off from Dushanbe to Pyandzhskiy and Kolkhozabadskiy Rayons, where similar cases have also appeared. It includes medics and specialists of the special rescue detachment formed three years ago after the earthquake in Sharor—which killed thousands of inhabitants of two villages—and led by Yuldash Tursunov, an experienced climber and mountain rescuer. The rescuers' task now is to urgently put into operation the drinking water purification equipment received from the FRG. This is task number one, because most of the 23 artesian wells have been put out of action as a result of the border fighting. Ten deep-well pumps have been allocated to restore them.

The last time cholera was observed on Tajik territory was 1971 in Shaartuzskiy Rayon.

Armenia

Karabakh Delegation To Take Part in Rome CSCE

NC1008170893 Yerevan SNARK in English 1541 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Stepanakert, August 10 (SNARK)—The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, though with a delay, will be presented at a conference of the CSCE Minsk Group.

Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, after long hesitations, decided to direct its delegation to Rome to take part in the conference of the CSCE Minsk Group on regulation to the Karabakh conflict. Arkadiy Gukasyan, the Karabakh foreign minister, urgently left for Rome.

At the same time, according to [chairman of] Karabakh Defence State Committee Robert Kocharyan, the above decision has been settled after numerous international appeals to Karabakh, at main from the Armenian side, to take part in the peacemaking process within the CSCE auspices.

However, in the official's opinion, the shortest way to a peace for a long time, would be an active international cooperation to the recently launched direct Azerbaijani-Karabakh negotiations that might be a part of the CSCE Minsk Group peacebringing process.

Kocharyan noted that to his regret by some subjective reasons the Azerbaijani-Karabakh bilateral contacts are not being supported by the CSCE Minsk Group which, in Kocharyan's opinion, makes the peacemaking process more difficult. Thus, the Karabakh official underlined, the Azerbaijani side refused to dialog and returned back to a force way of the conflict settlement, at this time using the UN and CSCE pressure upon Karabakh.

Azerbaijan Military Activity Leads to Political Problems

MK1008012093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Aug 93 p 3

[Armen Khanbabyan report under "Armenia" rubric: "The Calm Was Shortlived; War and Ruble Expansion Create Problems for Yerevan"]

[Excerpts] The period of relative military-political stability in the area of Karabakh-Azeri confrontation and in Armenia seems to be coming to an end. Obviously encouraged by the international support manifested in UN Security Council Resolution 853, the Azeri side has decided to bet on force once more. The cautious direct contacts between Baku and Stepanakert, which, of course, were a sensation, have been replaced by another round of aggravation on the southern sector of the Karabakh front, where for three days now Azeri infantry have been trying to take control of the district center of Gadrut. This development has undoubtedly strengthened the position of those Armenian politicians who were skeptical of Azerbaijan's willingness for real compromise and feared further escalation of the conflict; and even if Azerbaijan's current military activity is caused by the internal political situation (with the approach of the referendum on confidence in President Elchibey, the country's present leader, Geydar Aliyev, must create an image as a firm defender of unity and the indivisibility of the state)—all the same, another spiral of violence will inevitably lead to exacerbation of the situation in Armenia.

Possibly the first manifestation of this has been the unexpected resignation of Ashot Manucharyan, the president's chief national security adviser. It has not been ruled out, however, that the departure of one of Levon Ter-Petrosyan's closest associates is purely a formality. But there is some evidence to suggest that Manucharyan's resignation was caused by a sharp aggravation of relations within the presidential team, which has visibly split into two camps. If the chief adviser's resignation is accepted, this would mean another major success for Internal Minister Vano Siradegyan, who has quite successfully been increasing his power. [passage omitted]

The discussion of the new draft constitution, which is due to lead to early parliamentary and presidential elections, will apparently begin in a situation that is far from calm, and the authorities' hopes for easy success in the course of parliamentary debates and the subsequent referendum can hardly be expected to materialize.

Attacks, Shelling of Southern Karabakh Reported

NC1008192593 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1527 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] The Azerbaijani Army formations based in Fizulinskiy Rayon launched attacks throughout yesterday against Edillu, Hakhullu, Akhbulakh, and Khrmandzhukh in Gadrutskiy Rayon, as well as against Novruzlu, which is located to the southeast of Agdam.

The Karabakh Army took countermeasures and repulsed the attacks. Two Azerbaijani tanks and one armored car were hit. One fighter was killed, and three others were injured on the Armenian side. The Azerbaijani side also suffered considerable losses.

Martuni and Chartar came under long-range artillery and Grad shelling on the night of 9-10 August, as a result of which seven peaceful residents were injured.

Having resumed the artillery shelling today, an enemy army detachment, supported by armored cars, launched an attack towards Martuni this morning. It retreated after having suffered losses during a brief but fierce fighting.

According to noon reports from Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Army Headquarters, the border regions in Gadrutskiy and Martuninskiy Rayons are still coming under shelling from the rocket and artillery bases in Fizuli.

Armenian Defense Ministry press service reported that no serious incidents occurred on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border last night and today.

Attacks on Settlements Reported

NC1008165093 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1330 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we now present a report on the latest incidents in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The reports we have received from Nagorno-Karabakh have confirmed that the situation at NKR's battlefronts continues to be tense. Regardless of the talks held between the sides within the CSCE framework in Rome, Azerbaijan's military forces have grossly violated the cease-fire agreement and fired on the residential areas on NKR's border with various types of arms. Azerbaijan's military units fired on Yudumlu, Akbulat, [place-name indistinct], and other towns in Gadrutskiy Rayon from their positions in Fizulinskiy Rayon on 9 August. The Armenian defense forces obstructed the attack and inflicted serious losses on the enemy. Two of Azerbaijan's tanks and a PDM [not further specified] were hit. An Armenian fighter was killed and three others were wounded in the clashes.

Uninterrupted combat operations have continued in the region. Martuni and [place-name indistinct] were fired on from Kutablinskiy Rayon with artillery guns and Grad rocket launchers last night. The first reports we have received said that seven citizens have been wounded in the attacks. However, the aggressors [words indistinct]. They maintained their rocket and artillery attacks for several hours. The Azerbaijani units later launched an attack on Martuni with armored vehicles. The attack was repulsed after violent clashes. The Azerbaijani units lost many men in their advance.

The border areas in NKR's Gadrutskiy and Martuninskiy Rayons were fired on from Fizulinskiy Rayon in the afternoon today. Obviously, Azerbaijan's new leaders maintain an aggressive policy and wish to have the Nagorno-Karabakh problem resolved through the use of force. [passage omitted]

Although the situation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan is tense, a significant incident did not occur in the region yesterday and today. In other words, the situation has been calm.

Military Activity Continues

NC1108090293 Yerevan SNARK in English 0830 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Stepanakert, August 11 (SNARK)—Active military actions are going on at the eastern line of the Karabakh front.

The Karabakh military officials told SNARK that as a result of hard battles the Azerbaijani detachments managed to go forward for 2-3 km and captured some strategically important hills in the Agdam and Fizuli directions, at the same time the Usifdganly, Zargyar and Karamamedly villages were captured.

Air raids and artillery shellings of the Karabakh settlements accompany offensive actions. During the period of two last months there were killed 14 and were wounded 26 residents of the Karabakh settlements. There are considerable destructions.

Seiran Oghanyan, one of the high military officials, told SNARK that the Azerbaijani active military actions can be explained by the fact that the Karabakh Army detachments are abstaining from active military actions following the order of the Karabakh Army commandments.

Mr. Oghanyan also said that if Azerbaijani Army didn't stop the offensive, the Karabakh Army commandment would give order to neutralize the fire and the Azerbaijani forces because the actions of the Azerbaijani detachments are causing serious threat to the population of the Republic.

Interior Department Seizes Weapons, Drugs

NC1108091593 Yerevan SNARK in English 0830 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Yerevan, August 11 (SNARK)—Armenian department for Internal Affairs reports the employees of the Armenian Department for Internal Affairs confiscates 5 Howitzers, 5 machine guns, 27 submachine guns, 21 pistols, 10 rifles, 45 grenades, 14 boxes of patrons, 8 explosive devices, 2 kg of ammonal, 11 units of cold steels, a mine.

There were revealed 65 facts of illegislative keeping of arms.

As a result of active actions there were confiscated 11 kg 300 gr of drugs: more than a kg of opium 102 kg of hemp—1800 sq.m. of its sown area were destroyed.

Azerbaijan

Mamedov Removed as Deputy Internal Affairs Minister

NC1008212193 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1900 GMT 9 Aug 93

[Text] Geydar Aliyev, acting president and chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, has issued a decree appointing Ibragim Kerimoglu Dunyamaliyev as first deputy minister of internal affairs. Gabil Gasan Ogly Mamedov was removed from that post.

Rigging Results of Referendum on Elchibey Ruled Out

LD1008163893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1431 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Shulman]

[Text] Baku August 10 TASS—Any rigging of the results of referendum on confidence in President Abulfaz Elchibey of Azerbaijan on August 29 is fully ruled out, deputy of the republic's plebiscite commission Jafar Veliyev told a news conference here today.

He told journalists that representatives of 32 political parties officially registered in Azerbaijan will take part in the work of district commissions together with numerous representatives of public organisations.

According to Veliyev, international observers, including from Russia and other ex-Soviet republics have been invited to attend.

Veliyev stressed that the holding of a referendum in conditions of the state of emergency of Azerbaijan's territory does not run counter to the republic's laws. As reported earlier, the holding of a referendum was backed by the National Assembly (parliament) after an investigatory commission by the parliament recognised Abulfaz Elchibey politically responsible for the massacre in Ganja on June 4.

The president, stripped of his powers by the parliament, is staying in his native village of Keleki, Ordubad district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic amid his closest supporters from the Popular Front of Azerbaijan.

According to reports from Nakhichevan he meets journalists from time to time and makes political statements by telephone and other communication media.

Moscow Envoy on Offensive in Fizuli, Planned Coup

LD1008135793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1345 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow—Breaking the cease-fire agreement along the whole front, Karabakh self-defence units continue the offensive at the Azeri Fizuli region aiming to seize the regional center on August 12, a news conference at the Azeri representation in the Russian Federation was told here today.

In the opinion of Azeri plenipotentiary Ramis Rizayev, the new coil of escalation gives the Karabakh delegation a trump card at the next round of Rome negotiations on conflict peaceful settlement. Rizayev described as ungrounded the Karabakh claims on military threat from Fizuli side.

According to the official, the Karabakh self-defence forces "have a strong army, equipped with the most advanced materiel. One should admit this army excels the Azeri forces in equipment and combat experience."

Rizayev is alarmed over a possibility of the Azeri opposition's use of defeats in the conflict zone in its struggle for power. Referring to reliable forces, he said an armed coup is being planned on August 14 in Azerbaijan by opposition leader Iskander Gamidov, and the government is working to prevent participation of illegal armed units in possible riots.space

Violence Continues Near Fizuli; Situation 'Tense'

Enemy Attack Obstructed 9 Aug

NC1008205693 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 9 Aug 93

[Text] Azerbaijan's military forces have obstructed the enemy's attack in Fizulinskiy Rayon after violent clashes in the region lasting three days. Our troops liberated [place-names indistinct] in the region. That was reported by the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense Analytical Information Center. [words indistinct]

Cease-Fire Violations Reported

LD1008135293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1345 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By ARMENPRES for TASS]

[Text] Yerevan August 10 TASS—"The Azeri side continues to violate the bilateral cease-fire agreement," according to ARMENPRES.

Referring to information of the Karabakh self-defence headquarters, the news agency reported "a large Azeri unit launched an attack in direction of the martuni regional center this morning after long rocket-artillery preparations and with support of armored vehicles. "After short but fierce fighting the Azeris had considerable casualties and retreated.

"As of 12:00 on August 10, rocket-artillery shelling of settlements of the Gadrut and Martuni regional centers continued from Azeri military bases in Fizuli. Using Fizuli as a strong point, Azeri units attacked all through Monday in direction of the settlements of Edillu, Akhullu, Abdulakh and Khrmandzhukh of the Gadrut region. All the attacks were repulsed by the Karabakh army."

Armenian Shelling Reported

NC1008173293 Baku ASSA-IRADA in English 1507 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Baku, 10.08.93 (ASSA-IRADA)—The situation around Fizuli remains tense at the night of August 10 and since this morning the Armenian formations subjected Fizuli to tank fire from the hills located to the north and south-west ASSA-IRADA was told by the MOD [Ministry of Defense] of Azerbaijan. At the same time Gushchular village of adjacent Dzhebrailskiy Province was machine-gunned. In August 10 afternoon concentration of the Armenian combat gear is observed to the north of Fizuli and near the Fizuli-Dzhebrail motorway.

In the northern part of Karabakh the Armenian troops shelled Talysh village, the local school and the hospital were destroyed.

This night the border villages of Mormor and Novoivanovka of Kedabekskiy Province of Azerbaijan were subjected to fire from cannons, the armoured vehicles and rocket launchers. The Azeri party didn't launch response fire.

Armenians Said Stepping Up Activities

LD1008173593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1605 GMT 10 Aug 93

[by AZERTADZH correspondent Natig Abdullayev - TASS]

[Text] Baku, 10 Aug—According to a report of the Azeri Ministry of Defense which was handed to AZERTADZH this evening, the situation around Fizuli, the administrative center of the rayon of the same name in the southeast of the republic, remains complicated. According to information from this source, "since last night Fizuli has been suffering massive shelling by tanks and missile launchers from the heights to the north and southeast of the town."

The defense department, citing information from the spot, informs us that "after midday an advance of armored vehicles of the Armenian armed forces toward the rayon center was noted, and most of them are now concentrated near the Fizuli-Dzhebrail highway not far from the southern outskirts of the town."

The same source also reported a stepping up of the activities of the Armenian detachments in north Karabakh. Today the Armenian village of Talysh was shelled there. Missiles have destroyed the buildings of the local school and hospital here, and there are casualties among the medical personnel.

Enemy activities were also noted on the Azeri-Armenian border. A number of settlements, including the Russian villages of Novoivanovka and Novosaratovka in Kedabekskiy rayon, were shelled today by artillery, mortars, and heavy machineguns from the territory of Armenia, according to AZERTADZH.

Turkmenistan Suspends Gas Deliveries to Azerbaijan

LD1008182993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1810 GMT 10 Aug 93

[By AZERTAG correspondent Alla Baula for TASS]

[Text] Baku, 10 Aug—Turkmenistan, whose ultimatum of a month ago has expired, has suspended deliveries of natural gas to Azerbaijan. As the Turkmen side explains, this measure was provoked by the fact that Azerbaijan has not duly paid its debt for the transport of gas, a debt that has now reached 6.5 billion rubles. Moreover, this sum includes the debt not only to Turkmenistan but also to Russia and Uzbekistan, via whose territories transit of Turkmen gas is effected. The AZERTAG correspondent was told at the Azerigaz state company that possibilities are now being sought for paying the debt not in rubles but rather in goods made in Azerbaijan.

Aliyev Appoints President of Oil Company

NC1008210193 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 9 Aug 93

[Text] Geydar Aliyev, acting president and chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, has decreed the appointment of Natik Aliyev as the president [previous word in English] of the Azerbaijan State Oil Company.

National Income Falls by 13 Percent

NC1008160193 Baku TURAN in English 1106 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Baku, (August 10) TURAN: As "Zerkalo" newspaper reports today, fall of production and living standards have been continuing in Azerbaijan.

Ministry of Economics informs, within 6 months of current year national income has fell down by 13 per cent in comparison with corresponding period of last year. Volume of gross output has fell down by 10 per cent.

Drop in such leading fields as oil exploration and oil development, light and chemical industries is going on.

This year Azerbaijan has got production on 19 billion roubles less.

Georgia

Shot That Killed Woodruff 'Fired From Within the Vehicle'

AU1108101093 Paris AFP in English 0947 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Moscow, Aug 11 (AFP) - The chief of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze's body guards, Eldar Gogoladze, has been suspended pending a probe into the killing Sunday of a U.S. diplomat in Tbilisi, Interfax said Wednesday [11 August].

Gogoladze was travelling in a jeep with Fred Woodruff, the regional affairs officer in the political section of the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi, when the latter was shot once in the head and killed.

Interfax gave no details on the investigation into the killing.

Sources close to Georgian forensic experts involved in the probe told AFP Tuesday that preliminary indications showed the shot that killed Woodruff was fired from within the vehicle.

A Georgian Interior Ministry official speaking on condition of anonymity had said earlier that the two men were accompanied in the vehicle by two women.

The same official said Gogoladze was inebriated at the time of the incident late Sunday and added he was "known for his excesses" when drunk.

Gogoladze was present Tuesday during ceremonies at the Tbilisi airport where U.S. CIA Director James Woolsey arrived to retrieve Woodruff's body for repatriation to the United States.

Different Versions of Murder Viewed

NC1008172093 Yerevan SNARK in English 1450 GMT 10 Aug 93

["There Are Considered Different Versions of the Murder"—SNARK headline]

[Text] Tbilisi, August 10, (SNARK)—US Embassy to Georgia official Fred Woodruff's corpse has been taken away to the US (reason for his death on August 8 are unknown yet).

Malkhaz Topuria, official of press service of the Georgian defence ministry said to SNARK that there is an evidence that Woodruff was incidentally killed by a Georgian militiaman (there is a road militia post within 400 from the murder scene).

At the same time, Vakhtang Gvaramia, Georgian deputy prosecutor, who is investigating the case, denied the above information.

Shevardnadze at Airport

LD1008150593 Tbilisi IBERIA NEWS AGENCY in Georgian 1420 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Tbilisi 10 August— An Iberia correspondent reports that a United States Boeing aircraft arrived at Tbilisi airport today to take home the body of Fred Woodruff, a U.S. Embassy officer.

The leader of the Georgian state, E. Shevardnadze, and U.S. Embassy staff were at the airport during the departure ceremony.

U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Kent Brown said that this incident would not affect relations between Georgia and the United States, as it was a tragic accident.

Government of Ajaria Resigns

LD1108105393 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] The Presidium of the Ajaria Supreme Soviet has accepted the resignation of the autonomous republic's Council of Ministers. Until a new council of ministers is formed, Ajaria Supreme Soviet Chairman Aslan Abashidze has been charged with carrying out the duties of chairman of the Council of Ministers. He has been given a week to present Presidium of the Supreme Soviet with a proposed new council of ministers.

Shevardnadze Says 'Special Work Regime' Needed

LD1008194893 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] A Georgian Cabinet of Ministers session has been held in Tbilisi with Eduard Shevardnadze as chairman. Correspondent Lado Vachnadze reports that Eduard Shevardnadze said that in order to save the republic from hunger and crisis, the country must switch to a special work regime in both the economic and social spheres. The question of social protection of the populace during a growth in inflation was the subject of particular attention during the session.

It was noted that it will be necessary in the next few days to adopt a decision on an increase in the payment of benefits and compensations. It was necessary to improve relations with Russia in order to solve a number of economic problems, it was said at the session.

Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Leaves for Moscow

NC1008161093 Yerevan SNARK in English 0435 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Tbilisi, August 9 (SNARK)—Tomorrow, on August 10, Mikhail Ukleba, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Georgia, will leave Tbilisi for Moscow with working consultative visit. There will be worked out the agreements and treaties which will determine the relations between Georgia and Russia. Russian Ambassador Feliks Kovalyov [name and title as received] concluded his visit to Georgia on August.

Parliament Member Issues Threat to Russia

MK1008104493 Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No. 89, 10 Aug 93 (signed to print 9 Aug) p 7

[Unattributed report: "Georgian Parliamentarian Promises Russia 'New Afghanistan'"]

[Text] Having accused the Russian side of escalating the war in Abkhazia, Georgia's Parliament Member Dzhaba Ioseliani stated that should the Russian side continue to back the separatists and should Sukhumi come under threat once again, his armed formation would "start a guerrilla war and give Russia a 'new Afghanistan' in Georgia." Georgian Parliament Speaker Vakhtang Goguadze said he did not see anything disturbing in Dzhaba Ioseliani's statement.

Violations of Abkhaz Cease-Fire Reported

LD1108091693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0900 GMT 11 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchyogoleva]

[Text] Sochi August 11 TASS—The sides, in the main, were observing the ceasefire agreement in the past day in the Gumista front, says a report of the press service of the Abkhazian parliament. According to the information of the press centre of the Georgian troops deployed in Abkhazia, there was occassional fire from grenade launchers and automatic guns in the area of Apyanda heights by the Abkhazian side. An Abkhazian source says that last night the Georgian side many times fired on Labra and Atara, populated localities in the Ochamchira district, from guns of tanks and personnel carriers. Casualties are not reported.

Members of the working group for military affairs and security within the joint commission for the settlement in Abkhazia flew from Sochi to Sukhumi today. As was already reported, military experts are to work out a specific plan for the disengagement of the warring sides and for withdrawal of all armed units from the zone of the conflict, as well as a plan to form enlarged provisional monitoring groups with the participation of U.N. observers. The plan will be discussed by a meeting of the joint commission in

Sochi on Thursday. In addition, members of the working group will investigate the incident that occured on Tuesday evening in Sukhumi. Members of the Russian part of the joint commission that began working in Sukhumi came under fire at 21:20 on Tuesday. There is no loss of life.

UN Security Council Observers Arrive

LD1008165093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1523 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Report by correspondent Georgiy Tsviatishvili]

[Text] An advanced group of 10 military observers of the UN Security Council has arrived in Georgia. In the course of three months this group is due to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict zone. Today the UN military experts, together with a Georgian delegation, which is headed by a personal representative of Zhiuli Shartava, the head of state in Sukhumi, arrived in Pitsunda.

A regular session of the Joint Commission on a Settlement to the Conflict in Abkhazia was held in this resort town today. The results of the Pitsunda meeting will become known a little later.

The situation on the line of confrontation between the two sides along the Gumista River remains comparatively quiet. The cease-fire agreement is, in principle, being observed.

Abkhaz Peace Commission Attacked 10 Aug

LD1108085093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0340 GMT 11 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Aug—The working group of the joint commission for a settlement in Abkhazia was fired upon in Sukhumi on Tuesday [11 August] at 2120. Marina Ryklina, a representative of the commission's trilateral press center, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent about this incident today. The group was attacked while it was on the territory of the Sukhumi MVO [Ministry of Higher Education] sanatorium by people who have yet to be identified. No one was injured. Representatives of the joint commission are flying to Sukhumi today to look into the circumstances surrounding the incident.

Abkhaz Commission on Settlement Begins Session 10 Aug

LD1008132993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1044 GMT 10 Aug 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchegoleva]

[Text] Pitsunda, 10 Aug (TASS)—The fourth session of the joint commission on a settlement in Abkhazia got under way today in the "Samshitovaya Roshcha" [box-tree grove] holiday hotel in Pitsunda. Many obervers believe this tripartite meeting could be decisive, because decisions on what are in principle important military issues are to be adopted at it. Sergey Shoygu, the head of the Russian part of the tripartite commission and chairman of Russia's State Committee for Emergency Situations, suggested to representatives of the military leadership of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides that they report on the implementation of the timetable for demilitarizing the conflict zone. This timetable was drawn up in accordance with the ceasefire agreement signed in Sochi on 27 July and envisaged the disbandment and withdrawal of all armed formations from Abkhaz territory within a period of 10 to 15 days from the ceasefire. At the end of today's meeting it will be clear whether the sides intend to fulfil the agreement which was signed.

It is also planned today to discuss the position of the Georgian population living on territory that is being controlled by the Abkhaz side. A report will be heard on yesterday's visit to Gagra by a working group of the joint commission that was studying this problem. Members of the working group noted that part of the Georgian population, fearful of retribution, was forced to leave their normal place of residence. In the opinion of Major-General Sergey Kudinov, the head of the operational headquarters of the joint commission, the human rights violations that are occurring may aggravate the situation in Abkhazia.

Explosion in Marneuli Market Kills 4

NC1108110193 Yerevan SNARK in English 1047 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Tbilisi, August 11 (SNARK)—Today at 8:40 A.M. there was an explosion at the Marneuli market which cause victims: 4 people were killed and 19 were wounded.

According to the preliminary data, SNARK received from information and reconnaissance center, Georgia, the mine was in the rubbish box. The experts of the center headed by Irakyl Batiashvili left for Marneuli.

Emigration Law To Come Into Force 1 Oct

AU1008114893 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 28 Jul 93 p 3

["Decree of the Georgian Parliament on the Law 'on Emigration'"]

[Text] The Georgian Parliament **decrees:**

1. To bring the Republic of Georgia Law on Emigration into force as of 1 October 1993.

2. To entrust the Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers with adopting the appropriate normative acts in connection with bringing this law into force before 1 October 1993.

[Signed] Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, deputy speaker of the Georgian Parliament

[Dated] Tbilisi, 20 July 1993

Law on Emigration Published

AU1008114493 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 28 Jul 93 p 3

["Republic of Georgia Law 'on Emigration'"]

[Text] Chapter I

GENERAL RULES

Article 1. The Right to Emigration

A Georgian citizen has the right to emigrate from the Republic of Georgia or to leave and take up permanent residence in another state. This right cannot be restricted except in cases provided for by Republic of Georgia legislation.

Article 2. The Aim of the Republic of Georgia Law on Emigration

The aim of the Republic of Georgia Law on Emigration is to guarantee Georgian citizens, in accordance with universally recognized norms of international law, the right to leave their country and freely return to it; to determine the rules and conditions enabling Georgian citizens to take up permanent residence in another state (emigration); and also to regulate other relations that have arisen in connection with this question.

Article 3. Legislative Acts Regulating Emigration

Emigration from the Republic of Georgia is regulated by the current law and by other Republic of Georgia legislative acts.

If other rules, different from Republic of Georgia legislation, have been established by an international treaty, the rules of the international treaty are to be applied.

Article 4. The Taking of Property Abroad by a Citizen of the Republic of Georgia

On emigrating, a citizen of the Republic of Georgia has the right to take abroad any personal property, if this is not prohibited by Republic of Georgia legislation.

Chapter II

THE PROCEDURE FOR PROCESSING DOCUMENTS FOR EMIGRATION FROM THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

Article 5. The Passport of a Georgian Citizen

Georgian citizens are to emigrate from the Republic of Georgia using a passport issued by the internal affairs bodies.

Georgian citizens living abroad are to apply for a passport to diplomatic or consular representation of the Republic of Georgia.

The passport, which is a standard one, is valid for leaving the Republic of Georgia to go to any country in the world, and is valid for entering the Republic of Georgia.

The passport is the property of the Republic of Georgia.

In accordance with international treaties to which the Republic of Georgia is a party, a substitute document can be issued in place of the passport.

The procedure for processing and issuing an emigration passport is established by the Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 6. The Period of Validity of a Passport of a Georgian Citizen

The passport of a Georgian citizen is valid for five years from the day of issue.

In order to extend the period of validity of the passport of a Georgian citizen, the interested person is to apply to the diplomatic or consular representation of the Republic of Georgia when abroad, and, when in the territory of Georgia, to the internal affairs bodies.

Article 7. Application for an Emigration Passport

The right to apply for an emigration passport is held by all able-bodied Georgian citizens who have come of age.

In order to receive an emigration passport, the interested person is to apply to the Republic of Georgia internal affairs bodies, following the procedure established by the Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers.

The application contains all information that is to be included in the passport; the application is to be accompanied by the following documents that have been certified by a notary or his equivalent:

1) copy of birth certificate;

2) if children aged between 14 and 18 are leaving together with the person submitting the application, written consent from both the children and their lawful representatives;

3) if children under the age of 18 are leaving together with a lawful representative, and the other lawful representative is remaining in Georgia, the written consent of the latter to the emigration of children under the age of 18.

Article 8. The Emigration of Children Under the Age of 18

Children under the age of 18 can emigrate with their lawful representatives, if they are emigrating in order to join their lawful representatives abroad and if they have the written consent of the latter together with that of the able-bodied adult accompanying them.

If the lawful representatives have not come to an agreement concerning the question of the emigration of children under the age of 18 from the Republic of Georgia, the dispute is to be settled by the judicial process.

Article 9. The Emigration of Incapacitated Persons • Incapacitated persons are prohibited from emigrating without the permission of their lawful representatives and without being accompanied by an able-bodied adult.

Article 10. The Time Limit for Examining an Application for an Emigration Passport

An application for an emigration passport is to be examined within three months of the submission of all the necessary documents.

Article 11. State Duty

On submitting an application for an emigration passport, the applicant is to pay a state duty, the amount and procedure for which are established by the Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 12. Grounds for Restricting the Right to Emigrate from the Republic of Georgia

The interested person may be refused an emigration passport, an extension to the validity of the passport, and also [the right] to cross the border, if:

1) criminal proceedings have been brought against him;

2) the interested person has not served the term of a sentence determined by a court;

3) a civil lawsuit has been brought against him;

4) the person has not fulfilled the obligations placed upon him by the decision of a court, and a treaty on legal aid has not been signed by the Republic of Georgia with the country to which he is heading;

5) a person of age to be conscripted, not having been exempted from call-up, has not completed his military service;

6) based on the nature of his work, a person has knowledge of state or military secrets and the time period established in law linking him to this work has not expired; at the same time, this time period should not exceed five years;

7) on submitting an application for emigration, he presented a false or invalid document.

A decision on the refusal of his application is to be communicated to the citizen in written form within 10 days.

Article 13. Information From State Bodies, Organizations, and Establishments and Departments in Connection With the Emigration of a Georgian Citizen From the Republic of Georgia

Upon an appropriate demand from the internal affairs bodies in connection with examining an application for an emigration passport, state bodies, organizations, and establishments and departments are obliged to present information on the facts indicated in Article 12 of this law.

Article 14. The Right To Appeal Against the Refusal To Issue an Emigration Passport, Extension to the Validity of a Passport, and To Cross the Border

The interested person, who has been refused an emigration passport, an extension to the validity of his passport, and [the right] to cross the border, has the right to appeal against this decision in court, except in those cases provided for by points one, two, three, four, and seven of Article 12 of this law.

Article 15. A Second Examination of an Application for an Emigration Passport

The interested person, who has been refused an emigration passport, may submit a second application with regard to the same question only if the reasons for his having been refused a passport no longer exist.

Article 16. Documents Necessary for Crossing the Border From the Republic of Georgia

On crossing the Republic of Georgia border, Georgian citizens are to have their passports checked and the date on which they crossed the border will be stamped in the passport or substitute document.

In order to cross the border, a citizen has to have a entry visa for the state to which he is going.

Article 17. Entry Into the Republic of Georgia

A Georgian citizen residing abroad has the right to come to the Republic of Georgia at any time without any special permission.

Article 18. Emigration Statistics

Emigration statistics are compiled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that submits this information to the Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers.

[Signed] Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian Parliament-head of state
Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, deputy speaker of the Georgian Parliament
[Dated] Tbilisi, 20 July 1993

Estonia

Defense Forces Taking Over Paldiski From Russian Army

WS1108110193 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1904 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, August 10—Estonia's Defence Forces are taking over the town of Paldiski from the Russian army.

The acting Defence Minister Juri Luik, who visited the town on Monday [9 August], said the town was practically under Estonian control save the nuclear sites and the military training centre. He said the complete takeover of the ports and the garrison was a matter of exchanging formal documents. The Russian side seeks to use the southern port to ship away the nuclear reactors and other military equipment.

By the government's decree, which takes effect on Tuesday, access to Paldiski will be granted to the leading personnel of the central institutions and the Harju district government, advisors and leading specialists, members of the Harju district council, judges, public prosecutors, police officers and servicemen.

By Tuesday the Estonian armed forces had taken over the Russian military township and barracks of the garrison, the deputy chief of staff of Estonia's Defence Forces, Colonel Raul Luks, said. The southern and the northern port, three barracks and the guardhouse will be taken control of next.

The town is patrolled by the Puhja special infantry company. The soldiers, who have been tidying up the barracks of the former Russian garrison, are making preparations for the winter. "The men have food and clothes, there is electricity and water in the house. Now it's up to them how fast they can smarten up their home," Raul Luks said.

Head of the defence Ministry defence policy department Enn Tupp said the ministry has no intention of using most of the 400 Russian military objects in Paldiski. The Defence Ministry is interested only in the northern port, the military township and the barracks, Tupp said.

The main issue for the ministry at the moment is to figure out whom the Russian army property belongs as a number of shady deals have been concluded.

The Estonian Government decided to annul all land and real estate transactions involving the Russian army and, on Tuesday, formed a special commission to enact the decision.

According to the Paldiski city government, there are about 1,000 Russian military remaining in the town while the number of inhabitants is 7.000.

Cabinet Changes Entry Regulations

WS1008145193 Tallinn BNS in English 1034 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] TALLINN, Aug 10, BNS—The Estonian Cabinet introduced a series of changes in the entry regulations for visitors to the former Russian military base of Paldiski. The changes go into effect today.

The town, located some 40 km west of Tallinn, will remain a restricted area until Russia removes the nuclear reactors from its former submarine training center.

The new regulations allow Estonian officials, experts and representatives of the Harju municipal government to enter with the appropriate documents. Other officials can enter Paldiski by producing their certificate of work and a document indicating that they are on an official trip.

Estonian police will regulate entry into the town and local patrols. The Cabinet ordered the local Russian police to cease their activities as of today.

The Cabinet also ordered the commander of Paldiski's Russian garrison to end his military patrols outside the Russian military camps in the area. The Estonian interior ministry and the armed forces must introduce joint patrols of the police and the military, the document says.

The defense ministry will complete the takeover of the Russian military facilities and ensure a guard on the property.

The Cabinet's ruling, which amends this year's April 27 regulations, remains in effect until Dec. 31.

Government Allows Russia To Open Consulate in Narva

WS1108110693 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1904 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, August 10—Estonia's government at its session on Tuesday [10 August] decided to grant Russia permission to open its consulate in mainly Russian-populated border town Narva.

The main obstacle to opening the consulate had been the lack of space in the town. A former kindergarten will serve as the consulate building. Estonia now expects to get rooms for its St.Petersburg consulate.

The government's decision will be followed by a formal exchange of notes.

Russia opened its temporary consulate in Narva in 1993.

Government Joins IFC, Seeks Aid

WS1108110493 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1904 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, August 10—Estonia's ambassador to the United States, Toomas-Hendrik Ilves, on Monday [9 August] signed documents on Estonia's joining the International Financial Corporation (IFC).

Head of the Finance Ministry's international cooperation department, Raivo Maine, said the application to become a member of the IFC, a subdivision of the World Bank, was submitted to the organisation more than a year ago, but the matter was delayed due to the lack of finances. Later in July, the Government allocated money to buy the first IFC shares that cost US $502,000 apiece, Maine said.

Estonia can now expect more assistance from the World Bank. At the end of September, the board of the World Bank will discuss two major projects: renovation of state-owned

cement company, RAS Kunda Tehased, and the Aseri construction materials factory.

The IFC financial plan provides US $30 million for the first stage of development of Kunda Tehased, US $7.2 million for solving the environmental problems, US $8 million for building the Kunda port, and the rest will go to the renovation of the cement technology in the factory. The renovation project for the Aseri factory involves sums of the same magnitude.

Chairman of the board of RAS Kunda Tehased and head of the environment ministry construction development department, Aadu Kana, said the eight million dollars will be used to build a wharf, roads of access, and water constructions to the port.

National Independence Party To Select Defense Minister

WS1108110293 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1904 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, August 10—The board of the Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) and the party's parliamentary faction, who are to decide on the new defence minister, on Tuesday [10 August] reduced to two the number of candidates for the office.

The final decision on who will be the new defence minister lies with the ERSP parliamentary faction, member of the faction Vardo Rumessen said. The future defence minister need not belong to ERSP. "In this case, ERSP will set the national interests above those of the party," Rumessen assured.

"The defence minister must be acceptable to as large a proportion of the defence forces as possible," Rumessen said, adding that the prestige of the ERSP-party now depends on the choice.

The chairman of the Fatherland faction of the parliament, Illar Hallaste, told to a news conference on Tuesday that the appointment of the new defence minister should not break up the ruling coalition. "The future defence minister must have competence in the matters of defence and be able to keep the army away from politics," he explained.

The ERSP will also discuss the candidacy of Arvo Junti, put forward by himself. "We cannot just skip as prominent a politician as he is," Rumessen said.

Commission Rules Police's Use of Surveillance Constitutional

LD1008161393 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1200 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] The bugging of telephones, the monitoring of private correspondence, and the use of other special operational and technical measures by the security police is not in conflict with the constitution. This is the conclusion reached by a temporary Riigikogu [parliament] commission.

The commission monitoring the legality of the security police's work found that the law on police allows the security police to resort to special operational and technical measures up until the adoption of a law on operational surveillance activity.

In order to use the special measures, security police must apply for written permission from a State Court member nominated by the State Court chairman.

The procedure designed by the government to allow the bugging of telephones has created conflicting opinions. Both the article by Juri Kaljuvee, Eenok Kornel, and Jaak Oja published in the PAEVALEHT of 2 August and the parliamentary Center Faction's statement of 9 August claim that it is in conflict with the constitution.

Two Arms Caches Discovered in Tallinn

WS1108115893 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0716 GMT 11 Aug 93

[Text] Wednesday, August 11—The defence police discovered two arms caches in Tallinn on Monday [9 August], seizing one assault rifle, a number of cartridges, a dozen mines, three portable anti-aircraft missiles and a launcher, explosives and fuses. The discovery was made in connection with the investigation of the robbery of assault rifles and pistols from the police on July 28. The owner of the weapons claimed to have bought them from the Russian military.

Lithuania

Russian Negotiators Invited To Return to Vilnius

LD1008123193 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] The Information and Press Department at the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry reported that the Lithuanian state delegation for negotiations with Russia today invited the Russian delegation to come to Vilnius at a convenient time for them.

Drafts of four agreements have been proposed for discussion: The agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian Armed Forces from the territory of Lithuania; the agreement on the regulations for the payments of pensions to former servicemen by Russia; the agreement on economic and trade relations; and the agreement on the military transit of the Russian Armed Forces that are being withdrawn from Germany.

The Russian side can propose the date of the visit, which could be the end of this week or the beginning of next week.

Meanwhile a high-ranking official at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again threatened to revise the timetable of the troop pullout. It was stated: If Lithuania keeps dragging out the signing of the agreement on the withdrawal of the troops by continuing to make preconditions unacceptable to Russia, then the probability will become greater that the timetable of the troops pullout will revised.

This was stated by the high-ranking official at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs while commenting to the Baltic

News Service on the results of the meeting of the Russian and Lithuanian negotiation delegations.

The Russian diplomat, who chose to remain anonymous, agreed with the statements made by Virgilijus Bulovas, chief negotiator in the talks with Russia, that the negotiations in Moscow last week ended with no results. But he rejected the accusations that Russia refused to look for solutions acceptable to both sides. According to him, it is Lithuania that is deliberately making efforts not to sign the agreement until the end of the troops withdrawal, until the time when such an agreement would not be necessary.

As is known, last week similar threats were voiced through the information agencies by another official at the Russian Foreign Ministry, however, these were not confirmed through official channels or by the leadership of the withdrawing Russian troops from Lithuania by word of mouth or action.

Meanwhile it has been stated by the leaders of Lithuania's defense apparatus that it was practically impossible to stop the pullout of troops from Lithuania.

Spokesman Denies Premier's Statement on Russian Flights

WS1108120493 Tallinn BNS in English 1705 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] VILNIUS, Aug 10, BNS—Lithuanian government spokesmen denied statements that the premier "officially pledged himself" to permitting Russian flights in Lithuanian air space.

The prime minister's alleged promise was announced on national television Sunday [8 August] by Ceslovas Stankevicius, a Lithuanian special envoy.

"(The envoy's) statement does not correspond to reality," said a separate statement by a spokesman of the Lithuanian government.

Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius met with Sergey Shakhray, the Russian deputy prime minister, in Kaliningrad July 1. A statement released after the meeting said, "The parties have agreed to expedite the signing of an agreement allowing Russian aircraft to use Lithuanian air-space," according to the spokesman's statement.

The agreement, the press officer says, will have to conform "to the standards of similar international documents" and will have to consider the "interests of both parties."

"The Lithuanian government will seek economically advantageous agreements with the neighboring states," the Cabinet's press officer said and he expressed his regret that "a key diplomat based his statements on rumors instead of official documents."

Government To Pay Nuclear Fuel, Gas Debts to Russia

LD1008214793 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] Within the next few days Lithuania is to repay its debt to Russia in the sum of 28 million dollars for nuclear fuel supplied to the Ignalina nuclear power station.

This has been announced by Romualdas Visokavicius, the chairman of the board of the Bank of Lithuania, at a news conference today.

According to Romualdas Visokavicius, the credit in the sum of 28 million dollars has been granted by a German bank for a period of six months. The money will be transferred directly from Germany to Russia, to the producers of nuclear fuel.

In addition, the chairman of the Lithuanian Bank announced that there were funds to pay off the debt in the sum of 45 million dollars for natural gas. This money, most probably, will be taken from the loan by the European Community to Lithuania in the sum of 60 million dollars.

'Sources' Claim Eidintas To Be New Envoy to U.S.

WS1108120193 Tallinn BNS in English 1927 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] VILNIUS, Aug 10, BNS - Unofficial sources say Lithuania will appoint Alfonsas Eidintas, the deputy director of the Historic Institute of Science Academy, as its new ambassador to the United States, reports the Voice of America.

U.S. authorities have yet to send their approval, said the report.

Justas Paleckis, a presidential advisor on foreign policies, refused to comment on the information.

Jonas Paslauskas, director of the Diplomatic Protocol Department of the foreign ministry, told BNS that, abiding by international practice, information concerning the appointment of new Lithuanian ambassadors is not officially publicized until an the foreign state agrees to accept the diplomat.

As reported earlier, Ambassador Stasys Lozoraitis has been recalled from the post by a presidential decree, but remains in Washington until Lithuania appoints a new ambassador.

Statistics Department Reports Sales, Inflation Figures

LD1008215293 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 10 Aug 93

[Text] The sale of products by Lithuania's enterprises increased in July for the first time this year. The Statistical Department reports that the sale of products in July was three percent higher than in June. Hitherto, the sale of industrial products used to be declining.

The Statistical Department also reports that the transport of goods by rail, air, and rivers increased in July, but declined by road and sea.

The purchasing of agricultural products, excluding milk, declined sharply. The purchasing of animals and poultry declined in July by one fifth, and of eggs —by almost by one third compared to June. The purchasing of milk increased by two percent, according to statistical data, the level of inflation has been declining. In May inflation was reaching 12.7 percent, in June—more than six percent, and in July the level of inflation was 2.9 percent.